Against coherence in statutory interpretation

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 90, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 735-782

  Ohlendorf, John David ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84922473571     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (333)

1. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 159 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
2. (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 489 (1954)).
3. see WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 147-49 (1999);
4. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 694-95 (1987).
5. HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 159.
6. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction, in HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at cxvii;
7. see also LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 66-67, 91-93 (1996);
8. Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1987).
9. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986).
10. John F. Manning, What divides textualists from purposivists? 106 Colum L. Rev. 70, 73 2006 See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 73 (2006);
11. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2006).
12. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7, at cxxviii n.332.
13. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991).
14. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Fourth Amendment-Consent Search Doctrine-Co-occupant Refusal to Consent-Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 173 (2006). The phrase's origins go back to F.W. Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 L.Q. REV. 13, 13 (1898) ("Such is the unity of all history that any one who endeavours to tell a piece of it must feel that his first sentence tears a seamless web.").
16. The phrase's origins go back to F.W. Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 L.Q. REV. 13, 13 (1898).
17. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 165;
18. HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 159.
19. See Ken Kress, Coherence and Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639, 662 (1993).
20. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 74 (1964);
21. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 38-42 (2d ed. 1994).
22. FULLER, supra note 17, at 65-70.
23. See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 277-79 (1994).
24. See NICHOLAS RESCHER, THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH 23 (1973).
25. JOHN L. POLLOCK & JOSEPH CRUZ, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 71-72 (2d ed. 1999);
26. Andrei Marmor, Coherence, Holism, and Interpretation: The Epistemic Foundations of Dworkin's Legal Theory, 10 L. & PHIL. 383, 405-06 (1991). On holism generally, see W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (1970) (describing holism).
27. see W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (1970).
28. KEITH LEHRER, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 108-10 (1990).
29. POLLOCK & CRUZ, supra note 21, at 66-75.
30. RAZ, supra note 19, at 286.
31. Kress, supra note 16, at 650-59.
32. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 177-78.
33. Rolf Sartorius, The Justification of the Judicial Decision, 78 ETHICS 171, 178 (1968).
34. See RAZ, supra note 19, at 274.
35. E.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 949 (1988).
36. E.g., Kress, supra note 16, at 653-54;
37. Marmor, supra note 21.
38. see RAZ, supra note 19, at 319-25.
39. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 1, 10-11, 47-48, 93-94, 113-20, 184-88 (2011).
40. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 176-78;
41. E.g., RAZ, supra note 19, at 320-22;
42. Kress, supra note 16, at 653, 660.
43. See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 184;
44. S.L. HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS 260-70 (1989);
45. RAZ, supra note 19, at 290.
46. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 165;
47. HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 159.
48. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991).
49. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989).
50. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2092 (2000).
51. See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987).
52. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219-56 (2d ed. 2006).
53. See HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1374;
54. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 4 (1997);
55. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES 51 (2010).
56. See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1158 (2011)
57. Both "first" and "second generation" textualists have also embraced many of the considerations discussed in Part V. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (applying Arrow's theorem to statutory interpretation);
58. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1290-1317 (2010)
59. [hereinafter Manning, Second-Generation Textualism]
60. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113.
61. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994);
62. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21 (1988).
63. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed. 2000).
64. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986).
65. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987).
66. ESKRIDGE, supra note 49, at 14;
67. Aleinikoff, supra note 49, at 56.
68. See Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1428 (2005).
69. see generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 49, at 275-306,
70. see Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 163-81 (2010).
71. See Aleinikoff, supra note 49, at 58.
72. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
73. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
74. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445-46 (1827).
75. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 254-60 (2000).
76. See Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Preemption in Context, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION 1, 10 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007);
77. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 787-95 (1994).
78. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 142 (1998).
79. see Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
80. The role of coherence in this early attempt to preserve the exclusivity of federal and state power is nicely illustrated by the infamous case Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
81. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 24 (1820);
82. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 196 (1819).
83. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat.) (1824),
84. the fractured opinions two decades later in Thurlow v. Massachusetts (The License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847),
85. Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849),
86. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
87. 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
88. 1879 N.C. Sess. Laws 340.
89. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
90. Reid, 222 U.S. at 438.
91. E.g., Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 426, 435 (1913);
92. Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 55 (1912).
93. See Gardbaum, supra note 64, at 801-02.
94. The centrality of coherence to the latent exclusivity approach to preemption is nicely illustrated by the holding in New York Central Railroad Company v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917),
95. Mondou, 223 U.S. at 55;
96. see also Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 46-47 (1930);
97. Erie R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170, 174 (1917);
98. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 226 U.S. at 435 (1913).
99. 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
100. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
101. See Gardbaum, supra note 64, at 805-07.
102. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)
103. (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
104. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989).
105. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)
106. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
107. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
108. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008)
109. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
110. see PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 22, 33 (1989).
111. STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRESUMPTIVE MEANINGS 27-35 (2000).
112. see GEOFFREY N. LEECH, PRINCIPLES OF PRAGMATICS (1983);
113. STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS (1983);
114. GEORGE YULE, PRAGMATICS (1996).
115. GRICE, supra note 89, at 26-27.
116. see DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION 155-63, 176-202 (1986);
117. Robyn Carston, Informativeness, Relevance and Scalar Implicature, in RELEVANCE THEORY 179, 212-26 (Robyn Carston & Seiji Uchida eds., 1998),
118. see LAURENCE R. HORN, A NATURAL HISTORY OF NEGATION 192-203 (1989).
119. see John David Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369 (2013).
120. See GRICE, supra note 89, at 26-27;
121. SPERBER & WILSON, supra note 92, at 172-254;
122. Laurence R. Horn, Implicature, in THE HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 3, 6-17, 24-25 (Laurence R. Horn & Gregory Ward eds., 2006).
123. E.g., LEVINSON, supra note 90, at 114.
124. See GRICE, supra note 89, at 24-26.
125. see SPERBER & WILSON, supra note 92, at 182;
126. Kent Bach, Conversational Impliciture, 9 MIND & LANGUAGE 124, 124-33 (1994);
127. Scott Soames, Drawing the Line Between Meaning and Implicature-and Relating Both to Assertion, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT MEANS AND HOW WE USE IT 298, 316-21 (2009).
128. See GRICE, supra note 89, at 30-31.
129. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 120 (1940).
130. E.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2462 n.274 (2003);
131. Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423, 435-40 (2008).
132. Ohlendorf, supra note 93, at 422-38.
133. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000)
134. (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
135. See M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 373, 394 (1985).
136. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2520 (2012).
137. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1195-1202;
138. Sinclair, supra note 101, at 414-20.
139. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).
140. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
141. See generally JULIA HIRSCHBERG, A THEORY OF SCALAR IMPLICATURE 1-5 (1991).
142. The literature on scalar implicature is vast, and I explore much of it in Ohlendorf, supra note 93, at 388-401.
143. Ohlendorf, supra note 93.
144. 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
145. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120(e)(3)(i) (2011).
146. 1988 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 85-1195 (West) (repealed 2009).
147. Gade, 505 U.S. at 99
148. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
149. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
150. California Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act of 1925, ch. 350, § 10, 1925 Cal. Stat. 625, 633.
151. 7 C.F.R. §§ 51.3050-51.3069 (2014).
152. Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 144.
153. See Ohlendorf, supra note 93, at 397-401, 413-22.
154. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991)
155. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
156. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978).
157. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)
158. (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
159. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND∗90.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996);
161. Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905);
162. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
163. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)
164. (quoting United States v. United Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976);
165. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
166. see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973)
167. (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963)),
168. See Karen Petroski, Retheorizing the Presumption Against Implied Repeals, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 519 (2004).
169. See Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption in the Supreme Court, 89 NEB. L. REV. 682, 694 (2011);
170. Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 57 (2006);
171. David M. O'Brien, The Rehnquist Court and Federal Preemption: In Search of a Theory, 23 PUBLIUS 15, 22 (1993).
172. David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1159 (1999).
173. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 733 (1991).
174. Petroski, supra note 127, at 511.
175. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 293 (2003).
176. Petroski, supra note 127, at 511.
177. Compare United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. 321, 331 (1926),
178. with Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379 (2000).
179. (1614) 77 Eng. Rep. 1222 (K.B.).
180. see also 9 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 228 (Henry Gwyllim & Charles Edward Dodd eds., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1876) (1759).
181. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1232.
182. See, in chronological order, Warder v. Arell, 2 Va. 282, 299 (1796);
183. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 106 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 2d ed. 1874);
184. PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 133 (London, William Maxwell & Son 1875).
185. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 330 (2012).
186. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 937 (1992).
187. Tyler, supra note 55, at 1426-28(quoting HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1416).
188. (quoting HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1416).
189. 426 U.S. 148 (1976).
190. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 27, 48 Stat. 881, 902-03(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2012)).
191. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2012)).
192. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1970).
193. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 560 (1962).
194. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 154(quoting United States v. United Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976)).
195. (quoting United States v. United Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976)).
196. Id. at 158 (alteration in original) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
197. (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551).
198. 538 U.S. 254 (2003).
199. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (2012).
200. 2 U.S.C. § 2c.
201. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c).
202. Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, 549 (S.D. Miss. 2002);
203. Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 512, 512-25 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
204. Branch, 538 U.S. at 273.
205. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 17 (1962).
206. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 165.
207. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981)
208. (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)).
209. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001);
210. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988).See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65 (2011);
211. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65 (2011);
212. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010).
213. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985);
214. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
215. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000);
216. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Equal Protection Clause doctrine);
217. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
218. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
219. See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1515-21 (1984).
220. Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1039 (1985).
221. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33-34 (1812).
222. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
223. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1255 (1996)
224. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 885 (1986)
225. (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 78)).
226. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981)
227. (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
228. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie -And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 419 (1964).
229. see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3,
230. and Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 304,
231. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313
232. (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)).
233. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)
234. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
235. See Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 311-12 (2005).
236. Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985)
237. (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313, 315)
238. Texas, 507 U.S. at 534
239. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).
240. 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
241. (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317).
242. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317 n.9.
243. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Rebuff States on Utilities' Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/science/earth/21warming.html.
244. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011);
245. see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
246. See Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906);
247. see also Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907).
248. See, e.g., David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2003).
249. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
250. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538.
251. (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981)).
252. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970).
253. Pub. L. No. 66-165, 41 Stat. 537 (1920)(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2012)).
254. (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2012)).
255. See Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958).
256. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 96 (1946) (extending the duty of seaworthiness to longshoreman working onboard).
257. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007
258. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27-30, 37 (1990).
259. 46 U.S.C. § 30303
260. See, e.g., Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1934)
261. See STUART M. SPEISER & JAMES E. ROOKS, JR., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 6:9 (4th ed. 2005).
262. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1974)..
263. Miles, 498 U.S. at 27.
264. (discussing N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 153 (1917).
265. Miles, 498 U.S. at 36.
266. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 313-54;
267. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249 (1997).
268. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 36.
269. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 105 (1999).
270. WALDRON, supra note 217, at 144.
271. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22-33 (2d ed. 1963). For an influential summary of the constraints, see AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 167-69 (1970).
272. ARROW, supra note 221.
273. ARROW, supra note 221, at 11-14;
274. HURLEY, supra note 34, at 256-60.
275. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 39-40 (1991);
276. Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2137-38 (1990).
277. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 225, at 47-55.
278. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 225, at 48-49;
279. HURLEY, supra note 34, at 254-56 (same).
280. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 225, at 49-50;
281. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27 (1979) (same).
282. 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432 (1980).
283. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, supra note 48, at 1289.
284. See John David Ohlendorf, Textualism and the Problem of Scrivener's Error, 64 ME. L. REV. 119, 125 (2011) (noting this danger).
285. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 9-56, 218-26 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the complex procedural obstacle course through which modern legislation must pass);
286. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 711-12 (1992) ;
287. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1212-23 (2007).
288. See Miriam R. Jorgensen & Kenneth A. Shepsle, A Comment on the Positive Canons Project, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 1994, at 43, 44-46 .
289. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1487-98 (2003).
290. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 232, at 1242-48.
291. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 44, at 83-99;
292. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227-33 (1986) (same).
293. Chris Frates, Payoffs for States Get Harry Reid to 60 Votes, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2009, 7:56 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30815.html.
294. See William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 204-19 (2000) .
295. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
296. Sunstein, supra note 238, at 1739.
297. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167, 171-72 (1956).
298. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640-42 (2002) ;
299. Nourse, supra note 48, at 1128-34.
300. See Sunstein, supra note 238, at 1742 .
301. Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407, 415 (1950).
302. Buzbee, supra note 237, at 204.
303. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322 (1986)
304. See Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 1, 1-2 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
305. See Larry Alexander, Banishing the Bogey of Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1641, 1642 n.7 (1998).
306. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 113 (1980).
307. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988).
308. FINNIS, supra note 250, at 111-18;
309. Elizabeth Anderson, Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON
310. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 795-812 (1994).
311. See RAZ, supra note 249, at 325;
312. Pildes & Anderson, supra note 225, at 2161.
313. see DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 88-96, 118-20;
314. HURLEY, supra note 34, at 254-70;
315. Alexander, supra note 249;
316. Chang, supra note 249.
317. Cf. Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Commentary, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 760 n.160 (2000) (noting that adopting a "coherentist" style of interpreting the Constitution would dramatically increase the costs of amendment by giving each constitutional change unpredictable "ripple effects").
318. Cf. HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 97, 496-527, 775-83;
319. Tyler, supra note 55, at 1438-60. I thank Amy Barrett for helping me to see the argument in this way.
320. see AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES (2009).
321. See John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2039 (2006) (noting that our constitutional structure "contemplates and, indeed, places a premium on legislative compromise").
322. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 234, at 1454 ;
323. see Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 232, at 1219 .
324. WALDRON, supra note 217, at 106.
325. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 232, at 1255.
326. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991).
327. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 123, at∗60 n.12. ("It is an established rule of construction that statutes in pari materi ○a, or upon the same subject, must be construed with reference to each other.").
328. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1908). Pound's suggestion was famously repeated by Landis,
329. see James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 226-27 (1934), and Stone,
330. see Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12-13 (1936). For more modern echoes,
331. see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 82-83, 85-86 (1982);
332. HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 467, 472-73, 758-63, 775, 780, 782-83, 1194, 1210, 1370, 1378;
333. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1011-12 (1989).