Conflict-Inhibiting Norms

The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Leeson, Peter T ^a   Coyne, Christopher J ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Nation borders; Peaceful interactions; State governance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923408462     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0033     Document Type: Chapter

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