Spending priorities and democratic rule in Latin America

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 427-452

  Lebovic, James H ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035607989     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045004002     Document Type: Article

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