Introduction

Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-38

  Odell, John S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927958908     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511491610.001     Document Type: Chapter

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