The dynamics of bureaucracy in the U.S. government

The Dynamics of Bureaucracy in the U.S. Government

Volumn , Issue , 2015, Pages 1-195

  Workman, Samuel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84952933602     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781107447752     Document Type: Book

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