When mechanistic models explain

Synthese

Volumn 153, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 355-376

  Craver, Carl F ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Action; Electrophysiology; Explanation; Functional Analysis; Hodgkin; Huxley; Mechanisms; Models; Potential

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751524084     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9097-x     Document Type: Article

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