Board reform versus profits: The impact of ratings on the adoption of governance practices

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2017, Pages 815-833

  Rowley, Timothy J ^a   Shipilov, Andrew V ^b   Greve, Henrich R ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b INSEAD   (France)

^c INSEAD   (Singapore)

Author keywords

aspirations; corporate governance; networks; performance feedback; ratings

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; NETWORKS (CIRCUITS); RATING;

ADVERSE EFFECT; ASPIRATIONS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS; PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK;

PROFITABILITY;

EID: 84992699550     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2545     Document Type: Article

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