Excuse validation: a study in rule-breaking

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 172, Issue 3, 2015, Pages 615-634

  Turri, John ^a   Blouw, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Blame; Excuses; Moral psychology; Rules; Speech acts

Indexed keywords

EID: 84939878393     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-014-0322-z     Document Type: Article

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