Designing markets: Why competitive bidding and auctions in government often fail to deliver

Policy Studies Journal

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 61-85

  Whitford, Andrew B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GOVERNMENT; MARKET; PRICE DYNAMICS;

EID: 33947666074     PISSN: 0190292X     EISSN: 15410072     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2007.00207.x     Document Type: Article

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