Iranian-Oil-Free Zone and international oil prices

Energy Economics

Volumn 45, Issue , 2014, Pages 364-372

  Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza ^a,c   Raeisian Parvari, Mozhgan ^b  

^a PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

^b CESIFO   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Iran; Oil price; Sanction; VAR model

Indexed keywords

COSTS; IMPULSE RESPONSE; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; INVESTMENTS; VALUE ENGINEERING;

IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS; INTERNATIONAL MARKETS; IRAN; OIL PRICES; SANCTION; VAR MODELS; VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION; VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL;

CRUDE OIL PRICE;

ENERGY MARKET; EXPORT; GAS PRODUCTION; GAS SUPPLY; OIL PRODUCTION; OIL SUPPLY; PRICE DETERMINATION; PRICE DYNAMICS; CRUDE OIL; DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS; NUMERICAL MODEL; VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION;

IRAN;

EID: 84907301588     PISSN: 01409883     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2014.08.004     Document Type: Article

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