Economic coercion and currency crises in target countries

Journal of Peace Research

Volumn 52, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 448-462

  Peksen, Dursun ^a   Son, Byunghwan ^b  

^a University of Memphis   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

coercive diplomacy; currency crises; economic sanctions; financial crises

Indexed keywords

EID: 84938405871     PISSN: 00223433     EISSN: 14603578     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022343314563636     Document Type: Article

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