Managing the Northern atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries: The stability of the UN fish stock agreement solution

Marine Resource Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 341-360

  Brasão, Ana ^a   Duarte, Clara Costa ^b   Cunha E Sá, Maria A ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDADE LUSÓFONA DE HUMANIDADES E TECNOLOGIAS   (Portugal)

^b UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Agreement solution; Feedback equilibrium; Markov strategies; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 3843119113     PISSN: 07381360     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/mre.15.4.42629330     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Basar, T., and G. Olsder 1995. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. Philadelphia, PA: Siam: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
2. Campbell, H. 1999. Maximizing the Value of a Transboundary Resource: The Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries. Paper presented at the Conference on Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and the UN Agreement, Bergen.
3. Dockner, E.J., and N. Van Long. 1993. International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Non-cooperative Strategies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24: 13-29.
4. Duarte, C., A. Brasão, and P. Pintassilgo. 2000. Management of Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna: An Application of C-Games. Marine Resource Economics 15(1): 12-36.
5. ICCAT. 1996. Statistical Bulletin, Volume 26.
6. Kaitala, V., and M. Lindroos. 1998. Sharing the Benefits of Cooperation in High Seas Fisheries: A Characteristic Function Game Approach. Natural Resource Modeling 11: 87-108.
7. Li, E. 1998. Cooperative High-Seas Straddling Stock Agreement as a Characteristic Function Game. Marine Resource Economics 13(4): 247-58.
8. Munro, G. 1998. The Management of High Seas Fisheries and the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: A Review. University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
9. -. 1999. An Economic Review of the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Paper presented at the Conference on Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and the UN Agreement, Bergen.
10. Myerson, R. 1991. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflicts. Harvard University Press.
11. Orebach, P., K. Sigurjonsson, and T.L. McDorman. 1998. The 1995 United Nations Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: Management, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 13: 119-41. (Pubitemid 28392968)
12. Pintassilgo, P. 1999. The New Member Problem in the Cooperative Management of the Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna. Working Paper No. 373, FEUNL
13. Ploeg, F. Van Der, and A. de Zeeuw. 1992. International Aspects of Pollution Control. Environmental and Resource Economics 2: 117-40.
14. Provencher, B., and O. Burt. 1993. The Externalities Associated with the Common Property Exploitation of Groundwater. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24: 139-58.
15. Rubio, S.J., and B. Casino. 1998. Competitive Versus Efficient Extraction of a Common Property Resource: The Groundwater Case. Presented at the First World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, Venice, June 25-27.
16. Tahindro, A. 1999. Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: A Legal Review of the 1995 United Nations Fish Stock Agreement. Presented at the Conference on Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and the UN Agreement, Bergen.
17. Xepapadeas, A. 1995. Managing the International Commons: Resource Use and Pollution Control. Environmental and Resource Economics 5: 375-91. (Pubitemid 26429410)