Axioms for determinateness and truth

Review of Symbolic Logic

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 204-217

  Feferman, Solomon ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84989170595     PISSN: 17550203     EISSN: 17550211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1755020308080209     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (25)

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