Institutions, expectations, and currency crises

International Organization

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 245-262

  Leblang, David ^a   Satyanath, Shanker ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644926378     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818306060073     Document Type: Article

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