Why we view the brain as a computer

Synthese

Volumn 153, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 393-416

  Shagrir, Oron ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Computation; Content; Explanation; Information

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751527987     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9099-8     Document Type: Article

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