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2
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85191975838
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Common-law courts in a civil-law system: The role of United States federal courts in interpreting the constitution and laws
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Amy Gutmann ed.
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See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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(1997)
A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
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Scalia, A.1
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3
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Chief Judge, N.Y. Court of appeals, state courts at the dawn of a new century: Common law courts reading statutes and constitutions, the Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on state courts & social justice (Mar. 31, 1995)
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6
-
Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge, N.Y. Court of Appeals, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, The Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts & Social Justice (Mar. 31, 1995), in 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1995).
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, vol.70
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Kaye, J.S.1
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4
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84874364796
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A judicial traditionalist confronts Justice Brennan's School of judicial philosophy, Okla. City. U. School of law William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on state constitutional law & government (Oct. 18, 2007)
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280
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Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts Justice Brennan's School of Judicial Philosophy, Okla. City. U. School of Law William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Constitutional Law & Government (Oct. 18, 2007), in 33 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 263, 280 (2008).
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, pp. 263
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Young, R.P.1
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6
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84942913446
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A judicial traditionalist confronts the common law
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302
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Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts the Common Law, 8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 299, 302 (2004).
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Tex. Rev. L. & Pol.
, vol.8
, pp. 299
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Young, R.P.1
-
7
-
-
84874345891
-
Statutes in common law courts
-
522-36
-
See Kaye, supra note 3, at 6 (linking nonformalist interpretation to a state court's role as "keepers of the common law"); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 479, 522-36 (2013) (exploring the effect state courts' undisputed common law powers have on interpretive method compared to federal courts of limited jurisdiction)
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Tex. L. Rev.
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Pojanowski, J.A.1
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8
-
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0346975675
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The common law and statutes
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225 [hereinafter Strauss, The Common Law]
-
Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 225, 225 (1999) [hereinafter Strauss, The Common Law] (arguing that "our fundamental commitment to the common law... is inconsistent with" textualist statutory interpretation).
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, vol.70
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-
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Strauss, P.L.1
-
9
-
-
33749478653
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Classical common law jurisprudence (Part II)
-
17-21 [hereinafter Postema II]
-
The aim here is not to establish that sixteenth- and seventeenth-century common lawyers were unwavering textualists or original intentionalists in statutory interpretation. That was not likely the case. See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 Oxford U. Commonwealth L.J. 1, 17-21 (2003) [hereinafter Postema II] (describing Hale's approach to statutory interpretation in relatively nonformal terms).
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Oxford U. Commonwealth L.J.
, vol.3
, pp. 1
-
-
Postema, G.J.1
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10
-
-
84920486343
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A brief history of equitable interpretation in the common law system
-
67, 85 Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Tom Campbell eds.
-
But see generally Jim Evans, A Brief History of Equitable Interpretation in the Common Law System, in Legal Interpretation in Democratic States 67, 67, 85 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Tom Campbell eds., 2002) (challenging broad claims about common lawyers' departures from faithful agency in statutory interpretation).
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Legal Interpretation in Democratic States
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Evans, J.1
-
11
-
-
62849122688
-
The casus omissus: A pre-history of statutory analogy
-
93
-
Nor does this analysis rest on the already established point that many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century common law jurists took formal approaches to statutory interpretation. See Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, 20 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 45, 93 (1994) ("[T]he 'equity of the statute' fell victim to the sovereignty of Parliament.")
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Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.
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-
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Baade, H.W.1
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12
-
-
0348050646
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Textualism and the equity of the statute
-
53-54
-
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 53-54 (2001) ("The shift away from equitable interpretation had become perceptible during the eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century, the trend was unmistakable.").
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Colum. L. Rev.
, vol.101
, pp. 1
-
-
Manning, J.F.1
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13
-
-
69749124995
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All about words: Early understandings of the "Judicial power" in statutory interpretation, 1776-1806
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998-1009
-
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 990, 998-1009 (2001).
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, vol.101
, pp. 990
-
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Eskridge, W.N.1
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14
-
-
0042234794
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Is tobacco a drug? Administrative agencies as common law courts
-
1019-20
-
See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 Duke L.J. 1013, 1019-20 (1998) ("[A]gencies have become modern America's common law courts, and properly so.").
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Duke L.J.
, vol.47
, pp. 1013
-
-
Sunstein, C.R.1
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15
-
-
84925451999
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-
See Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 28-29 (2014) ("American administrative law revives the extralegal government familiar from the royal prerogative.... it restores a version of the absolute prerogative... that purported to bind and that flourished before the development of constitutional law.").
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Is Administrative Law Unlawful?
, pp. 28-29
-
-
Hamburger, P.1
-
16
-
-
84911147294
-
Formalism
-
511-20
-
See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 511-20 (1988) (distinguishing this understanding of formalism from the version associated with late nineteenth-century common lawyers like Christopher Columbus Langdell). This does not mean formalists never apply standards or creatively develop the law. When legislation is unclear, prescribes a standard, or otherwise confers decision making authority to the interpreter, a formalist will exercise that judgment within the confines of other clear rules.
-
(1988)
Yale L.J.
, vol.97
, pp. 509
-
-
Schauer, F.1
-
17
-
-
38049085287
-
The anti-formalist
-
1886, 1890-94
-
See David A. Strauss, The Anti-Formalist, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1885, 1886, 1890-94 (2007) (characterizing the approach of Judge Richard Posner). Formalism is often contrasted with "functionalism," but the label's affiliation with social science and instrumentalism does not chime with some nonformalist approaches. For example, Ronald Dworkin is no formalist, but his celebration of high principle and broad moral vision is hardly functionalist.
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U. Chi. L. Rev.
, vol.74
, pp. 1885
-
-
Strauss, D.A.1
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18
-
-
79951717991
-
-
908 F.2d 1312, 1333-37 7th Cir.
-
See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1333-37 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting).
-
(1990)
United States v. Marshall
-
-
-
19
-
-
84934454328
-
Dynamic statutory interpretation
-
1554-55
-
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1554-55 (1987) (arguing that "federal courts should interpret statutes in light of their current as well as historical context" and that "[d]ynamic interpretation is most appropriate when the statute is old yet still the source of litigation, is generally phrased, and faces significantly changed societal problems or legal contexts").
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U. Pa. L. Rev.
, vol.135
, pp. 1479
-
-
Eskridge, W.N.1
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21
-
-
0040283174
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From the big sleep to the big heat: The revival of theory in statutory interpretation
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247
-
Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 241, 247 (1992) (arguing that "[t]o defend Weber, then, one needed a theory of statutory interpretation" more elaborate than mere invocation of spirit).
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Minn. L. Rev.
, vol.77
, pp. 241
-
-
Frickey, P.P.1
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22
-
-
84898886375
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Private law in the gaps
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1719-20
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See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Private Law in the Gaps, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 1689, 1719-20 (2014).
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Fordham L. Rev.
, vol.82
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-
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Pojanowski, J.A.1
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23
-
-
84937316924
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Foreword: Law as equilibrium
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29 n.6
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see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 29 n.6 (1994) ("Stable equilibrium is the common law ideal, best exemplified at the Supreme Court level in admiralty cases" like Moragne.).
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Harv. L. Rev.
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, pp. 26
-
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Eskridge, W.N.1
Frickey, P.P.2
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24
-
-
78751618537
-
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512 U.S. 532, 563
-
See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 563 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (approving of a method that would "evolve[] not through a 'rules first' approach, but in the traditional, fact-bound, case-by-case common-law way")
-
(1994)
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall
-
-
-
25
-
-
84867064344
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-
458 U.S. 564, 578
-
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 578 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
-
(1982)
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors
-
-
-
27
-
-
84942943151
-
-
816 A.2d 562, 581, 585 Conn.
-
Id. at 26. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Connecticut's rejection of the plain meaning rule traced its purposive approach's roots to the common law classic Heydon's Case. State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 581, 585 (Conn. 2003).
-
(2003)
Heydon's Case. State v. Courchesne
-
-
-
30
-
-
84942919457
-
-
872 P.2d 859, 862-63 N.M.
-
see also Gandy v. Wal-Mart Stores, 872 P.2d 859, 862-63 (N.M. 1994) (using "public policy" manifested in a discrimination statute to give rise to an additional common law tort action for retaliatory discharge).
-
(1994)
Gandy v. Wal-Mart Stores
-
-
-
32
-
-
84927034304
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Reasoned decisions and legal theory
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134 Douglas E. Edlin ed.
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David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, in Common Law Theory 134, 134 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007).
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Common Law Theory
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Dyzenhaus, D.1
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33
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26444541003
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Dworkin's "Empire"
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177
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see George C. Christie, Dworkin's "Empire," 36 Duke L.J. 157, 177 (1987) (reviewing Dworkin, supra note 28) ("In short, Hercules aims to make the legislative story, as a whole, as good as it can be."). Dworkin does distinguish between legislation and common law adjudication. For him, adjudication is primarily concerned with questions of principle and individual rights, whereas the legislature can make "policy" decisions that roughly promote general or particular interests. See Dworkin, supra note 28, at 221-24, 410. An ideal judge will proceed differently "when a statute rather than a set of law reports has been placed before him," but only because a judge interpreting legislation can factor in not just legal principles, but also policy. Id. at 337.
-
(1987)
Duke L.J.
, vol.36
, pp. 157
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Christie, G.C.1
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34
-
-
84859628608
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Legislative intent in law's empire
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444-50
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cf. Richard Ekins, Legislative Intent in Law's Empire, 24 Ratio Juris 435, 444-50 (2011) (defending a concept of original intent immune from Dworkin's criticism).
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Ratio Juris
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, pp. 435
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Ekins, R.1
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35
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-
32044457967
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What divides textualists from purposivists?
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91-109
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cf. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 91-109 (2006) (identifying adherence to clear semantic meaning over background policy context as textualism's central differentiating tenet).
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Manning, J.F.1
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36
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84896306930
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Hard cases
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See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1058 (1975) ("[J]udges neither should be nor are deputy legislators, and the familiar assumption, that when they go beyond political decisions already made by someone else they are legislating, is misleading.").
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Harv. L. Rev.
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Dworkin, R.1
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37
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0007021973
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The common law in the United States
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12
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Id. at 238 (quoting Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12 (1936)).
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Harv. L. Rev.
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Stone, H.F.1
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38
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0346787086
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On resegregating the worlds of statute and common law
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527-28 [hereinafter Strauss, Resegregating]
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Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 429, 527-28 [hereinafter Strauss, Resegregating].
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Strauss, P.L.1
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40
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79955375081
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Reading the legal process
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Anthony J. Sebok, Reading The Legal Process, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1571, 1592 (1996)
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Sebok, A.J.1
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41
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0004257004
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see also Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 258 (1995) ("Hart and Sacks purport to favour neither common law nor legislation,... yet they seem to display a peculiar preference for the judicial decision.").
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Patterns of American Jurisprudence
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Duxbury, N.1
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42
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77950529885
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Intent, clear statements, and the common law: Statutory interpretation in the supreme court
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Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892, 913 (1982).
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, pp. 892
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-
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43
-
-
84942929116
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at 6
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The author of this unsigned note is the now-prominent law professor Richard Pildes. See Richard H. Pildes, CV, at 6, http://its.law.nyu.edu/faculty/profiles/CVFiles/vitawithoutlectures.pdf.
-
CV
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Pildes, R.H.1
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44
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84926505522
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The legitimacy of (Some) federal common law
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[hereinafter Nelson, Legitimacy]
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A notable exception is Professor Caleb Nelson, whose inclination toward formalism does not lead to hostility toward common law. See generally Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Nelson, Legitimacy]
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Va. L. Rev.
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Nelson, C.1
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45
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33646576229
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The persistence of general law
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[hereinafter Nelson, Persistence]
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Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (2006) [hereinafter Nelson, Persistence] (explaining the continued relevance of unwritten law in the federal system)
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Colum. L. Rev.
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Nelson, C.1
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46
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84879222770
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State and federal models of the interaction between statutes and unwritten law
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[hereinafter Nelson, State and Federal Models]
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Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657 (2013) [hereinafter Nelson, State and Federal Models].
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Nelson, C.1
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47
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Second-generation textualism
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See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1287, 1288 (2010)
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Manning, J.F.1
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48
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232
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see also Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 231, 232 (noting the rise of such formalism in the Supreme Court and offering "a plausible normative argument supporting" this development).
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Schauer, F.1
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49
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77950381119
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550 U.S. 81, 122
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See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't. of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 122 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that courts should interpret "the law as Congress has written it, not as we would wish it to be"); see also id. ("The only sure indication of what Congress intended is what Congress enacted; and even if there is a difference between the two, the rule of law demands that the latter prevail.").
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Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't. of Educ.
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50
-
-
0012873196
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532 U.S. 275, 287
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Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001)
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Alexander v. Sandoval
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52
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0041453152
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The role of original intent in statutory construction
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65
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See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, 59, 65 (1988) ("We should look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words.").
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Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
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, pp. 59
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Easterbrook, F.H.1
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53
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84859076105
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Statutes' domains
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544
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Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983).
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Easterbrook, F.H.1
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54
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Id. at 534 n.2 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 811-32 (1982)).
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Easterbrook, F.H.1
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55
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84942914422
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123 F.3d 490, 553 7th Cir.
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Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 553 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
-
(1997)
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am.
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56
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-
84898892849
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791 N.W.2d 853, 879-80 Mich.
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O'Neal v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr.
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57
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84942886623
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The art of statutory construction: Texas style
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342-48
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See Ron Beal, The Art of Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 64 Baylor L. Rev. 339, 342-48 (2012).
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Beal, R.1
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58
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See John F. Manning, Response, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1648, 1662-63 (2001).
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Manning, J.F.1
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59
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0037791008
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The absurdity doctrine
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The greatest role that orthodox textualists will give to legislative intent is the minimal intention that a speaker wishes to be understood pursuant to the community's objective, conventional norms of speech in the given context. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2457-58 & n.258 (2003)
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Manning, J.F.1
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60
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(citing Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism 249, 257-60 (Robert P. George ed., 1996)).
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The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism
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Raz, J.1
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62
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992
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cf. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, "Is That English You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 967, 992 (2004) (arguing that textualism is best understood as a rule-like method for identifying legislative intent)
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Alexander, L.1
Prakash, S.2
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63
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18444417148
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349
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Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 349 (2005) (same).
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Va. L. Rev.
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Nelson, C.1
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64
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117 n.90, 120
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see also Donald L. Drakeman, Charting a New Course in Statutory Interpretation: A Commentary on Richard Ekins' The Nature of Legislative Intent, 24 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 107, 117 n.90, 120 (2014) (noting some practical similarities despite sharp theoretical differences between Ekins and textualists like John Manning)
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Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
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Drakeman, D.L.1
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Hillel Y. Levin, Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love, 30 Const. Comment. 89, 96-99 (2015) (reviewing Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent (2012)) (noting the practical similarities between Ekins's intentionalism and Justice Scalia's textualism).
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Levin, H.Y.1
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see also Paul Yowell, Legislation, Common Law, and the Virtue of Clarity, in Modern Challenges to the Rule of Law (Richard Ekins ed., 2011) (identifying ways in which the clarity of legislative direction promotes rule-of-law values better than does the common law).
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2007
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Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1565, 1575, 1590-91 (2010).
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Id. at 1598-99. Merrill raises similar points while arguing that federal courts should have only limited inherent common law powers. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 12-32 (1985)
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Hedley, T.1
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74
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Common lawyers' skepticism toward legislation did not die in the seventeenth century. See, e.g., James Coolidge Carter, Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function 221 (1907) ("The popular estimate of the possibilities for good which may be realised through the enactment of law is, in my opinion, greatly exaggerated.").
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Carter, J.C.1
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75
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0004015503
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Law and Disagreement
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Waldron, J.1
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see also Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation 1 (1999) (positing that contemporary jurisprudence lacks a "model that is capable of making normative sense of legislation as a genuine form of law, of the authority that it claims, and of the demands that it makes on the other actors in a legal system").
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The Dignity of Legislation
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78
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Gale
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See, e.g., James C. Carter, The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law 6 (Gale 2015) (1884) (contrasting a common law that by process of "natural growth ... springs up from, and is made by, the people" with "Codes, enacted by the arbitrary power of the sovereign, or by the authority of a legislative assembly").
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The Proposed Codification of our Common Law
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Carter, J.C.1
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79
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See id.; see also Joseph Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis 100-01 (2003) ("Custom and statute do not differ in their efficient cause and its efficacy, but [rather] in their mode and form.").
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Canning, J.1
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81
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St. Germain, C.1
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82
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See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Seldon, Hale 103 Yale L.J. 1651, 1698 (1994).
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83
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Reflections by the Lrd. Cheife Justice Hale on Mr. Hobbes His Dialogue of the Lawe (1835), reprinted in 5 509
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Reflections by the Lrd. Cheife Justice Hale on Mr. Hobbes His Dialogue of the Lawe (1835), reprinted in 5 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 500, 509 (1927).
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A History of English Law
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Holdsworth, W.S.1
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Id. at 4; see also Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 51-52 (2008) (explaining the classical understanding of common law as a form of custom "recorded in popular memory" and instantiated in the "use and practice" of the courts)
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Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Theory and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law 359, 373 (1987) (identifying and embracing "the traditional notion of the common law as custom, which was standard form in the older writers" like Hale and Blackstone).
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Legal Theory and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law
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Simpson, B.1
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Some roots of our notion of precedent
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Precedent in Law
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Postema, G.J.1
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87
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26044479686
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Cf. Geoffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament 109 (1999) (stating for many common lawyers "the authority of the common law and that of Parliament were one and the same: the common law embodied the wisdom of the community, as expressed in immemorial customs," while that wisdom "lives still in that which the law calls the 'reason of the kingdom,' the votes and ordinances of Parliament").
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Goldsworthy, G.1
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91
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33
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see also Eben Moglen, Legal Fictions and Common Law Legal Theory: Some Historical Reflections, 10 Tel-Aviv U. Stud. L. 33, 33 (1990) ("[T]he distinguishing marks of the common law... are its resistance to systematization, its refusal to consider more than the case at hand, and [its resistance to] attempts at 'academic' or comprehensively analytical statements of substantive rules and their presuppositions.").
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368
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Coke, E.1
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96
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451 U.S. 304, 312
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See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) ("Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision.") (citations omitted). See generally Nelson, State and Federal Models, supra note 77 (discussing state court use of common law to resolve silences in statutes, unlike federal courts which find answers in the statute itself); Pojanowski, supra note 7 (examining federal courts' lack of common law power, as opposed to state court powers, and their treatment of statutes).
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(1981)
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois
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97
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70349875221
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284
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See Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not Reading Statutes, 10 Green Bag 2d 283, 284 (2007) (noting that rather than looking to authoritative session laws published in serial form in the United States Statutes at Large, lawyers overwhelmingly use the U.S. Code, which "is-no disrespect intended - a Frankenstein's monster of session laws").
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Green Bag 2d
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, pp. 283
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Dorsey, T.A.1
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98
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Legislating with integrity
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386
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See Jeremy Waldron, Legislating with Integrity, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 373, 386 (2003)
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99
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424
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See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 424 (2005) ("[The legislative process] conditions [Congress's] ability to translate raw policy impulses or intentions into finished legislation. For them, intended meaning never emerges unfiltered; it must survive a process that includes committee approval, logrolling, the need for floor time, threatened filibusters, conference committees, veto threats, and the like.").
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0011674694
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See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 49-50 (1991) ("Legislatures apparently use a variety of structures, rules, and norms to ameliorate the problem of cycling majorities. As a result, legislatures possess 'structure-induced equilibrium.'"); id. at 50 ("[These] various institutional features of legislatures may promote stability and coherence."). For a discussion of shifting views in public and social choice theory about legislative rationality, see Manning, supra note 79, at 1293-303.
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bk. III, ch. 11, at 66-68 Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
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Politics
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Competing presumptions about statutory competence
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2039
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See John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions about Statutory Competence, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2009, 2039 (2006) ("[P]olitical scientists have shown that by dividing the legislative process among three institutions answering to distinct constituencies, the bicameralism and presentment requirements... in effect create a supermajority requirement.... [That requirement] assign[s] political minorities extraordinary power to stop (or at least slow) the passage of legislation and, more important, to insist upon compromise as the price of their assent." (footnote omitted)).
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A Matter of Principle
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Dworkin, R.1
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104
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34248577707
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The textualization of precedent
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See Simpson, supra note 160, at 24 (hypothesizing that the "breakdown in the cohesion of the common law" and the accompanying press for authoritative doctrinal rules stems in part from the fact that it is no longer overseen by "12 men in scarlet," but rather "well over a hundred"); Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1187, 1187-88 (2006) (describing how judicial opinions have become more formal in explaining their holdings and how that has affected practicing lawyers).
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Even when it succeeds, congress fails
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Wash. Post
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Kaiser, R.G.1
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Obama assails house inaction on immigration
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David Nakamura & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama Assails House Inaction on Immigration, Wash. Post, July 1, 2014, at A3 ("If Congress will not do their job, at least we can do ours.").
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Wash. Post
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Nakamura, D.1
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108
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84983945935
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The traditionality of statutes
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30
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This may be more a difference of degree than kind. Even if Congress is unconstrained by the work of previous legislation, and even if courts are not strongly inclined to seek global coherence, it is hard for a legislature to escape the practical and interpretive effects of other legislation, especially in instances of ambiguity or vagueness. See Martin Krygier, The Traditionality of Statutes, 1 Ratio Juris 20, 30 (1988) ("Statutes arrive into legal orders in which much of the available space is filled.... [W]hat they do not change will remain. Where it is deemed relevant they will be read in light of what remains. And that is usually a lot.").
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Ratio Juris
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Krygier, M.1
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109
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0347803880
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Administrative common law in judicial review
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189-211
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Again, this may be a difference of degree given the role the jury plays (or used to play) in common law systems or even judicial deference to administrative interpretations of unclear statutory provisions. Regarding the latter, Congress is the formal delegator, but given that the legislature's delegation is usually implicit (or a "fiction" in the words of Justice Scalia), it is sensible to attribute this delegation to the courts. See John Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 113, 189-211 (1998).
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Duffy, J.1
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110
-
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0038977660
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Foreword: The passive virtues
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40-42
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Yet again, this could be a difference of degree, especially for appellate courts with discretionary review. See also Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 40-42 (1961) (praising use of doctrines like justiciability to avoid judicial resolution of controversial questions on the merits).
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Bickel, A.M.1
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11244351348
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The truth in legal positivism
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201-02 Robert P. George ed.
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That legislatures may enact morally erroneous statutes in a valid fashion is not alone persuasive. Courts may err as well. Furthermore, even unapologetic natural lawyers believe that on many questions of law and policy there is a wide range of reasonably available options. In those (many) circumstances, legal authority is necessary to choose intelligibly among those valid options. See John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism 195, 201-02 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
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Finnis, J.1
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112
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(1673) 89 Eng. Rep. 120 (C.P.); 1 Freeman 167)
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Hill v. Good, (1673) 89 Eng. Rep. 120 (C.P.); 1 Freeman 167).
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Hill v. Good
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-
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113
-
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0347350449
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443 U.S. 193
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See Dworkin, Civil Rights, supra note 224, at 327-30 (discussing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979))
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(1979)
United Steelworkers v. Weber
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-
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114
-
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79956290636
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437 U.S. 153
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Dworkin, supra note 28, at 337-54 (discussing Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
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(1978)
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
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115
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0007021973
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The common law in the United States
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12
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Strauss, The Common Law, supra note 7, at 238 (quoting Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12 (1936)).
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Stone, H.F.1
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116
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Eskridge is more skeptical of broad coherence, at least as adopted by Dworkin and the Legal Process. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 148 (1994).
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Dynamic Statutory Interpretation
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Eskridge, W.N.1
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117
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937
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Id. at 148; see also David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921, 937 (1992) (situating the interpretive task "in a world where common law and statutory law are woven together in a complex fabric defining a wide range of rights and duties").
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738
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See Manning, supra note 79, at 1288 (textualism); Ekins, supra note 99, at 250-51 (intentionalism). See generally John David Ohlendorff, Against Coherence in Statutory Interpretation, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 735, 738 (2014) ("[T]he coherence ideal fails to justify the courts' departure from their presumptive duty to faithfully carry out Congress's will.").
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Ohlendorff, J.D.1
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119
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84906275729
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499 U.S. 83, 101
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See W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991) (Scalia, J.) ("[I]t is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris."); Ekins, supra note 99, at 259-60.
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W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey
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121
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Statutes revolving in common law orbits
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Calabresi, supra note 1, at 92 n.1 (citing Roger Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 Cath. U. L. Rev. 401 (1968)).
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Traynor, R.1
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122
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Reasoning in a circle of law
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751
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Professor Strauss also states that common law courts, like Congress, "make law," though he puts scare quotes around the phrase and hedges skepticism about the classical account. See Strauss, The Common Law, supra note 7, at 253; see also Roger Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 Va. L. Rev. 739, 751 (1970) (characterizing judging as "the recurring choice of one policy over another").
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Traynor, R.1
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123
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Statutes and the sources of law
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217 Roscoe Pound ed.
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See James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213, 217 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1934) (dismissing as "abstract rationalism" the notion that common law courts "merely 'find' law"); Stone, supra note 264, at 10 (noting that a common law judge is "often engaged not so much in extracting a rule of law from the precedents, as we were once accustomed to believe, as in making an appraisal and comparison of social values" and "weigh[ing] competing demands of social advantage, not unmindful that continuity and symmetry of the law are themselves such advantages").
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Harvard Legal Essays
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Landis, J.M.1
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124
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77957855824
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501 U.S. 529, 549
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Postema, Bentham, supra note 130, at 263. Antiformalists are not alone in this skepticism. See James B. Beam Distillery Corp. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they were 'finding' it - discerning what the law is ....")
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(1991)
James B. Beam Distillery Corp. v. Georgia
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125
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Henry Holt & Co., New York
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Henry Summer Maine, Dissertations on the Early Law and Custom 389 (Henry Holt & Co., New York 1883) ("[Early English] substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the insterstices of procedure."); cf. S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 59 (2d ed. 1981) ("There was no substantive law to which pleading was adjective. These were the terms in which the law existed and in which lawyers thought.").
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(1883)
Dissertations on the Early Law and Custom
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Maine, H.S.1
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127
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36049015744
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The newer textualism: Justice alito's statutory interpretation
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Note 985-987
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See Manning, supra note 79, at 1308-09 (noting the diminishing importance of the legislative history debate and a settled "equilibrium" where the center of the Court is willing to consider legislative history in cases of ambiguity or vagueness); Elliott M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito's Statutory Interpretation, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 983, 985-987 (2007) (comparing Justice Alito's openness to legislative history with Justice Scalia's opposition).
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Davis, E.M.1
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128
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The gap
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695
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Cf. Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 695, 695 (1991) (describing this "problem of rules" as "the heart of the problem of law")
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Alexander, L.1
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Reason and fiat in case law
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377
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Lon Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 376, 377 (1946)
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Fuller, L.1
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131
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Settled versus right: Constitutional method and the path of precedent
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Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1843, 1855-63 (2013) (discussing the costs and benefits of legal continuity).
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26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.) 23
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Compare Dworkin, supra note 28, at 400 (invoking "the impure, present law gradually transforming itself into its own purer ambition"), with Omychund v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.) 23 (1744) (Mansfield, L.J.) ("[A] statute very seldom can take in all cases, therefore the common law, that works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this reason superior to an act of parliament.")
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(1744)
Omychund v. Barker
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134
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11144308766
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The limited domain of law
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1937-38
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Professor Schauer has scoured the law reports for cases in which, like Riggs v. Palmer, the letter of the law allows wrongdoers to profit from a will. He found that, "pace Dworkin," Riggs appears to be an exception to a general rule of undesirable actors inheriting pursuant to the letter of wills statutes. See Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of Law, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1909, 1937-38 (2004) (citing cases).
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Schauer, F.1
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135
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84930520590
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134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090-91
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See Pojanowski, supra note 7, at 485-86 (describing the Court's formalist turn in recent decades); cf. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090-91 (2014) (giving, "in this curious case," legislation a narrower interpretation when an otherwise-ordinary reading would conflict with background principles of federalism).
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Bond v. United States
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137
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84931333768
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See David J. Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law 30 (2010) (contrasting common law understood as "custom of the courts" with the vision of the common law as "populist and deeply rooted in practices of the English people-at-large"); Cromartie, supra note 150, at 211 (observing the problem of connecting custom of the courts to popular practice and beliefs); Postema I, supra note 111, at 168-69 (same).
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Bederman, D.J.1
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138
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The forms and limits of adjudication
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See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in The Principles of Social Order, Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller 86, 111-21 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981) (discussing the limits of adjudication to resolve such polycentric problems)
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The Principles of Social Order, Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller
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Fuller, L.1
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Do cases make bad law?
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see generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883, 883-85 (2006) (exploring the limits of case-by-case litigation for law development).
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244 U.S. 205, 222
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S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.) ("The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified.")
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S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen
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141
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77951704762
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304 U.S. 64, 79
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see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (adopting Holmes's rejection of general federal law because there is no "transcendental body of law outside any particular State but obligatory within it").
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Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins
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142
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See ABBE R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories for Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1763, 1829-33 (2010) (identifying this feature of federal textualism and comparing it to state court "modified textualists" who prefer legislative history over non-linguistic canons).
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Gluck, R.1
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11844253714
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Andrei Marmor ed.
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Compare Manning, supra note 96 (grounding formalism in constitutional structure), with Larry Alexander, All or Nothing At All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in Law and Interpretation 357 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (grounding formalism in the nature of interpreting legal texts), and Vermeule, supra note 280 (grounding formalism in consequentialism).
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Law and Interpretation
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Alexander, L.1
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77951848473
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534 U.S. 438, 461
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See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (Thomas, J.) (reasoning that allowing legislative purpose to trump enacted text would undermine the Constitution's legislative process of bicameralism and presentment)
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Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.
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145
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84882370070
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516 U.S. 264, 280
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Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (objecting to judicial use of legislative history on constitutional grounds).
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Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.
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146
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79959898736
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1944
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See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1944 (2011) ("Viewed in isolation from the constitutionmakers' many discrete choices, the concept of separation of powers as such can tell us little, if anything, about where, how, or to what degree the various powers were, in fact, separated (and blended) in the Philadelphia Convention's countless compromises."); Manning, supra note 104, at 2008 ("But to say, as the Court does in its new federalism cases, that the document adopts an unspecified federalism norm ignores the fact that lawmakers - including constitutionmakers - must make hard choices about how to carry out their purposes, judgments about what the attainment of some purposes is worth in particular settings, and tradeoffs against other values.").
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See Manning, supra note 98, at 2434 n.179 (citing Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 3-32 (1969)) ("The structural approach I advance here parallels the longstanding constitutional tradition of interpreting open-ended grants of power in light of the constitutional structure as a whole.").
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Black, C.L.1
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148
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See generally, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding. Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 (1986)
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