Possible-worlds semantics for modal notions conceived as predicates

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 179-223

  Halbach, Volker ^a,b,c   Leitgeb, Hannes ^d   Welch, Philip ^e,f,g  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^d UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG   (Austria)

^e UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

^f UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^g UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Modal logic; Necessity; Paradox; Possible worlds

Indexed keywords

EID: 61249276562     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1023080715357     Document Type: Article

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