To devalue or to defend? The political economy of exchange rate policy

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 47, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 533-560

  Leblang, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CURRENCY DEVALUATION; CURRENCY MARKET; EXCHANGE RATE; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 0348162307     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00278.x     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. ALESINA, A. (1989) Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies. Economic Policy 8:55-89.
2. BECK, N., J. KATZ, AND R. TUCKER (1997) Beyond Ordinary Logit: Taking Time Seriously in Binary Time-Series-Cross-Section Models. Manuscript. Available at ftp://weber.ucsd.edu:/pub/nbeck.
3. BECK, T., G. CLARKE, A. GROFF, P. KEEFER, AND P. WALSH (1999) New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. Manuscript, World Bank Development Research Group.
4. BERNHARD, W. (1998) Political Accountability in the European Monetary System. Typescript, University of Illinois.
5. BERTOLINI, L., AND A. DRAZEN (1997) Capital Account Liberalization as a Signal. American Economic Review 87:138-154.
6. BLANCO, H., AND P. GARBER (1986) Recurrent Devaluations and Speculative Attacks on the Mexican Peso. Journal of Political Economy 94:148-166.
7. CALVO, G. A. (1995) Varieties of Capital-Market Crises. Working Paper # 15. Center for International Economics, University of Maryland.
8. CORSETTI, G., P. PESENTI, AND N. ROUBINI (1998) Paper Tigers? A Model of the Asian Crisis. Manuscript, Department of Economics, New York University.
9. COX, G., AND M. MCCUBBINS (2000) "Political Structure and Economic Policy: The Institutional Determinants of Policy Outcomes." In Political Institutions and the Determinants of Public Policy: When Do Institutions Matter?, edited by S. Haggard and M. McCubbins. Manuscript, School of International Studies and Pacific Affairs, UCSD.
10. CUKIERMAN, A., M. KIGUEL, AND N. LIVIATAN (1995) "How Much to Commit to an Exchange Rate Rule: Balancing Credibility and Flexibility." In Varieties of Monetary Reform: Lessons and Experiences on the Road to Monetary Union, edited by P. Siklos. Boston: Kluwer.
11. DEMIRGUC-KUNT, A., AND E. DETRAGIACHE (1997) The Determinants of Banking Crises: Evidence from the Industrial and Developing Countries. IMF Working Paper #97-106.
12. DOOLEY, M. (1998) A Model of Crises in Emerging Markets. International Finance Discussion Papers, #1998-630. Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Bank.
13. DRAZEN, A. (1997) Policy Signaling in the Open Economy: A Re-Examination. NBER Working Paper #5892.
14. DRAZEN, A. (1999) Interest Rate Defense Against Speculative Attacks Under Asymmetric Information. Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland.
15. EDWARDS, S. (1996) The Determinants of the Choice Between Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes. NBER Working Paper #5576.
16. EICHENGREEN, B. (2000) Capital Account Liberalization: What Do Cross-Country Studies Tell US? Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley.
17. EICHENGREEN, B., AND A. ROSE (2001) Does It Pay to Defend Against a Speculative Attack? Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Available at (http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose/defense.pdf).
18. EICHENGREEN, B., A. ROSE, AND C. WYPLOSZ (1995) Exchange Market Mayhem: The Antecedents and Aftermath of Speculative Attacks. Economic Policy 21:249-312.
19. EICHENGREEN, B., A. ROSE, AND C. WYPLOSZ (1997) Contagious Currency Crises. Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of California.
20. EICHENGREEN, B., P. MASSON, H. BREDENKAMP, B. JOHNSTON, J. HAMANN, E. JADRESIC, AND I. OTKER (1998) Exit Strategies: Policy Options for Countries Seeking Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility. IMF Occasional Paper #168.
21. FRANKEL, J., AND A. ROSE (1996) Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: An Empirical Treatment. Journal of International Economics 41:351-366.
22. FREEMAN, J. R., J. C. HAYES, AND H. STIX (2000) Democracy and Markets: The Case of Exchange Rates. American Journal of Political Science 44(3):449-468.
23. FRIEDEN, J. (1991) Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. International Organization 45:425-451.
24. FRIEDEN, J. (1994) Exchange Rate Politics: Contemporary Lessons from American History. Review of International Political Economy 1:81-103.
25. FRIEDEN, J. (1997) "The Politics of Exchange Rates." In Mexico 1994: The Anatomy of an Emerging-Market Crash, edited by S. Edwards and M. Naim. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace.
26. FRIEDEN, J., P. GHEZZI, AND E. STEIN (2001) "Politics and Exchange Rates: A Cross-Country Approach." In The Currency Game, edited by J. Frieden and E. Stein. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
27. GARRETT, G. (1998) Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
28. GOLDFAJN, I., AND R. VALDEZ (1997) Are Currency Crises Predictable? IMF Working Paper WP/97/159.
29. HAGGARD, S. (2000) The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
30. HIBBS, D. (1987) The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
31. KAMINSKY, G., AND C. REINHART (1996) The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems. International Finance Discussion Paper #544. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Washington, DC.
32. KAMINSKY, G., S. LIZONDO, AND C. REINHART (1997) Leading Indicators of Currency Crises. IMF Working Paper #97-79.
33. KING, G., AND L. ZENG (1999) Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data. Manuscript, Department of Government, Harvard University. Available at (http://gking.harvard.edu/files/Os.pdf).
34. KRAAY, A. (1998) Do High Interest Rates Defend Currencies During Speculative Attacks? World Bank Working Paper #2267.
35. KRUGMAN, P. (1979) A Model of Balance of Payments Crises. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 11:311-325.
36. KRUGMAN, P. (1998) Are Currency Crises Self-Fulfilling? NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
37. LAHIRI, A., AND C. VÉIGH (2000) Delaying the Inevitable: Optimal Interest Policy and BOP Crises. Working Paper, Department of Economics, UCLA.
38. LEBLANG, D. (1997) Are Capital Controls Obsolete? Evidence from the Developed and Developing World, 1967-1986. International Studies Quarterly 41:435-454.
39. LEBLANG, D. (1999) Democratic Political Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments in the Developing World. International Studies Quarterly 43:599-620.
40. LEBLANG, D. (2002) The Political Economy of Speculative Attacks in the Developing World. International Studies Quarterly 46:69-91.
41. LEBLANG, D., AND W. BERNHARD (2000) The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrial Democracies. International Organization 54:291-324.
42. MILNER, H., AND R. KEOHANE (1996) "Internationalization and Domestic Politics: An Introduction." In Internationalization and Domestic Politics, edited by R. Keohane and H. Milner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
43. MORRIS, S., AND H. S. SHIN (1997) Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks. Manuscript, Department of Economics, Yale University.
44. MORRIS, S., AND H. S. SHIN (1998) A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks. Manuscript, Department of Economics, Yale University.
45. NITTTHANPRAPAS, E., AND T. WILLETT (2000) A Currency Crisis Model That Works: A Payments Disequilibrium Approach. Manuscript, Claremont Institute of Economic Policy Studies, Claremont Graduate University.
46. OATLEY, T. (1999) How Constraining Is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy. American Journal of Political Science 43:1003-1027.
47. OBSTFELD, M. (1994) The Logic of Currency Crises. National Bureau of Economics. Working Paper #4640.
48. OBSTFELD, M. (1996) Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features. European Economic Review 40:1037-1047.
49. QUINN, D., AND C. INCLAN (1997) The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization. American Journal of Political Science 41:771-813.
50. SACHS, J., A. TORNELL, AND A. VELASCO (1996) Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from 1995. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:147-215.
51. SIGNORINO, C. (1999) Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict. American Political Science Review 93(2):279-298.
52. SIGNORINO, C. (2000) Theoretical Sources of Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models. Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester. Available at (http://www.rochester.edu/College/PSC/signorino/papers/SigUnc.pdf).
53. SIGNORINO, C. (2001a) STRAT: A Program for Analyzing Statistical Strategic Models. Department of Political Science, University of Rochester. Available at (http://www.rochester.edu/College/PSC/signorino/programs/strat.zip).
54. SIGNORINO, C. (2001b) Strategy and Selection in International Relations. Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester. Available at (http://www.rochester.edu/College/PSC/signorino/papers/SigSelect.pdf).
55. SIGNORINO, C., AND A. TARAR (2000) A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence. Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester. Available at (http://www.rochester.edu/College/PSC/signorino/papers/SigDeter.pdf).
56. WILLETT, T. (1998) Exchange Rates as Nominal Anchors. The World Economy 21:803-826.