An enforcement-coalition model: Fishermen and authorities forming coalitions

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 169-194

  Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk ^a   Lindroos, Marko ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Fisheries management; Quota enforcement; Self enforcing policy

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; LAW ENFORCEMENT; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT;

COALITION FORMATION; FISHERIES MANAGEMENT; QUOTA ENFORCEMENT; SELF-ENFORCING POLICY;

FISHERIES;

FISHERY MANAGEMENT; QUOTA SYSTEM;

ATLANTIC OCEAN; BALTIC SEA;

EID: 33750071980     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9012-4     Document Type: Article

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