A dynamic oligopoly with collusion and price wars

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 207-236

  Fershtman, Chaim ^a   Pakes, Ariel ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034373060     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2601038     Document Type: Article

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