Political competition, electoral participation and public finance in 20th century Latin America

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 181-200

  Aidt, Toke S ^a,b   Eterovic, Dalibor S ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b CESIFO   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSIDAD ADOLFO IBÁÑEZ   (Chile)

Author keywords

Literacy requirements; Political competition; Political participation; Size of government; The extension of the franchise; Women's suffrage

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952693724     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.06.006     Document Type: Article

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