Let the right "one" win: Policy lessons from the new economics of platforms

Competition Policy International

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 28-51

  Weyl, E Glen ^a   White, Alexander ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b Tsinghua University   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84971496522     PISSN: 15540189     EISSN: 15546853     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (62)

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46. A more detailed and richer discussion of these issues has appeared in the context of the platformlike properties of languages in the analysis of Edward P. Lazear, Avinash Dixit, and David Singh Grewal. The optimal strength of interventions certainly relates to the nature of user heterogeneity, the speed of expected future learning through fragmentation compared to the value of network effects (the explore v. exploit tradeoff), and the nature of distortions induced by the competitive environment (how strong are excessive incentives for fragmentation). Edward P. Lazear, Culture and Language, 107(S6) J. POL. ECON. S95-S126 (1999)
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