Entrepreneurs and democracy: A political theory of corporate governance

Entrepreneurs and Democracy: A Political Theory of Corporate Governance

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-336

  Gomez, Pierre Yves ^a   Korine, Harry ^a,b  

^a EMLYON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (France)

^b LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929746277     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511488696     Document Type: Book

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