Efficient distributions of arms-control inspection effort

Naval Research Logistics

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-27

  Avenhaus, Rudolf ^a   Kilgour, D Marc ^b  

^a BUNDESWEHR UNIVERSITY MUNICH   (Germany)

^b WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Arms control; Detection function; Game theory; IAEA; Inspection; NPT; Safeguards; Verification

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; INSPECTION; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; NUCLEAR MATERIALS SAFEGUARDS; OPERATIONS RESEARCH; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION; DETECTION FUNCTION; VERIFICATION;

AMMUNITION;

EID: 1142293237     PISSN: 0894069X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/nav.10096     Document Type: Article

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