When to ratify an environmental agreement: The case of high seas fisheries

International Game Theory Review

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 55-68

  Kaitala, Veijo ^a   Lindroos, Marko ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Cooperative agreements; Differential games; Fisheries; International environmental agreements; Ratification

Indexed keywords

EID: 13844317756     PISSN: 02191989     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0219198904000071     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (8)

1. Barrett, S. [1994]. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements", Oxford Econ. Papers 46, 878-894.
2. Bjørndal, T. and Lindroos, M. [2004]. "International management of North Sea herring", Environmental and Resource Economics, forthcoming.
3. Clark, C. [1980]. "Restricted access to common-property fishery resources: a game-theoretic analysis", In Dynamic Optimisation and Mathematical Economics, ed. Pan-Tai Liu (New York: Plenum Press), pp. 117-132.
4. Clark, C. and Munro, G. [1975]. "The economics of fisheries and modern capital theory: a simplified approach", J. Environmental Econ. and Management 2, 92-106.
5. Flåm, S. and Jourani, A. [2001]. "Noncooperative games involving cooperation", Working Papers in Economics No. 0901, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
6. Fredriksson, P. and Gaston, N. [2000]. "Ratification of the 1992 climate change convention: what determines legislative delay?", Public Choice 104, 345-368.
7. Kaitala, V. and Pohjola, M. [1988]. "Optimal recovery of a shared resource stock: a differential game model with efficient memory equilibria", Natural Resource Modeling 3, 91-119.
8. United Nations [1995]. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Sixth Session, A/CONF.164/37, New York 24.7.-4.8. 〈URL:gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/LOS/CONF164/164_37.TXT〉.