Game theoretic applications to fisheries

International Series in Operations Research and Management Science

Volumn 99, Issue , 2016, Pages 201-215

  Kaitala, Veijo ^a   Lindroos, Marko ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Coalitions; Cooperative games; Dynamic games; Non cooperative games; Static games

Indexed keywords

EID: 84955113255     PISSN: 08848289     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (29)

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