Axiomatic theories of truth

Axiomatic Theories of Truth

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-364

  Halbach, Volker ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84924577467     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511921049     Document Type: Book

References (186)

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