Nash equilibria in a coalition game of the Norwegian spring-spawning herring fishery

Marine Resource Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 321-339

  Lindroos, Marko ^a   Kaitala, Veijo ^b  

^a NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

^b UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ   (Finland)

Author keywords

Cooperative games; Fisheries; New member problem; Norwegian spring spawning herring

Indexed keywords

EID: 13844312654     PISSN: 07381360     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/mre.15.4.42629329     Document Type: Article

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