What truth depends on

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 155-192

  Leitgeb, Hannes ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG   (Austria)

Author keywords

Dependence; Self referentiality; Supervenience; Truth; Ungroundedness

Indexed keywords

EID: 61249084251     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10992-004-3758-3     Document Type: Article

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