Privacy and truthful equilibrium selection for aggregative games

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 9470, Issue , 2015, Pages 286-299

  Cummings, Rachel ^a   Kearns, Michael ^b   Roth, Aaron ^b   Wu, Zhiwei Steven ^b  

^a California Institute of Technology   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Differential privacy; Equilibrium computation; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; GAME THEORY; INTERNET; MACHINE DESIGN;

BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM; DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACIES; EX POST NASH EQUILIBRIUM; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; LINEAR OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS; MECHANISM DESIGN; PURE STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUMS; REVELATION PRINCIPLE;

COMPUTER GAMES;

EID: 84951875163     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_21     Document Type: Conference Paper

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