Effort subsidies and entry deterrence in transboundary fisheries

Natural Resource Modeling

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 369-389

  Quinn, John ^a   Ruseski, Gorazd ^b  

^a ST FRANCIS XAVIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Entry deterrence; Fisheries subsidies; Non cooperative games

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542732907     PISSN: 08908575     EISSN: 19397445     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1939-7445.2001.tb00063.x     Document Type: Article

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