Where do developing countries go after doha? An analysis of WTO positions and potential alliances

Journal of World Trade

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 543-562

  Bjørnskov, Christian ^a,b   Lind, Kim Martin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^b AARHUS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPING WORLD; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION;

EID: 26244460520     PISSN: 10116702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1016375407242     Document Type: Review

References (23)

1. Ministerial Declaration: Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health
2. Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns
3. WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session; WTO, Geneva.
4. Mary E. Burfisher, The Road Ahead: Agricultural Policy Reform in the WTO - Summary Report, Agricultural Economic Report 797 (Washington, D.C.: Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture, 2000).
5. E.g., Global Economic. Prospects and the Developing Countries 2002, Report (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001).
6. Christian Bjørnskov and Kirn Martin Lind, Where Do Developing Countries Go After Doha?, FOI Working Paper 02/2002 (Fredriksberg: Danish Research Institute of Food Economies, 2002).
7. The 24 Members not included in the data set are Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, Cyprus, the EU (as single entity, all 15 Member countries are represented), Georgia, Iceland, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Malta, Moldova, Oman, Panama, Papua-New Guinea, Qatar, Romania, Solomon Islands, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, and a few overseas territories listed as independent members.
8. Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential Treatment and a Development Box, Proposal to the June 2000 Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, G/AG/NG/W/13 (Geneva: WTO, June 2000).
9. Agreement on Agriculture: Green Box/Annex 2 Subsidies, Proposal to the June 2000 Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, G/AG/NG/W/14 (Geneva: WTO, June 2000);
10. Market Access, G/AG/NG/W/37, WTO, Geneva, September 2000)
11. WTO African Group: Joint Proposal on the Negotiations of Agriculture, G/AG/NG/W/ 142 (Geneva: WTO, March 2001).
12. WTO Negotiations on Agriculture. Proposal by Kenya, G/AG/NG/W/136 (Geneva: WTO, March 2001).
13. Kenya. Statement by the Honourable Kipyator N.K. Biwott, Egh, MP, Minister for Trade and Industry, WT/MIN(01)/ST/81 (Geneva: WTO, 11 November 2001). All relevant documents can be downloaded at the official WTO website at www.wto.org.
14. New WTO round slap in the face for isolationism", says EU Farm Commissioner Fischler, EU Press Release, 14 November 2001.
15. The US officially wants domestic support for agriculture split into two groups: distortionary and nondistortionary measures (presently in the green box) with a view to eliminating all distortionary measures (Note on Domestic Support Reform. Agricultural Negotiations, submission from the United States, G/AG/NG/W/36 (Geneva: WTO, June 2000).
16. Norway has proposed a similar arrangement, although with a significantly different policy objective (WTO Agricultural Negotiations. Proposal by Norway, G/AG/NG/W/101 (Geneva: WTO, January 2001).
17. See, e.g., William M. Miner, An Overview of the Issues and Positions of the Major Countries in the WTO Negotiations, 2 Estey Centre J. Int'l Law and Trade Policy 1 (2001), pp. 10-34.
18. See Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla, Marcelle Thomas, Sherman Robinson and Andrea Cattaneo, Food Security and Trade Negotiations in the World Trade Organization: a Cluster Analysis of Country Groups, TMD Discussion Paper 59 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2000).
19. For a comprehensive description of the theory and algebra of cluster analysis, see Joseph H. Hair Jr., Rolph E. Andersen, Ronald L. Tatharn and William C. Black, Multivariate Data Analysis (5th edn, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1998).
20. In order to be able to perform the cluster analyses, missing data points were replaced by the overall average position on any given issue, which is an endogenous reason for forming this average cluster. Sensitivity analyses of both the correlation and cluster analyses reveal that most of the countries in cluster 3 can relatively easily be made to switch clusters. However, by placing these countries in an average cluster, the method limits problems relating to missing data points mainly to one cluster.
21. The within-cluster standard deviation of the ratings is 0.67, compared to an overall average standard deviation of 0.46 for all clusters. In fact, the Indian positions have a correlation of only 0.53 with the Philippine positions.
22. It must be stressed that Norway - one of the wealthiest countries - has extremely high agricultural tariffs, averaging 152 percent, and substantial support to its vastly uncompetitive agricultural sector.
23. Sensitivity analyses reveal that most of the results above, with the exception of findings related to cluster 3, are remarkably robust, given the type of analysis and data.