The Norwegian spring-spawning herring fishery: A Stylized game model

Marine Resource Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 293-319

  Arnason, Ragnar ^a   Magnusson, Gylfi ^a   Agnarsson, Sveinn ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ICELAND   (Iceland)

Author keywords

Fisheries economics; Fisheries game theory; High seas fishing gratory fish stocks; Multi nation fisheries games; Natural resource extra games

Indexed keywords

EID: 53449101251     PISSN: 07381360     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/mre.15.4.42629328     Document Type: Article

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