The private value single item bisection auction

Economic Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 107-118

  Grigorieva, Elena ^a   Herings, P Jean Jacques ^a   Müller, Rudolf ^a   Vermeulen, Dries ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Binary search; Extensive form games of incomplete information; Information revelation; Single item auction; Weakly dominant strategy

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750514038     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0032-z     Document Type: Article

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