Paradoxes, Self-Reference and Truth in the 20th Century

Handbook of the History of Logic

Volumn 5, Issue , 2009, Pages 875-1013

  Cantini, Andrea ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 67649394328     PISSN: 18745857     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1874-5857(09)70020-2     Document Type: Chapter

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