Integrating psychology and neuroscience: Functional analyses as mechanism sketches

Synthese

Volumn 183, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 283-311

  Piccinini, Gualtiero ^a   Craver, Carl ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI ST LOUIS   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Functional analysis; Mechanism sketch; Mechanistic explanation; Neuroscience; Psychology

Indexed keywords

EID: 80255137237     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9898-4     Document Type: Article

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