Understanding game theory: Introduction to the analysis of many agent systems with competition and cooperation

Understanding Game Theory: Introduction to the Analysis of Many Agent Systems with Competition and Cooperation

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-286

  Kolokoltsov, Vassili N ^a   Malafeyev, Oleg A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b ST PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84967604553     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1142/7564     Document Type: Book

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