Political institutions and government spending behavior: theory and evidence from Iran

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2016, Pages 522-549

  Dizaji, Sajjad F ^a   Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza ^b   Naghavi, Alireza ^c  

^a TARBIAT MODARES UNIVERSITY   (Iran)

^b PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Education spending; Iran; Military spending; Political institutions; VAR modeling

Indexed keywords

EID: 84944710898     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: 15736970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10797-015-9378-8     Document Type: Article

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