One mechanism, many models: a distributed theory of mechanistic explanation

Synthese

Volumn 193, Issue 5, 2016, Pages 1387-1407

  Hochstein, Eric ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Action potential; Computational models; Dynamical models; Mechanistic explanation; Representation as; Representation of; Topological models

Indexed keywords

EID: 84939186066     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0844-8     Document Type: Article

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