Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical synthesis and policy framework

Theory and Society

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 151-208

  Woolcock, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0032384959     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1006884930135     Document Type: Review

References (342)

1. An oft-cited refrain is that of Arrow, who contends that "among the properties of many societies whose economic development is backward is a lack of mutual trust." Kenneth Arrow, The Limits of Organization (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), 26.
2. This general definition summarizes the positions of the major contributors to social capital theory (such as it is). For more specific definitions, see James Coleman: "Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence." Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 302; Pierre Bourdieu: "[social capital is] the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition." Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 119; Ronald Burt: "[social capital refers to] friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use [other forms of] capital . . . . Relations within and between firms are social capital . . . [; it] is the final arbiter of competitive success." Burt, Structural Holes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 9; Glenn Loury: "[social capital refers to] naturally occurring social relationships among persons which promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in the marketplace. . . . [It is] an asset which may be as significant as financial bequests in accounting for the maintenance of inequality in our society" (Loury, "The economics of discrimination: getting to the core of the problem," Harvard Journal for African American Public Policy 1 (1992): 100; Robert Putnam: "social capital . . . refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 167; and Alejandro Portes: "social capital refers to the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures." Portes, "Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: a conceptual overview," in Alejandro Portes, editor, The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), 12. There are several problems with these definitions, for reasons I outline below.
3. This general definition summarizes the positions of the major contributors to social capital theory (such as it is). For more specific definitions, see James Coleman: "Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence." Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 302; Pierre Bourdieu: "[social capital is] the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition." Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 119; Ronald Burt: "[social capital refers to] friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use [other forms of] capital . . . . Relations within and between firms are social capital . . . [; it] is the final arbiter of competitive success." Burt, Structural Holes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 9; Glenn Loury: "[social capital refers to] naturally occurring social relationships among persons which promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in the marketplace. . . . [It is] an asset which may be as significant as financial bequests in accounting for the maintenance of inequality in our society" (Loury, "The economics of discrimination: getting to the core of the problem," Harvard Journal for African American Public Policy 1 (1992): 100; Robert Putnam: "social capital . . . refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 167; and Alejandro Portes: "social capital refers to the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures." Portes, "Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: a conceptual overview," in Alejandro Portes, editor, The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), 12. There are several problems with these definitions, for reasons I outline below.
4. This general definition summarizes the positions of the major contributors to social capital theory (such as it is). For more specific definitions, see James Coleman: "Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence." Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 302; Pierre Bourdieu: "[social capital is] the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition." Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 119; Ronald Burt: "[social capital refers to] friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use [other forms of] capital . . . . Relations within and between firms are social capital . . . [; it] is the final arbiter of competitive success." Burt, Structural Holes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 9; Glenn Loury: "[social capital refers to] naturally occurring social relationships among persons which promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in the marketplace. . . . [It is] an asset which may be as significant as financial bequests in accounting for the maintenance of inequality in our society" (Loury, "The economics of discrimination: getting to the core of the problem," Harvard Journal for African American Public Policy 1 (1992): 100; Robert Putnam: "social capital . . . refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 167; and Alejandro Portes: "social capital refers to the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures." Portes, "Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: a conceptual overview," in Alejandro Portes, editor, The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), 12. There are several problems with these definitions, for reasons I outline below.
5. This general definition summarizes the positions of the major contributors to social capital theory (such as it is). For more specific definitions, see James Coleman: "Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence." Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 302; Pierre Bourdieu: "[social capital is] the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition." Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 119; Ronald Burt: "[social capital refers to] friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use [other forms of] capital . . . . Relations within and between firms are social capital . . . [; it] is the final arbiter of competitive success." Burt, Structural Holes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 9; Glenn Loury: "[social capital refers to] naturally occurring social relationships among persons which promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in the marketplace. . . . [It is] an asset which may be as significant as financial bequests in accounting for the maintenance of inequality in our society" (Loury, "The economics of discrimination: getting to the core of the problem," Harvard Journal for African American Public Policy 1 (1992): 100; Robert Putnam: "social capital . . . refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 167; and Alejandro Portes: "social capital refers to the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures." Portes, "Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: a conceptual overview," in Alejandro Portes, editor, The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), 12. There are several problems with these definitions, for reasons I outline below.
6. This general definition summarizes the positions of the major contributors to social capital theory (such as it is). For more specific definitions, see James Coleman: "Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence." Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 302; Pierre Bourdieu: "[social capital is] the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition." Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 119; Ronald Burt: "[social capital refers to] friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use [other forms of] capital . . . . Relations within and between firms are social capital . . . [; it] is the final arbiter of competitive success." Burt, Structural Holes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 9; Glenn Loury: "[social capital refers to] naturally occurring social relationships among persons which promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in the marketplace. . . . [It is] an asset which may be as significant as financial bequests in accounting for the maintenance of inequality in our society" (Loury, "The economics of discrimination: getting to the core of the problem," Harvard Journal for African American Public Policy 1 (1992): 100; Robert Putnam: "social capital . . . refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 167; and Alejandro Portes: "social capital refers to the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures." Portes, "Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: a conceptual overview," in Alejandro Portes, editor, The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), 12. There are several problems with these definitions, for reasons I outline below.
7. This general definition summarizes the positions of the major contributors to social capital theory (such as it is). For more specific definitions, see James Coleman: "Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence." Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 302; Pierre Bourdieu: "[social capital is] the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition." Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 119; Ronald Burt: "[social capital refers to] friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use [other forms of] capital . . . . Relations within and between firms are social capital . . . [; it] is the final arbiter of competitive success." Burt, Structural Holes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 9; Glenn Loury: "[social capital refers to] naturally occurring social relationships among persons which promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in the marketplace. . . . [It is] an asset which may be as significant as financial bequests in accounting for the maintenance of inequality in our society" (Loury, "The economics of discrimination: getting to the core of the problem," Harvard Journal for African American Public Policy 1 (1992): 100; Robert Putnam: "social capital . . . refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 167; and Alejandro Portes: "social capital refers to the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures." Portes, "Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: a conceptual overview," in Alejandro Portes, editor, The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), 12. There are several problems with these definitions, for reasons I outline below.
8. For compelling recent accounts, see, among others, Benjamin Barber, Jihad versus McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995), Robert Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Random House, 1996), and Stephen Holmes, "What Russia teaches us now," The American Prospect 33 (1997): 30-39. The latter parts of the opening passage should not in any way be read as the mark of a disrespectful, unappreciative, or condescending attitude toward the people and places in question. That said, I wish neither to romanticize or make light of the daily struggles of the poor in developing countries, nor to remain morally indifferent in the face of such practices as infanticide. Between ethnocentrism and cultural relativism I seek a more detached but nuanced position.
9. For compelling recent accounts, see, among others, Benjamin Barber, Jihad versus McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995), Robert Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Random House, 1996), and Stephen Holmes, "What Russia teaches us now," The American Prospect 33 (1997): 30-39. The latter parts of the opening passage should not in any way be read as the mark of a disrespectful, unappreciative, or condescending attitude toward the people and places in question. That said, I wish neither to romanticize or make light of the daily struggles of the poor in developing countries, nor to remain morally indifferent in the face of such practices as infanticide. Between ethnocentrism and cultural relativism I seek a more detached but nuanced position.
10. For compelling recent accounts, see, among others, Benjamin Barber, Jihad versus McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995), Robert Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Random House, 1996), and Stephen Holmes, "What Russia teaches us now," The American Prospect 33 (1997): 30-39. The latter parts of the opening passage should not in any way be read as the mark of a disrespectful, unappreciative, or condescending attitude toward the people and places in question. That said, I wish neither to romanticize or make light of the daily struggles of the poor in developing countries, nor to remain morally indifferent in the face of such practices as infanticide. Between ethnocentrism and cultural relativism I seek a more detached but nuanced position.
11. As an influential United Nations document of the time put it, "ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated." United Nations, Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs), cited in Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 3.
12. As an influential United Nations document of the time put it, "ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated." United Nations, Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs), cited in Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 3.
13. The view that certain "social rigidities" such as caste and community pervade South Asian culture and thus retard efficient economic activity (the so-called "Hindu rate of growth") has been a popular theme at least since Weber's The Religion of India (Glencoe, Il.: The Free Press, 1958 [1916-17], translated by Hans Gerth and Don Martindale). See also Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) and Lloyd Rudolf and Susan Rudolf, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). Appeals to "cultural explanations" of social outcomes, however, do not get us very far; as Sen rightly reminds us, it is highly problematic to attribute specific ideas or behaviors to certain cultures (e.g., "freedom" as a Western idea, "authority" as an Asian one), as there is always considerable heterogeneity even within a given cultural unit. A more fruitful line of inquiry begins by asking "what is right, what makes sense?" in terms of policies likely to support greater levels of social participation and economic development in Asia, and elsewhere. Amartya Sen, "Our culture, their culture," The New Republic April 1 (1996): 32.
14. The view that certain "social rigidities" such as caste and community pervade South Asian culture and thus retard efficient economic activity (the so-called "Hindu rate of growth") has been a popular theme at least since Weber's The Religion of India (Glencoe, Il.: The Free Press, 1958 [1916-17], translated by Hans Gerth and Don Martindale). See also Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) and Lloyd Rudolf and Susan Rudolf, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). Appeals to "cultural explanations" of social outcomes, however, do not get us very far; as Sen rightly reminds us, it is highly problematic to attribute specific ideas or behaviors to certain cultures (e.g., "freedom" as a Western idea, "authority" as an Asian one), as there is always considerable heterogeneity even within a given cultural unit. A more fruitful line of inquiry begins by asking "what is right, what makes sense?" in terms of policies likely to support greater levels of social participation and economic development in Asia, and elsewhere. Amartya Sen, "Our culture, their culture," The New Republic April 1 (1996): 32.
15. The view that certain "social rigidities" such as caste and community pervade South Asian culture and thus retard efficient economic activity (the so-called "Hindu rate of growth") has been a popular theme at least since Weber's The Religion of India (Glencoe, Il.: The Free Press, 1958 [1916-17], translated by Hans Gerth and Don Martindale). See also Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) and Lloyd Rudolf and Susan Rudolf, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). Appeals to "cultural explanations" of social outcomes, however, do not get us very far; as Sen rightly reminds us, it is highly problematic to attribute specific ideas or behaviors to certain cultures (e.g., "freedom" as a Western idea, "authority" as an Asian one), as there is always considerable heterogeneity even within a given cultural unit. A more fruitful line of inquiry begins by asking "what is right, what makes sense?" in terms of policies likely to support greater levels of social participation and economic development in Asia, and elsewhere. Amartya Sen, "Our culture, their culture," The New Republic April 1 (1996): 32.
16. The view that certain "social rigidities" such as caste and community pervade South Asian culture and thus retard efficient economic activity (the so-called "Hindu rate of growth") has been a popular theme at least since Weber's The Religion of India (Glencoe, Il.: The Free Press, 1958 [1916-17], translated by Hans Gerth and Don Martindale). See also Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) and Lloyd Rudolf and Susan Rudolf, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). Appeals to "cultural explanations" of social outcomes, however, do not get us very far; as Sen rightly reminds us, it is highly problematic to attribute specific ideas or behaviors to certain cultures (e.g., "freedom" as a Western idea, "authority" as an Asian one), as there is always considerable heterogeneity even within a given cultural unit. A more fruitful line of inquiry begins by asking "what is right, what makes sense?" in terms of policies likely to support greater levels of social participation and economic development in Asia, and elsewhere. Amartya Sen, "Our culture, their culture," The New Republic April 1 (1996): 32.
17. Civil society refers to that broad class of institutions located between the family and the state, the forums in and through which there is an attempt to harmonize, where necessary, "the conflicting demands of individual interests and social good." Adam Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), x.
18. Putnam, "The prosperous community: social capital and public life," The American Prospect, Spring (1993): 38.
19. See T.W. Schultz, "Investment in human capital," American Economic Review 51: 1-16; Schultz, The Economic, Value of Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Gary Becker, "Investment in human capital: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Political Economy 70 (1962): 9-49; Becker, Human Capital, third edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993 [1964]) ; and, more recently, Robert Lucas, "On the mechanics of development," Journal of Monetary Economics 22 (1988): 3-42. In contemporary research, the importance of endogenous factors such as human capital and technology is stressed by the so-called New Growth Economists; for a review of this literature, which has interesting and important complementarities with the social capital approach, see Paul Romer, "The origins of endogenous growth" Journal of Economic Perspectives 8/1 (1994): 3-22.
20. See T.W. Schultz, "Investment in human capital," American Economic Review 51: 1-16; Schultz, The Economic, Value of Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Gary Becker, "Investment in human capital: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Political Economy 70 (1962): 9-49; Becker, Human Capital, third edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993 [1964]) ; and, more recently, Robert Lucas, "On the mechanics of development," Journal of Monetary Economics 22 (1988): 3-42. In contemporary research, the importance of endogenous factors such as human capital and technology is stressed by the so-called New Growth Economists; for a review of this literature, which has interesting and important complementarities with the social capital approach, see Paul Romer, "The origins of endogenous growth" Journal of Economic Perspectives 8/1 (1994): 3-22.
21. See T.W. Schultz, "Investment in human capital," American Economic Review 51: 1-16; Schultz, The Economic, Value of Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Gary Becker, "Investment in human capital: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Political Economy 70 (1962): 9-49; Becker, Human Capital, third edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993 [1964]) ; and, more recently, Robert Lucas, "On the mechanics of development," Journal of Monetary Economics 22 (1988): 3-42. In contemporary research, the importance of endogenous factors such as human capital and technology is stressed by the so-called New Growth Economists; for a review of this literature, which has interesting and important complementarities with the social capital approach, see Paul Romer, "The origins of endogenous growth" Journal of Economic Perspectives 8/1 (1994): 3-22.
22. See T.W. Schultz, "Investment in human capital," American Economic Review 51: 1-16; Schultz, The Economic, Value of Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Gary Becker, "Investment in human capital: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Political Economy 70 (1962): 9-49; Becker, Human Capital, third edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993 [1964]) ; and, more recently, Robert Lucas, "On the mechanics of development," Journal of Monetary Economics 22 (1988): 3-42. In contemporary research, the importance of endogenous factors such as human capital and technology is stressed by the so-called New Growth Economists; for a review of this literature, which has interesting and important complementarities with the social capital approach, see Paul Romer, "The origins of endogenous growth" Journal of Economic Perspectives 8/1 (1994): 3-22.
23. See T.W. Schultz, "Investment in human capital," American Economic Review 51: 1-16; Schultz, The Economic, Value of Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Gary Becker, "Investment in human capital: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Political Economy 70 (1962): 9-49; Becker, Human Capital, third edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993 [1964]) ; and, more recently, Robert Lucas, "On the mechanics of development," Journal of Monetary Economics 22 (1988): 3-42. In contemporary research, the importance of endogenous factors such as human capital and technology is stressed by the so-called New Growth Economists; for a review of this literature, which has interesting and important complementarities with the social capital approach, see Paul Romer, "The origins of endogenous growth" Journal of Economic Perspectives 8/1 (1994): 3-22.
24. See T.W. Schultz, "Investment in human capital," American Economic Review 51: 1-16; Schultz, The Economic, Value of Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Gary Becker, "Investment in human capital: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Political Economy 70 (1962): 9-49; Becker, Human Capital, third edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993 [1964]) ; and, more recently, Robert Lucas, "On the mechanics of development," Journal of Monetary Economics 22 (1988): 3-42. In contemporary research, the importance of endogenous factors such as human capital and technology is stressed by the so-called New Growth Economists; for a review of this literature, which has interesting and important complementarities with the social capital approach, see Paul Romer, "The origins of endogenous growth" Journal of Economic Perspectives 8/1 (1994): 3-22.
25. Physical capital is sometimes subdivided into financial capital, to distinguish fixed from monetary assets. For useful overviews of the relationship between theories of economic development and the development of economics itself, see Pranab Bardhan, "Economics of development and the development of economics," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7/2 (1993): 129-142, and Escobar, Encountering Development (chapter 3).
26. Physical capital is sometimes subdivided into financial capital, to distinguish fixed from monetary assets. For useful overviews of the relationship between theories of economic development and the development of economics itself, see Pranab Bardhan, "Economics of development and the development of economics," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7/2 (1993): 129-142, and Escobar, Encountering Development (chapter 3).
27. The new economic sociology - as opposed to the old economic sociology characterized by Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser's Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory (New York: Free Press, 1956) - is less deferential to formal economics, seeing little distinction between exchange that is otherwise deemed "economic" or "social." Rather than assuming that the presence of an economic problem or opportunity would lead to its automatic resolution - the position of neo-classical economics and functionalist sociology -the new economic sociology regards these events as highly problematic, focusing instead on how the relevant combinations of social ties and resources were assembled to meet a given economic challenge. More precisely, it is a field that seeks to position itself between the traditional "oversocialized" and "undersocialized" approaches to understanding economic behavior (see below). On the intellectual history of the new economic sociology, see Richard Swedberg, "Major traditions of economic sociology," Annual Review of Sociology 17 (1991): 251-276; for contemporary empirical examples of work continuing in this tradition, see Richard Swedberg, editor, Explorations in Economic Sociology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation), and Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
28. The new economic sociology - as opposed to the old economic sociology characterized by Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser's Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory (New York: Free Press, 1956) - is less deferential to formal economics, seeing little distinction between exchange that is otherwise deemed "economic" or "social." Rather than assuming that the presence of an economic problem or opportunity would lead to its automatic resolution - the position of neo-classical economics and functionalist sociology - the new economic sociology regards these events as highly problematic, focusing instead on how the relevant combinations of social ties and resources were assembled to meet a given economic challenge. More precisely, it is a field that seeks to position itself between the traditional "oversocialized" and "undersocialized" approaches to understanding economic behavior (see below). On the intellectual history of the new economic sociology, see Richard Swedberg, "Major traditions of economic sociology," Annual Review of Sociology 17 (1991): 251-276; for contemporary empirical examples of work continuing in this tradition, see Richard Swedberg, editor, Explorations in Economic Sociology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation), and Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
29. The new economic sociology - as opposed to the old economic sociology characterized by Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser's Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory (New York: Free Press, 1956) - is less deferential to formal economics, seeing little distinction between exchange that is otherwise deemed "economic" or "social." Rather than assuming that the presence of an economic problem or opportunity would lead to its automatic resolution - the position of neo-classical economics and functionalist sociology - the new economic sociology regards these events as highly problematic, focusing instead on how the relevant combinations of social ties and resources were assembled to meet a given economic challenge. More precisely, it is a field that seeks to position itself between the traditional "oversocialized" and "undersocialized" approaches to understanding economic behavior (see below). On the intellectual history of the new economic sociology, see Richard Swedberg, "Major traditions of economic sociology," Annual Review of Sociology 17 (1991): 251-276; for contemporary empirical examples of work continuing in this tradition, see Richard Swedberg, editor, Explorations in Economic Sociology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation), and Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
30. The new economic sociology - as opposed to the old economic sociology characterized by Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser's Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory (New York: Free Press, 1956) - is less deferential to formal economics, seeing little distinction between exchange that is otherwise deemed "economic" or "social." Rather than assuming that the presence of an economic problem or opportunity would lead to its automatic resolution - the position of neo-classical economics and functionalist sociology - the new economic sociology regards these events as highly problematic, focusing instead on how the relevant combinations of social ties and resources were assembled to meet a given economic challenge. More precisely, it is a field that seeks to position itself between the traditional "oversocialized" and "undersocialized" approaches to understanding economic behavior (see below). On the intellectual history of the new economic sociology, see Richard Swedberg, "Major traditions of economic sociology," Annual Review of Sociology 17 (1991): 251-276; for contemporary empirical examples of work continuing in this tradition, see Richard Swedberg, editor, Explorations in Economic Sociology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation), and Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
31. The contemporary literature assigns social capital a number of distinctive properties that gives rise to these results. First, where physical capital and human capital are essentially the property of individuals, social capital by extension resides in groups; unlike other capitals, it incorporates expectations of reciprocity, and is essentially immobile (this claim is controversial; see James Baron and Michael Hannon, "The impact of economics on contemporary sociology," Journal of Economic Literature 32/September (1994): 1111-1146, and Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landolt, "The downside of social capital," The American Prospect 26/ May-June (1996): 18-21, 94. Second, stocks of social capital increase rather than decrease through use; where physical capital is worn out or consumed, for example, trust demonstrated today will be amplified tomorrow. Third, however, social capital is more easily destroyed than created; one corrupt employee can discredit an otherwise exemplary organization, a single gaffe by a politician in the final weeks of a campaign can undermine decades of faithful, competent service. Fourth, because of its capacity to resolve collective action problems and enhance productivity, social capital is regarded as complementary to, rather than a substitute or competitor for, investments in other forms of capital. Finally, it is important to add that both human and social capital can have intrinsic value as well as instrumental value; good health, education, cooperation, and friendships, as Drèze and Sen rightly stress, "can be valued for their own sake - above and beyond their instrumental importance as factors of production. Indeed, being a 'component of human capital' cannot be the most fulfilling achievement to which a human being can aspire." Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 43.
32. The contemporary literature assigns social capital a number of distinctive properties that gives rise to these results. First, where physical capital and human capital are essentially the property of individuals, social capital by extension resides in groups; unlike other capitals, it incorporates expectations of reciprocity, and is essentially immobile (this claim is controversial; see James Baron and Michael Hannon, "The impact of economics on contemporary sociology," Journal of Economic Literature 32/September (1994): 1111-1146, and Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landolt, "The downside of social capital," The American Prospect 26/ May-June (1996): 18-21, 94. Second, stocks of social capital increase rather than decrease through use; where physical capital is worn out or consumed, for example, trust demonstrated today will be amplified tomorrow. Third, however, social capital is more easily destroyed than created; one corrupt employee can discredit an otherwise exemplary organization, a single gaffe by a politician in the final weeks of a campaign can undermine decades of faithful, competent service. Fourth, because of its capacity to resolve collective action problems and enhance productivity, social capital is regarded as complementary to, rather than a substitute or competitor for, investments in other forms of capital. Finally, it is important to add that both human and social capital can have intrinsic value as well as instrumental value; good health, education, cooperation, and friendships, as Drèze and Sen rightly stress, "can be valued for their own sake - above and beyond their instrumental importance as factors of production. Indeed, being a 'component of human capital' cannot be the most fulfilling achievement to which a human being can aspire." Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 43.
33. The contemporary literature assigns social capital a number of distinctive properties that gives rise to these results. First, where physical capital and human capital are essentially the property of individuals, social capital by extension resides in groups; unlike other capitals, it incorporates expectations of reciprocity, and is essentially immobile (this claim is controversial; see James Baron and Michael Hannon, "The impact of economics on contemporary sociology," Journal of Economic Literature 32/September (1994): 1111-1146, and Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landolt, "The downside of social capital," The American Prospect 26/ May-June (1996): 18-21, 94. Second, stocks of social capital increase rather than decrease through use; where physical capital is worn out or consumed, for example, trust demonstrated today will be amplified tomorrow. Third, however, social capital is more easily destroyed than created; one corrupt employee can discredit an otherwise exemplary organization, a single gaffe by a politician in the final weeks of a campaign can undermine decades of faithful, competent service. Fourth, because of its capacity to resolve collective action problems and enhance productivity, social capital is regarded as complementary to, rather than a substitute or competitor for, investments in other forms of capital. Finally, it is important to add that both human and social capital can have intrinsic value as well as instrumental value; good health, education, cooperation, and friendships, as Drèze and Sen rightly stress, "can be valued for their own sake - above and beyond their instrumental importance as factors of production. Indeed, being a 'component of human capital' cannot be the most fulfilling achievement to which a human being can aspire." Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 43.
34. See Putnam, Making Democracy Work; "Bowling alone: America's declining social capital," Journal of Democracy 6/1 (1995): 65-78; and "Tuning in, tuning out: the strange disappearance of social capital in America," Political Science and Politics, December (1995): 664-683.
35. See Putnam, Making Democracy Work; "Bowling alone: America's declining social capital," Journal of Democracy 6/1 (1995): 65-78; and "Tuning in, tuning out: the strange disappearance of social capital in America," Political Science and Politics, December (1995): 664-683.
36. Several plausible candidates - e.g., Alvin Gouldner, "The norm of reciprocity: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25/April (1960): 161-178 -can be put forward as founders of the letter and spirit of social capital (see below), but in the contemporary sense in which the term is used, the following passage from Jacobs seems to be the earliest: "[N]etworks are a city's irreplaceable social capital. Whenever the capital is lost, from whatever cause, the income from it disappears, never to return until and unless new capital is slowly and chancily accumulated." Jane Jacobs, The Life and Death of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961), 138. An earlier, isolated, astonishingly prescient use of the term is that of Lyda Hanifan, who argued that "social capital . . . refer[s] to . . . those tangible assets [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit." Lyda Judson Hanifan, The Community Center (Boston: Silver, Burdette, and Co., 1920), 78. Hanifan's proposals for "investing" in a community's social bear a striking resemblance to those being made today. I am grateful to Robert Putnam for bringing this citation to my attention.
37. Several plausible candidates - e.g., Alvin Gouldner, "The norm of reciprocity: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25/April (1960): 161-178 - can be put forward as founders of the letter and spirit of social capital (see below), but in the contemporary sense in which the term is used, the following passage from Jacobs seems to be the earliest: "[N]etworks are a city's irreplaceable social capital. Whenever the capital is lost, from whatever cause, the income from it disappears, never to return until and unless new capital is slowly and chancily accumulated." Jane Jacobs, The Life and Death of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961), 138. An earlier, isolated, astonishingly prescient use of the term is that of Lyda Hanifan, who argued that "social capital . . . refer[s] to . . . those tangible assets [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit." Lyda Judson Hanifan, The Community Center (Boston: Silver, Burdette, and Co., 1920), 78. Hanifan's proposals for "investing" in a community's social bear a striking resemblance to those being made today. I am grateful to Robert Putnam for bringing this citation to my attention.
38. Several plausible candidates - e.g., Alvin Gouldner, "The norm of reciprocity: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25/April (1960): 161-178 - can be put forward as founders of the letter and spirit of social capital (see below), but in the contemporary sense in which the term is used, the following passage from Jacobs seems to be the earliest: "[N]etworks are a city's irreplaceable social capital. Whenever the capital is lost, from whatever cause, the income from it disappears, never to return until and unless new capital is slowly and chancily accumulated." Jane Jacobs, The Life and Death of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961), 138. An earlier, isolated, astonishingly prescient use of the term is that of Lyda Hanifan, who argued that "social capital . . . refer[s] to . . . those tangible assets [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit." Lyda Judson Hanifan, The Community Center (Boston: Silver, Burdette, and Co., 1920), 78. Hanifan's proposals for "investing" in a community's social bear a striking resemblance to those being made today. I am grateful to Robert Putnam for bringing this citation to my attention.
39. Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (London: Sage, 1990 [1970]).
40. Loury, "A dynamic theory of racial income differences," in P. A. Wallace and A. LeMund, editors. Women, Minorities, and Employment Discrimination (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1977).
41. Coleman, "Social capital in the creation of human capital," American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988): S95-S120; Foundations of Social Theory (chapter 12); and "A rational choice perspective on economic sociology," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 7).
42. Coleman, "Social capital in the creation of human capital," American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988): S95-S120; Foundations of Social Theory (chapter 12); and "A rational choice perspective on economic sociology," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 7).
43. Coleman, "Social capital in the creation of human capital," American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988): S95-S120; Foundations of Social Theory (chapter 12); and "A rational choice perspective on economic sociology," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 7).
44. Burt, Structural Holes.
45. See endnote 12.
46. Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and immigration: notes on the social determinants of economic action," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1320-1350. For other work on social capital by these authors, see Bourdieu, Esquisse d'une Théorie de la Pratique. Précédée de trois études d'ethnologie Kabyle (Geneve: Droz, 1972); Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984 [1979]); "Le capital social," Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 32/33 (1980): 2-3; "The forms of capital," in John Richardson, editor, Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986 [1983]); and Sociology in Question (London: Sage, 1993 [1984]).
47. Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and immigration: notes on the social determinants of economic action," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1320-1350. For other work on social capital by these authors, see Bourdieu, Esquisse d'une Théorie de la Pratique. Précédée de trois études d'ethnologie Kabyle (Geneve: Droz, 1972); Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984 [1979]); "Le capital social," Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 32/33 (1980): 2-3; "The forms of capital," in John Richardson, editor, Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986 [1983]); and Sociology in Question (London: Sage, 1993 [1984]).
48. Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and immigration: notes on the social determinants of economic action," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1320-1350. For other work on social capital by these authors, see Bourdieu, Esquisse d'une Théorie de la Pratique. Précédée de trois études d'ethnologie Kabyle (Geneve: Droz, 1972); Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984 [1979]); "Le capital social," Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 32/33 (1980): 2-3; "The forms of capital," in John Richardson, editor, Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986 [1983]); and Sociology in Question (London: Sage, 1993 [1984]).
49. Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and immigration: notes on the social determinants of economic action," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1320-1350. For other work on social capital by these authors, see Bourdieu, Esquisse d'une Théorie de la Pratique. Précédée de trois études d'ethnologie Kabyle (Geneve: Droz, 1972); Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984 [1979]); "Le capital social," Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 32/33 (1980): 2-3; "The forms of capital," in John Richardson, editor, Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986 [1983]); and Sociology in Question (London: Sage, 1993 [1984]).
50. Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and immigration: notes on the social determinants of economic action," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1320-1350. For other work on social capital by these authors, see Bourdieu, Esquisse d'une Théorie de la Pratique. Précédée de trois études d'ethnologie Kabyle (Geneve: Droz, 1972); Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984 [1979]); "Le capital social," Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 32/33 (1980): 2-3; "The forms of capital," in John Richardson, editor, Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986 [1983]); and Sociology in Question (London: Sage, 1993 [1984]).
51. Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and immigration: notes on the social determinants of economic action," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1320-1350. For other work on social capital by these authors, see Bourdieu, Esquisse d'une Théorie de la Pratique. Précédée de trois études d'ethnologie Kabyle (Geneve: Droz, 1972); Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984 [1979]); "Le capital social," Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 32/33 (1980): 2-3; "The forms of capital," in John Richardson, editor, Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986 [1983]); and Sociology in Question (London: Sage, 1993 [1984]).
52. Loury, "Why should we care about group inequality?" Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (1987): 249-271;
53. and "The economics and discrimination. . . ." Coleman, "Norms as social capital," in G. Radnitzky and P. Bernholz, editors, Economic Imperialism: The Economic Method Applied Outside the Field of Economics (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987);
54. "The creation and destruction of social capital: implications for the law," Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy 3 (1988): 375-404;
55. "Social capital, human capital, and investment in youth," in Anne C. Peterson and Jeylan T. Mortimer, editors, Youth Unemployment and Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
56. Burt, "Social capital, structural holes, and the entrepreneur," mimeo (University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, 1995).
57. John Helliwell and Robert Putnam, "Social capital and economic growth in Italy," Eastern Economic Journal 21/3 (1995): 295-307.
58. Portes, editor, The Economic Sociology of Immigration.
59. Social capital research can be grouped into seven substantive fields. In addition to the literature on social theory and economic development - the primary focus of this article - the idea of (if not the exact term) social capital has also been employed extensively in studies of: (1) Families and Youth Behavior Problems. T. Parcel and E. Menaghan, "Family social capital and children's behavior problems," Social Psychology Quarterly 56/2 (1993): 120-135; Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); J. Boisjoly, G. Duncan, and S. Hofferth, "Access to social capital," Journal of Family Issues 16/5 (1995): 609-631; John Hagan, H. Merkens, and K. Boehnke, "Delinquency and disdain: social capital and the control of right-wing extremism among east and west Berlin youth," American Journal of Sociology 100/4 (1995): 1028-1052; F. Furstenburg and M. Hughes, "Social capital and successful development among at-risk youth," Journal of Marriage and the Family 57/August (1995): 580-592; Francis Fukuyama, "The Great Disruption," Tanner Lectures, Brasenose College, Oxford University, 1997.
60. Social capital research can be grouped into seven substantive fields. In addition to the literature on social theory and economic development - the primary focus of this article - the idea of (if not the exact term) social capital has also been employed extensively in studies of: (1) Families and Youth Behavior Problems. T. Parcel and E. Menaghan, "Family social capital and children's behavior problems," Social Psychology Quarterly 56/2 (1993): 120-135; Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); J. Boisjoly, G. Duncan, and S. Hofferth, "Access to social capital," Journal of Family Issues 16/5 (1995): 609-631; John Hagan, H. Merkens, and K. Boehnke, "Delinquency and disdain: social capital and the control of right-wing extremism among east and west Berlin youth," American Journal of Sociology 100/4 (1995): 1028-1052; F. Furstenburg and M. Hughes, "Social capital and successful development among at-risk youth," Journal of Marriage and the Family 57/August (1995): 580-592; Francis Fukuyama, "The Great Disruption," Tanner Lectures, Brasenose College, Oxford University, 1997.
61. Social capital research can be grouped into seven substantive fields. In addition to the literature on social theory and economic development - the primary focus of this article - the idea of (if not the exact term) social capital has also been employed extensively in studies of: (1) Families and Youth Behavior Problems. T. Parcel and E. Menaghan, "Family social capital and children's behavior problems," Social Psychology Quarterly 56/2 (1993): 120-135; Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); J. Boisjoly, G.
62. Social capital research can be grouped into seven substantive fields. In addition to the literature on social theory and economic development - the primary focus of this article - the idea of (if not the exact term) social capital has also been employed extensively in studies of: (1) Families and Youth Behavior Problems. T. Parcel and E. Menaghan, "Family social capital and children's behavior problems," Social Psychology Quarterly 56/2 (1993): 120-135; Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); J. Boisjoly, G. Duncan, and S. Hofferth, "Access to social capital," Journal of Family Issues 16/5 (1995): 609-631; John Hagan, H. Merkens, and K. Boehnke, "Delinquency and disdain: social capital and the control of right-wing extremism among east and west Berlin youth," American Journal of Sociology 100/4 (1995): 1028-1052; F. Furstenburg and M. Hughes, "Social capital and successful development among at-risk youth," Journal of Marriage and the Family 57/August (1995): 580-592; Francis Fukuyama, "The Great Disruption," Tanner Lectures, Brasenose College, Oxford University, 1997.
63. Social capital research can be grouped into seven substantive fields. In addition to the literature on social theory and economic development - the primary focus of this article - the idea of (if not the exact term) social capital has also been employed extensively in studies of: (1) Families and Youth Behavior Problems. T. Parcel and E. Menaghan, "Family social capital and children's behavior problems," Social Psychology Quarterly 56/2 (1993): 120-135; Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); J. Boisjoly, G. Duncan, and S. Hofferth, "Access to social capital," Journal of Family Issues 16/5 (1995): 609-631; John Hagan, H. Merkens, and K. Boehnke, "Delinquency and disdain: social capital and the control of right-wing extremism among east and west Berlin youth," American Journal of Sociology 100/4 (1995): 1028-1052; F. Furstenburg and M. Hughes, "Social capital and successful development among at-risk youth," Journal of Marriage and the Family 57/August (1995): 580-592; Francis Fukuyama, "The Great Disruption," Tanner Lectures, Brasenose College, Oxford University, 1997.
64. Social capital research can be grouped into seven substantive fields. In addition to the literature on social theory and economic development - the primary focus of this article - the idea of (if not the exact term) social capital has also been employed extensively in studies of: (1) Families and Youth Behavior Problems. T. Parcel and E. Menaghan, "Family social capital and children's behavior problems," Social Psychology Quarterly 56/2 (1993): 120-135; Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); J. Boisjoly, G. Duncan, and S. Hofferth, "Access to social capital," Journal of Family Issues 16/5 (1995): 609-631; John Hagan, H. Merkens, and K. Boehnke, "Delinquency and disdain: social capital and the control of right-wing extremism among east and west Berlin youth," American Journal of Sociology 100/4 (1995): 1028-1052; F. Furstenburg and M. Hughes, "Social capital and successful development among at-risk youth," Journal of Marriage and the Family 57/August (1995): 580-592; Francis Fukuyama, "The Great Disruption," Tanner Lectures, Brasenose College, Oxford University, 1997.
65. (2) Schooling and Education, James Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, Public and Private Schools: The Impact of Communities (New York: Basic Books, 1987); J. Crane, "Effects of neighborhoods on dropping out of school and teenage childbearing," in Chistopher Jencks and Paul Peterson, editors, The Urban Underclass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991); M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and G. Israel, "Effects of human capital and social capital on dropping out of high school in the south," Journal of Research in Rural Education 8/1 (1992): 75-87; John Modell, "When may social capital influence children's school performance?" in Anne C. Peterson and Jeylan T. Mortimer, editors, Youth Unemployment and Society; A. Valenzuela and S. Dornbush, "Familism and social capital in the academic achievement of Mexican origin and Anglo adolescents," Social Science Quarterly 75/1 (1994): 18-36; M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and A. Seraphine, "Social capital, place of residence, and college attendance," Rural Sociology 60/3 (1995): 363-380.
66. (2) Schooling and Education, James Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, Public and Private Schools: The Impact of Communities (New York: Basic Books, 1987); J. Crane, "Effects of neighborhoods on dropping out of school and teenage childbearing," in Chistopher Jencks and Paul Peterson, editors, The Urban Underclass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991); M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and G. Israel, "Effects of human capital and social capital on dropping out of high school in the south," Journal of Research in Rural Education 8/1 (1992): 75-87; John Modell, "When may social capital influence children's school performance?" in Anne C. Peterson and Jeylan T. Mortimer, editors, Youth Unemployment and Society; A. Valenzuela and S. Dornbush, "Familism and social capital in the academic achievement of Mexican origin and Anglo adolescents," Social Science Quarterly 75/1 (1994): 18-36; M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and A. Seraphine, "Social capital, place of residence, and college attendance," Rural Sociology 60/3 (1995): 363-380.
67. (2) Schooling and Education, James Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, Public and Private Schools: The Impact of Communities (New York: Basic Books, 1987); J. Crane, "Effects of neighborhoods on dropping out of school and teenage childbearing," in Chistopher Jencks and Paul Peterson, editors, The Urban Underclass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991); M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and G. Israel, "Effects of human capital and social capital on dropping out of high school in the south," Journal of Research in Rural Education 8/1 (1992): 75-87; John Modell, "When may social capital influence children's school performance?" in Anne C. Peterson and Jeylan T. Mortimer, editors, Youth Unemployment and Society; A. Valenzuela and S. Dornbush, "Familism and social capital in the academic achievement of Mexican origin and Anglo adolescents," Social Science Quarterly 75/1 (1994): 18-36; M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and A. Seraphine, "Social capital, place of residence, and college attendance," Rural Sociology 60/3 (1995): 363-380.
68. (2) Schooling and Education, James Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, Public and Private Schools: The Impact of Communities (New York: Basic Books, 1987); J. Crane, "Effects of neighborhoods on dropping out of school and teenage childbearing," in Chistopher Jencks and Paul Peterson, editors, The Urban Underclass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991); M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and G. Israel, "Effects of human capital and social capital on dropping out of high school in the south," Journal of Research in Rural Education 8/1 (1992): 75-87; John Modell, "When may social capital influence children's school performance?" in Anne C. Peterson and Jeylan T. Mortimer, editors, Youth Unemployment and Society; A. Valenzuela and S. Dornbush, "Familism and social capital in the academic achievement of Mexican origin and Anglo adolescents," Social Science Quarterly 75/1 (1994): 18-36; M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and A. Seraphine, "Social capital, place of residence, and college attendance," Rural Sociology 60/3 (1995): 363-380.
69. (2) Schooling and Education, James Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, Public and Private Schools: The Impact of Communities (New York: Basic Books, 1987); J. Crane, "Effects of neighborhoods on dropping out of school and teenage childbearing," in Chistopher Jencks and Paul Peterson, editors, The Urban Underclass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991); M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and G. Israel, "Effects of human capital and social capital on dropping out of high school in the south," Journal of Research in Rural Education 8/1 (1992): 75-87; John Modell, "When may social capital influence children's school performance?" in Anne C. Peterson and Jeylan T. Mortimer, editors, Youth Unemployment and Society; A. Valenzuela and S. Dornbush, "Familism and social capital in the academic achievement of Mexican origin and Anglo adolescents," Social Science Quarterly 75/1 (1994): 18-36; M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and A. Seraphine, "Social capital, place of residence, and college attendance," Rural Sociology 60/3 (1995): 363-380.
70. (2) Schooling and Education, James Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, Public and Private Schools: The Impact of Communities (New York: Basic Books, 1987); J. Crane, "Effects of neighborhoods on dropping out of school and teenage childbearing," in Chistopher Jencks and Paul Peterson, editors, The Urban Underclass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991); M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and G. Israel, "Effects of human capital and social capital on dropping out of high school in the south," Journal of Research in Rural Education 8/1 (1992): 75-87; John Modell, "When may social capital influence children's school performance?" in Anne C. Peterson and Jeylan T. Mortimer, editors, Youth Unemployment and Society; A. Valenzuela and S. Dornbush, "Familism and social capital in the academic achievement of Mexican origin and Anglo adolescents," Social Science Quarterly 75/1 (1994): 18-36; M. Smith, L. Beaulieu, and A. Seraphine, "Social capital, place of residence, and college attendance," Rural Sociology 60/3 (1995): 363-380.
71. (3) Community Life (a) In physical settings. Phillip Abrams, with Martin Bulmer, Neighbours (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); A. Case and L. Katz, "The company you keep: the effects of family and neighborhood on disadvantaged youths" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3705, 1991); Loïc Wacquant and William J. Wilson, "The cost of racial and class exclusion in the inner city," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 501: 8-26, 1989; Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelley, "Social and cultural capital in the urban ghetto: implications for the economic sociology of immigration" in Portes, editor. The Economic Sociology of Immigration; Everett Ladd, "The data just don't show erosion of America's 'social capital,'" Public Perspective (1996): 4-22; John Clark, "Shifting engagements: lessons from the 'bowling alone' debate," Hudson Briefing Papers, No. 196, 1996; Andrew Greely, "The other civic America: religion and social capital," The American Prospect 32 (1997): 68-73.
72. (3) Community Life (a) In physical settings. Phillip Abrams, with Martin Bulmer, Neighbours (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); A. Case and L. Katz, "The company you keep: the effects of family and neighborhood on disadvantaged youths" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3705, 1991); Loïc Wacquant and William J. Wilson, "The cost of racial and class exclusion in the inner city," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 501: 8-26, 1989; Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelley, "Social and cultural capital in the urban ghetto: implications for the economic sociology of immigration" in Portes, editor. The Economic Sociology of Immigration; Everett Ladd, "The data just don't show erosion of America's 'social capital,'" Public Perspective (1996): 4-22; John Clark, "Shifting engagements: lessons from the 'bowling alone' debate," Hudson Briefing Papers, No. 196, 1996; Andrew Greely, "The other civic America: religion and social capital," The American Prospect 32 (1997): 68-73.
73. (3) Community Life (a) In physical settings. Phillip Abrams, with Martin Bulmer, Neighbours (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); A. Case and L. Katz, "The company you keep: the effects of family and neighborhood on disadvantaged youths" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3705, 1991); Loïc Wacquant and William J. Wilson, "The cost of racial and class exclusion in the inner city," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 501: 8-26, 1989; Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelley, "Social and cultural capital in the urban ghetto: implications for the economic sociology of immigration" in Portes, editor. The Economic Sociology of Immigration; Everett Ladd, "The data just don't show erosion of America's 'social capital,'" Public Perspective (1996): 4-22; John Clark, "Shifting engagements: lessons from the 'bowling alone' debate," Hudson Briefing Papers, No. 196, 1996; Andrew Greely, "The other civic America: religion and social capital," The American Prospect 32 (1997): 68-73.
74. (3) Community Life (a) In physical settings. Phillip Abrams, with Martin Bulmer, Neighbours (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); A. Case and L. Katz, "The company you keep: the effects of family and neighborhood on disadvantaged youths" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3705, 1991); Loïc Wacquant and William J. Wilson, "The cost of racial and class exclusion in the inner city," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 501: 8-26, 1989; Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelley, "Social and cultural capital in the urban ghetto: implications for the economic sociology of immigration" in Portes, editor. The Economic Sociology of Immigration; Everett Ladd, "The data just don't show erosion of America's 'social capital,'" Public Perspective (1996): 4-22; John Clark, "Shifting engagements: lessons from the 'bowling alone' debate," Hudson Briefing Papers, No. 196, 1996; Andrew Greely, "The other civic America: religion and social capital," The American Prospect 32 (1997): 68-73.
75. (3) Community Life (a) In physical settings. Phillip Abrams, with Martin Bulmer, Neighbours (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); A. Case and L. Katz, "The company you keep: the effects of family and neighborhood on disadvantaged youths" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3705, 1991); Loïc Wacquant and William J. Wilson, "The cost of racial and class exclusion in the inner city," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 501: 8-26, 1989; Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelley, "Social and cultural capital in the urban ghetto: implications for the economic sociology of immigration" in Portes, editor. The Economic Sociology of Immigration; Everett Ladd, "The data just don't show erosion of America's 'social capital,'" Public Perspective (1996): 4-22; John Clark, "Shifting engagements: lessons from the 'bowling alone' debate," Hudson Briefing Papers, No. 196, 1996; Andrew Greely, "The other civic America: religion and social capital," The American Prospect 32 (1997): 68-73.
76. (3) Community Life (a) In physical settings. Phillip Abrams, with Martin Bulmer, Neighbours (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); A. Case and L. Katz, "The company you keep: the effects of family and neighborhood on disadvantaged youths" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3705, 1991); Loïc Wacquant and William J. Wilson, "The cost of racial and class exclusion in the inner city," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 501: 8-26, 1989; Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelley, "Social and cultural capital in the urban ghetto: implications for the economic sociology of immigration" in Portes, editor. The Economic Sociology of Immigration; Everett Ladd, "The data just don't show erosion of America's 'social capital,'" Public Perspective (1996): 4-22; John Clark, "Shifting engagements: lessons from the 'bowling alone' debate," Hudson Briefing Papers, No. 196, 1996; Andrew Greely, "The other civic America: religion and social capital," The American Prospect 32 (1997): 68-73.
77. (3) Community Life (a) In physical settings. Phillip Abrams, with Martin Bulmer, Neighbours (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); A. Case and L. Katz, "The company you keep: the effects of family and neighborhood on disadvantaged youths" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3705, 1991); Loïc Wacquant and William J. Wilson, "The cost of racial and class exclusion in the inner city," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 501: 8-26, 1989; Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelley, "Social and cultural capital in the urban ghetto: implications for the economic sociology of immigration" in Portes, editor. The Economic Sociology of Immigration; Everett Ladd, "The data just don't show erosion of America's 'social capital,'" Public Perspective (1996): 4-22; John Clark, "Shifting engagements: lessons from the 'bowling alone' debate," Hudson Briefing Papers, No. 196, 1996; Andrew Greely, "The other civic America: religion and social capital," The American Prospect 32 (1997): 68-73.
78. (3) Community Life (a) In physical settings. Phillip Abrams, with Martin Bulmer, Neighbours (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); A. Case and L. Katz, "The company you keep: the effects of family and neighborhood on disadvantaged youths" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3705, 1991); Loïc Wacquant and William J. Wilson, "The cost of racial and class exclusion in the inner city," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 501: 8-26, 1989; Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelley, "Social and cultural capital in the urban ghetto: implications for the economic sociology of immigration" in Portes, editor. The Economic Sociology of Immigration; Everett Ladd, "The data just don't show erosion of America's 'social capital,'" Public Perspective (1996): 4-22; John Clark, "Shifting engagements: lessons from the 'bowling alone' debate," Hudson Briefing Papers, No. 196, 1996; Andrew Greely, "The other civic America: religion and social capital," The American Prospect 32 (1997): 68-73.
79. (b) In "virtual" settings. Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994); Douglas Schuler, New Community Networks: Wired For Change (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1996); Sherry Turkic, "Virtuality and its discontents," The American Prospect 24 (1996): 50-57.
80. (b) In "virtual" settings. Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994); Douglas Schuler, New Community Networks: Wired For Change (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1996); Sherry Turkic, "Virtuality and its discontents," The American Prospect 24 (1996): 50-57.
81. (b) In "virtual" settings. Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994); Douglas Schuler, New Community Networks: Wired For Change (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1996); Sherry Turkic, "Virtuality and its discontents," The American Prospect 24 (1996): 50-57.
82. (4) Work and Organizations. H. Flap and N. De Graaf, "Social capital and attained occupational status," The Netherlands Journal of Sociology 22 (1986): 145-161; E. Boxman, P. De Graaf, and H. Flap, "The impact of social and human capital on the income attainment of Dutch managers," Social Networks 13 (1991): 51-73: Maurice Schiff, "Social capital, labor mobility, and welfare: the impact of uniting states," Rationality and Society 4 (1992): 157-75; Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 1995); A. Fellmeth, "Social capital in the United States and Taiwan: trust or rule of law?" Development Policy Review 14 (1996): 151-171.
83. (4) Work and Organizations. H. Flap and N. De Graaf, "Social capital and attained occupational status," The Netherlands Journal of Sociology 22 (1986): 145-161; E. Boxman, P. De Graaf, and H. Flap, "The impact of social and human capital on the income attainment of Dutch managers," Social Networks 13 (1991): 51-73: Maurice Schiff, "Social capital, labor mobility, and welfare: the impact of uniting states," Rationality and Society 4 (1992): 157-75; Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 1995); A. Fellmeth, "Social capital in the United States and Taiwan: trust or rule of law?" Development Policy Review 14 (1996): 151-171.
84. (4) Work and Organizations. H. Flap and N. De Graaf, "Social capital and attained occupational status," The Netherlands Journal of Sociology 22 (1986): 145-161; E. Boxman, P. De Graaf, and H. Flap, "The impact of social and human capital on the income attainment of Dutch managers," Social Networks 13 (1991): 51-73: Maurice Schiff, "Social capital, labor mobility, and welfare: the impact of uniting states," Rationality and Society 4 (1992): 157-75; Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 1995); A. Fellmeth, "Social capital in the United States and Taiwan: trust or rule of law?" Development Policy Review 14 (1996): 151-171.
85. (4) Work and Organizations. H. Flap and N. De Graaf, "Social capital and attained occupational status," The Netherlands Journal of Sociology 22 (1986): 145-161; E. Boxman, P. De Graaf, and H. Flap, "The impact of social and human capital on the income attainment of Dutch managers," Social Networks 13 (1991): 51-73: Maurice Schiff, "Social capital, labor mobility, and welfare: the impact of uniting states," Rationality and Society 4 (1992): 157-75; Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 1995); A. Fellmeth, "Social capital in the United States and Taiwan: trust or rule of law?" Development Policy Review 14 (1996): 151-171.
86. (4) Work and Organizations. H. Flap and N. De Graaf, "Social capital and attained occupational status," The Netherlands Journal of Sociology 22 (1986): 145-161; E. Boxman, P. De Graaf, and H. Flap, "The impact of social and human capital on the income attainment of Dutch managers," Social Networks 13 (1991): 51-73: Maurice Schiff, "Social capital, labor mobility, and welfare: the impact of uniting states," Rationality and Society 4 (1992): 157-75; Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 1995); A. Fellmeth, "Social capital in the United States and Taiwan: trust or rule of law?" Development Policy Review 14 (1996): 151-171.
87. (5) Democracy and Governance. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); J. Cohen and J. Rogers, "Secondary associations in democratic governance," Politics and Society 20 (1992): 393-472; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Support for parliaments and regimes in transition towards democracy in eastern Europe," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19/1 (1994): 5-32; Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope: the dynamics of support for democracy in eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28/4 (1995): 553-581; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist society," Journal of Politics (forthcoming); Rose and Mishler, "Mass reaction to regime change in eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards?" British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 159-182; Jennifer Widner, "State-building and community: understanding local government performance in Africa," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996; Widner, "Social capital and investment," mimeo (Ann Arbor: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1997); Gary Woller, "Social capital and citizen support for the new democratic regimes of central and eastern Europe," mimeo (Provo: Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, 1997).
88. (5) Democracy and Governance. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); J. Cohen and J. Rogers, "Secondary associations in democratic governance," Politics and Society 20 (1992): 393-472; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Support for parliaments and regimes in transition towards democracy in eastern Europe," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19/1 (1994): 5-32; Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope: the dynamics of support for democracy in eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28/4 (1995): 553-581; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist society," Journal of Politics (forthcoming); Rose and Mishler, "Mass reaction to regime change in eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards?" British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 159-182; Jennifer Widner, "State-building and community: understanding local government performance in Africa," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996; Widner, "Social capital and investment," mimeo (Ann Arbor: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1997); Gary Woller, "Social capital and citizen support for the new democratic regimes of central and eastern Europe," mimeo (Provo: Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, 1997).
89. (5) Democracy and Governance. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); J. Cohen and J. Rogers, "Secondary associations in democratic governance," Politics and Society 20 (1992): 393-472; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Support for parliaments and regimes in transition towards democracy in eastern Europe," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19/1 (1994): 5-32; Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope: the dynamics of support for democracy in eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28/4 (1995): 553-581; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist society," Journal of Politics (forthcoming); Rose and Mishler, "Mass reaction to regime change in eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards?" British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 159-182; Jennifer Widner, "State-building and community: understanding local government performance in Africa," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996; Widner, "Social capital and investment," mimeo (Ann Arbor: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1997); Gary Woller, "Social capital and citizen support for the new democratic regimes of central and eastern Europe," mimeo (Provo: Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, 1997).
90. (5) Democracy and Governance. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); J. Cohen and J. Rogers, "Secondary associations in democratic governance," Politics and Society 20 (1992): 393-472; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Support for parliaments and regimes in transition towards democracy in eastern Europe," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19/1 (1994): 5-32; Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope: the dynamics of support for democracy in eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28/4 (1995): 553-581; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist society," Journal of Politics (forthcoming); Rose and Mishler, "Mass reaction to regime change in eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards?" British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 159-182; Jennifer Widner, "State-building and community: understanding local government performance in Africa," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996; Widner, "Social capital and investment," mimeo (Ann Arbor: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1997); Gary Woller, "Social capital and citizen support for the new democratic regimes of central and eastern Europe," mimeo (Provo: Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, 1997).
91. (5) Democracy and Governance. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); J. Cohen and J. Rogers, "Secondary associations in democratic governance," Politics and Society 20 (1992): 393-472; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Support for parliaments and regimes in transition towards democracy in eastern Europe," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19/1 (1994): 5-32; Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope: the dynamics of support for democracy in eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28/4 (1995): 553-581; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist society," Journal of Politics (forthcoming); Rose and Mishler, "Mass reaction to regime change in eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards?" British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 159-182; Jennifer Widner, "State-building and community: understanding local government performance in Africa," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996; Widner, "Social capital and investment," mimeo (Ann Arbor: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1997); Gary Woller, "Social capital and citizen support for the new democratic regimes of central and eastern Europe," mimeo (Provo: Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, 1997).
92. (5) Democracy and Governance. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); J. Cohen and J. Rogers, "Secondary associations in democratic governance," Politics and Society 20 (1992): 393-472; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Support for parliaments and regimes in transition towards democracy in eastern Europe," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19/1 (1994): 5-32; Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope: the dynamics of support for democracy in eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28/4 (1995): 553-581; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist society," Journal of Politics (forthcoming); Rose and Mishler, "Mass reaction to regime change in eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards?" British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 159-182; Jennifer Widner, "State-building and community: understanding local government performance in Africa," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996; Widner, "Social capital and investment," mimeo (Ann Arbor: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1997); Gary Woller, "Social capital and citizen support for the new democratic regimes of central and eastern Europe," mimeo (Provo: Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, 1997).
93. (5) Democracy and Governance. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); J. Cohen and J. Rogers, "Secondary associations in democratic governance," Politics and Society 20 (1992): 393-472; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Support for parliaments and regimes in transition towards democracy in eastern Europe," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19/1 (1994): 5-32; Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope: the dynamics of support for democracy in eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28/4 (1995): 553-581; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist society," Journal of Politics (forthcoming); Rose and Mishler, "Mass reaction to regime change in eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards?" British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 159-182; Jennifer Widner, "State-building and community: understanding local government performance in Africa," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996; Widner, "Social capital and investment," mimeo (Ann Arbor: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1997); Gary Woller, "Social capital and citizen support for the new democratic regimes of central and eastern Europe," mimeo (Provo: Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, 1997).
94. (5) Democracy and Governance. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); J. Cohen and J. Rogers, "Secondary associations in democratic governance," Politics and Society 20 (1992): 393-472; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Support for parliaments and regimes in transition towards democracy in eastern Europe," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19/1 (1994): 5-32; Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope: the dynamics of support for democracy in eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28/4 (1995): 553-581; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist society," Journal of Politics (forthcoming); Rose and Mishler, "Mass reaction to regime change in eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards?" British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 159-182; Jennifer Widner, "State-building and community: understanding local government performance in Africa," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996; Widner, "Social capital and investment," mimeo (Ann Arbor: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1997); Gary Woller, "Social capital and citizen support for the new democratic regimes of central and eastern Europe," mimeo (Provo: Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, 1997).
95. (5) Democracy and Governance. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); J. Cohen and J. Rogers, "Secondary associations in democratic governance," Politics and Society 20 (1992): 393-472; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Support for parliaments and regimes in transition towards democracy in eastern Europe," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19/1 (1994): 5-32; Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope: the dynamics of support for democracy in eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28/4 (1995): 553-581; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist society," Journal of Politics (forthcoming); Rose and Mishler, "Mass reaction to regime change in eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards?" British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 159-182; Jennifer Widner, "State-building and community: understanding local government performance in Africa," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996; Widner, "Social capital and investment," mimeo (Ann Arbor: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1997); Gary Woller, "Social capital and citizen support for the new democratic regimes of central and eastern Europe," mimeo (Provo: Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, 1997).
96. (5) Democracy and Governance. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); J. Cohen and J. Rogers, "Secondary associations in democratic governance," Politics and Society 20 (1992): 393-472; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Support for parliaments and regimes in transition towards democracy in eastern Europe," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19/1 (1994): 5-32; Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope: the dynamics of support for democracy in eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 28/4 (1995): 553-581; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist society," Journal of Politics (forthcoming); Rose and Mishler, "Mass reaction to regime change in eastern Europe: polarization or leaders and laggards?" British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 159-182; Jennifer Widner, "State-building and community: understanding local government performance in Africa," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, 1996; Widner, "Social capital and investment," mimeo (Ann Arbor: Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1997); Gary Woller, "Social capital and citizen support for the new democratic regimes of central and eastern Europe," mimeo (Provo: Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, 1997).
97. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
98. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
99. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
100. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the
101. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
102. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
103. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
104. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
105. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
106. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
107. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
108. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
109. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
110. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
111. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
112. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling
113. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
114. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
115. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
116. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
117. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
118. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
119. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
120. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
121. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
122. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
123. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
124. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in
125. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
126. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
127. (6) General Cases of Collective Action Problems. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); M. Taylow and S. Singleton, "The communal resource: Transaction costs and the solution of collective action problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 195-214; Elinor Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Lindon Robison and A. Alan Schmid, "Applications of social capital theory," Journal of Agriculturaland Applied Economics 27/1 (1995): 59-66; Andre Habish, "Extending capital theory: social capital analysis as a new instrument to understand local institutions" (Bloomington: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, W96-5, 1996). The idea of social capital also trades under the name of "intangible assets": Thorston Veblen, "On the nature of capital, intangible assets and the pecuniary magnate," Quarterly Journal of Economics 22 (1908): 104-136; "social energy": Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), and Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); "social capability": Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); "sociability": Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); "moral resources": Albert Hirschman, "Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic analysis," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 88-96; and "ties"/"networks": Mark Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380; Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and networks in Taiwan's economic development," in E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, editors, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and economic life," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 15). It is implicit in studies of various "economic groups" - e.g., Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary statement," American Sociological Review 25 (1963): 161-178; Nathaniel Leff, "Capital markets in the less developed countries: the group principle," in Ronald McKinnon, editor, Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Development (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1976); Leff, "Industrial organizational and entrepeneurship in the developing countries: the economic groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change 26/July (1978): 661-675; Yoram Ben-Porath, "The F-connection: families, friends and firms and the organization of exchange," Population and Development Review 6/1 (1980): 1-30 - and more recent innovative work by economists and economic historians: see Moses Abramovitz, "Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind," Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 385-406; Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Avner Greif, "Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 525-549; Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 912-950; John Helliwell, "Economic growth and social capital in Asia" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996); Cynthia Taft Morris, "How fast and why did capitalism benefit the majority?" Journal of Economic History 55/2 (1995): 211-226; Jean-Philippe Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist" [Parts I & II], Journal of Development Studies 30: 533-577 and 753-817; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures," Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995): 207-227; Knack and Keefer, "Does social capital have an economic pay off? A cross-country investigation," (College Park: University of Maryland, IRIS Working Paper No. 197, 1996); Platteau, "Traditional sharing norms as, an obstacle to economic growth in tribal societies," Cahires de la Faculte des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix 173 (1996): 201-223; James Rauch, "Trade and search: social capital, sogo shoba, and spillovers" (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 5618, 1996).
128. Baron and Hannon, "The impact of economics on contemporary sociology," 1122-1124. The claim that social capital is a form of capital comparable to physical and human capital is problematic, but not overly so. Baron and Hannan contend that to qualify as "capital" an entity must possess an opportunity cost, that social capital in the popular sense lacks this quality, and that it is therefore erroneous to bracket it with physical and human capital. They are partly right - much of one's social capital stems from an inherited endowment over which one has little influence - but it is also the case that people can and do make deliberate, hence costly, efforts to increase their social capital, as the infamous practice of networking ("it's not what you know, it's who you know") indicates (see Burt, Structural Holes, chapter 1). For empirical evidence that social capital is indeed both social and capital, see the promising work of Deepa Narayan and Lant Pritchett, "Cents and sociability: household income and social capital in rural Tanzania," mimeo (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Environment Department, 1997).
129. Baron and Hannon, "The impact of economics on contemporary sociology," 1122-1124. The claim that social capital is a form of capital comparable to physical and human capital is problematic, but not overly so. Baron and Hannan contend that to qualify as "capital" an entity must possess an opportunity cost, that social capital in the popular sense lacks this quality, and that it is therefore erroneous to bracket it with physical and human capital. They are partly right - much of one's social capital stems from an inherited endowment over which one has little influence - but it is also the case that people can and do make deliberate, hence costly, efforts to increase their social capital, as the infamous practice of networking ("it's not what you know, it's who you know") indicates (see Burt, Structural Holes, chapter 1). For empirical evidence that social capital is indeed both social and capital, see the promising work of Deepa Narayan and Lant Pritchett, "Cents and sociability: household income and social capital in rural Tanzania," mimeo (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Environment Department, 1997).
130. Baron and Hannon, "The impact of economics on contemporary sociology," 1122-1124. The claim that social capital is a form of capital comparable to physical and human capital is problematic, but not overly so. Baron and Hannan contend that to qualify as "capital" an entity must possess an opportunity cost, that social capital in the popular sense lacks this quality, and that it is therefore erroneous to bracket it with physical and human capital. They are partly right - much of one's social capital stems from an inherited endowment over which one has little influence - but it is also the case that people can and do make deliberate, hence costly, efforts to increase their social capital, as the infamous practice of networking ("it's not what you know, it's who you know") indicates (see Burt, Structural Holes, chapter 1). For empirical evidence that social capital is indeed both social and capital, see the promising work of Deepa Narayan and Lant Pritchett, "Cents and sociability: household income and social capital in rural Tanzania," mimeo (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Environment Department, 1997).
131. Ordinarily, a theory's parsimony - i.e., its capacity to explain the most with the least - is a desirable property; in this instance, however, a single term is being adopted indiscriminately, adapted uncritically, and applied imprecisely.
132. Coleman, "Norms as social capital"; Foundations (chapter 11).
133. This concern mirrors the familiar argument made against rational-choice theorists, namely that if all behavior is, by definition, utility-maximizing, then the assumption is rendered non-falsifiable. Similarly, just as Olson's early work predicts too much "free-riding," so too an indiscriminate application of social capital over-explains collective action. A partial solution in both cases is to search for the specific conditions under which individuals and groups are able to work together (or not) for mutual benefit, a position that Olson himself now seems to endorse. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); cf. Olson, "Preface," in Todd Sandler, Collective Action: Theory and Applications (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).
134. This concern mirrors the familiar argument made against rational-choice theorists, namely that if all behavior is, by definition, utility-maximizing, then the assumption is rendered non-falsifiable. Similarly, just as Olson's early work predicts too much "free-riding," so too an indiscriminate application of social capital over-explains collective action. A partial solution in both cases is to search for the specific conditions under which individuals and groups are able to work together (or not) for mutual benefit, a position that Olson himself now seems to endorse. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); cf. Olson, "Preface," in Todd Sandler, Collective Action: Theory and Applications (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).
135. This formulation actually represents a synthesis of Weber and Durkheim; see Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter Evans, "The state and economic transformation: toward an analysis of the conditions underlying effective intervention," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors. Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 59.
136. Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties"; William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor (New York: Knopf, 1996).
137. Fukuyama, Trust; see also Diego Gambetta, "Can we trust trust?" in Gambetta, editor. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988) and James Henslin, "What makes for trust?" in Henslin, editor, Down to Earth Sociology: Introductory Readings, fourth edition (New York: The Free Press).
138. Fukuyama, Trust; see also Diego Gambetta, "Can we trust trust?" in Gambetta, editor. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988) and James Henslin, "What makes for trust?" in Henslin, editor, Down to Earth Sociology: Introductory Readings, fourth edition (New York: The Free Press).
139. Fukuyama, Trust; see also Diego Gambetta, "Can we trust trust?" in Gambetta, editor. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988) and James Henslin, "What makes for trust?" in Henslin, editor, Down to Earth Sociology: Introductory Readings, fourth edition (New York: The Free Press).
140. This is the sense in which social capital is employed by Pierre Bourdieu; see citations in endnote 19.
141. Bob Edwards and Michael Foley, "Social capital and the political economy of our discontent," American Behavioral Scientist 40/5 (1997): 669.
142. Portes and Landolt, "The downside of social capital," 19.
143. See Berger and Neuhaus, To Empower People; Amatai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993); Alan Ahrenhalt, The Lost City (New York: Basic Books, 1995).
144. See Berger and Neuhaus, To Empower People; Amatai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993); Alan Ahrenhalt, The Lost City (New York: Basic Books, 1995).
145. See Berger and Neuhaus, To Empower People; Amatai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993); Alan Ahrenhalt, The Lost City (New York: Basic Books, 1995).
146. George F. Will, cited in Theda Skocpol, "Unraveling from above," The American Prospect 25 (1996), 20. Cf. Robert Bellah et al.'s trenchant criticism of those who would "strengthen democracy by weakening government." Bellah et al., The Good Society (New York: Random House, 1992), 133. For empirical refutations of the zero-sum argument of state-society relations, see Lester Salamon, Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), and Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) on the United States, and Bo Rothstein, The Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem of Social Reforms (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), on Sweden.
147. George F. Will, cited in Theda Skocpol, "Unraveling from above," The American Prospect 25 (1996), 20. Cf. Robert Bellah et al.'s trenchant criticism of those who would "strengthen democracy by weakening government." Bellah et al., The Good Society (New York: Random House, 1992), 133. For empirical refutations of the zero-sum argument of state-society relations, see Lester Salamon, Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), and Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) on the United States, and Bo Rothstein, The Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem of Social Reforms (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), on Sweden.
148. George F. Will, cited in Theda Skocpol, "Unraveling from above," The American Prospect 25 (1996), 20. Cf. Robert Bellah et al.'s trenchant criticism of those who would "strengthen democracy by weakening government." Bellah et al., The Good Society (New York: Random House, 1992), 133. For empirical refutations of the zero-sum argument of state-society relations, see Lester Salamon, Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), and Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) on the United States, and Bo Rothstein, The Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem of Social Reforms (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), on Sweden.
149. George F. Will, cited in Theda Skocpol, "Unraveling from above," The American Prospect 25 (1996), 20. Cf. Robert Bellah et al.'s trenchant criticism of those who would "strengthen democracy by weakening government." Bellah et al., The Good Society (New York: Random House, 1992), 133. For empirical refutations of the zero-sum argument of state-society relations, see Lester Salamon, Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), and Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) on the United States, and Bo Rothstein, The Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem of Social Reforms (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), on Sweden.
150. George F. Will, cited in Theda Skocpol, "Unraveling from above," The American Prospect 25 (1996), 20. Cf. Robert Bellah et al.'s trenchant criticism of those who would "strengthen democracy by weakening government." Bellah et al., The Good Society (New York: Random House, 1992), 133. For empirical refutations of the zero-sum argument of state-society relations, see Lester Salamon, Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), and Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) on the United States, and Bo Rothstein, The Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem of Social Reforms (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), on Sweden.
151. William Schambra, "By the people: the old values of the new citizenship," Policy Review, Summer (1994): 32-38.
152. Fukuyama, Trust. For a related argument, see Lawrence Harrison, Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
153. Fukuyama, Trust. For a related argument, see Lawrence Harrison, Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
154. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Putnam's critics, while otherwise celebrating his work, have directed most of their attack at his reading of Italy's social and political history.
155. For a critique of Putnam's general thesis as it applies to the United States, see, among others, Michael Schudson, "What if civic life didn't die?" The American Prospect 25 (1996): 17-20; Nicholas Lemann, "Kicking in groups," The Atlantic Monthly 277/4 (1996): 22-26; Ladd, "The data just don't show America's erosion of 'social capital
156. For a critique of Putnam's general thesis as it applies to the United States, see, among others, Michael Schudson, "What if civic life didn't die?" The American Prospect 25 (1996): 17-20; Nicholas Lemann, "Kicking in groups," The Atlantic Monthly 277/4 (1996): 22-26; Ladd, "The data just don't show America's erosion of 'social capital
157. For a critique of Putnam's general thesis as it applies to the United States, see, among others, Michael Schudson, "What if civic life didn't die?" The American Prospect 25 (1996): 17-20; Nicholas Lemann, "Kicking in groups," The Atlantic Monthly 277/4 (1996): 22-26; Ladd, "The data just don't show America's erosion of 'social capital
158. '"; Clark, "Shifting engagements."
159. See also Margaret Levi, "Social and unsocial capital: a review essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work" Politics and Society 24/1 (1996): 45-55.
160. More accurately, scholars in this tradition argue that there is a wide range of actions by the state, from the "predatory" to the "developmental." I discuss the merits of this approach in more detail below.
161. Skocpol, "Unraveling from above," 20. See also Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States. For the most part, however, liberals have been conspicuous in their reluctance to offer a broader range of concrete policy recommendations to nurture social capital. To be fair, Putnam's work has been published in the liberal press and he seeks explicitly to identify himself with this camp, arguing forcefully that "differences in social capital appear essentially uncorrelated with welfare spending or government size. . . . [Social capital is], if anything, positively correlated with the size of the state." Putnam, "Turning in, turning out," 671 (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, it is still the case that hasty readers can use Putnam's results to suit opposing political agendas.
162. Skocpol, "Unraveling from above," 20. See also Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States. For the most part, however, liberals have been conspicuous in their reluctance to offer a broader range of concrete policy recommendations to nurture social capital. To be fair, Putnam's work has been published in the liberal press and he seeks explicitly to identify himself with this camp, arguing forcefully that "differences in social capital appear essentially uncorrelated with welfare spending or government size. . . . [Social capital is], if anything, positively correlated with the size of the state." Putnam, "Turning in, turning out," 671 (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, it is still the case that hasty readers can use Putnam's results to suit opposing political agendas.
163. Skocpol, "Unraveling from above," 20. See also Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States. For the most part, however, liberals have been conspicuous in their reluctance to offer a broader range of concrete policy recommendations to nurture social capital. To be fair, Putnam's work has been published in the liberal press and he seeks explicitly to identify himself with this camp, arguing forcefully that "differences in social capital appear essentially uncorrelated with welfare spending or government size. . . . [Social capital is], if anything, positively correlated with the size of the state." Putnam, "Turning in, turning out," 671 (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, it is still the case that hasty readers can use Putnam's results to suit opposing political agendas.
164. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality.
165. That this debate persists despite the wealth of evidence in favor of the "positive sum" camp is testimony more to the strength of ideological commitments among conservatives than the persuasiveness of their contradictory data.
166. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
167. Portes and Landolt, "The downside of social capital."
168. Coleman, for example, recognized that social capital "not only facilitates certain actions but also constrains others," but his examples indicate that he was more concerned with showing how social capital could prevent undesirable behavior (crime, lying) just as it could encourage good behavior. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, 311. As I show in detail below, however, certain combinations of social capital can in fact undermine desirable behavior and support destructive behavior.
169. See, for example, the positive relation among local associations, governance, and economic performance in the United States reported in Tom Rice and Alexander Sumberg, "Civic culture and government performance in the American states," mimeo (Ames, Ia.: Department of Political Science, Iowa State University, 1995), John Helliwell, "Do borders matter for social capital? Economic growth and civic culture in U.S. states and Canadian provinces," mimeo (Vancouver: Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, 1996), and Helliwell, "Empirical linkages between democracy and economic growth," British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 225-248. where "old" states such as Vermont and Massachusetts performed best of all. These findings do not support the arguments made in Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations.
170. See, for example, the positive relation among local associations, governance, and economic performance in the United States reported in Tom Rice and Alexander Sumberg, "Civic culture and government performance in the American states," mimeo (Ames, Ia.: Department of Political Science, Iowa State University, 1995), John Helliwell, "Do borders matter for social capital? Economic growth and civic culture in U.S. states and Canadian provinces," mimeo (Vancouver: Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, 1996), and Helliwell, "Empirical linkages between democracy and economic growth," British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 225-248. where "old" states such as Vermont and Massachusetts performed best of all. These findings do not support the arguments made in Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations.
171. See, for example, the positive relation among local associations, governance, and economic performance in the United States reported in Tom Rice and Alexander Sumberg, "Civic culture and government performance in the American states," mimeo (Ames, Ia.: Department of Political Science, Iowa State University, 1995), John Helliwell, "Do borders matter for social capital? Economic growth and civic culture in U.S. states and Canadian provinces," mimeo (Vancouver: Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, 1996), and Helliwell, "Empirical linkages between democracy and economic growth," British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 225-248. where "old" states such as Vermont and Massachusetts performed best of all. These findings do not support the arguments made in Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations.
172. See, for example, the positive relation among local associations, governance, and economic performance in the United States reported in Tom Rice and Alexander Sumberg, "Civic culture and government performance in the American states," mimeo (Ames, Ia.: Department of Political Science, Iowa State University, 1995), John Helliwell, "Do borders matter for social capital? Economic growth and civic culture in U.S. states and Canadian provinces," mimeo (Vancouver: Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, 1996), and Helliwell, "Empirical linkages between democracy and economic growth," British Journal of Political Science 24/2 (1994): 225-248. where "old" states such as Vermont and Massachusetts performed best of all. These findings do not support the arguments made in Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations.
173. For an overview of this literature, see Ivan Light and Stavros Karageorgis, "The ethnic economic," in Smelser and Swedberg, Handbook of Economic Sociology (chapter 26).
174. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, first edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1890); John Hicks, The Social Framework: An Introduction to Economics (New York: Clarendon Press, 1942). The classical usage of social capital is the sense in which it used by Louis Putterman, "Social capital and development capacity: the example of rural Tanzania," Development Policy Review 13 (1995): 5-22.
175. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, first edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1890); John Hicks, The Social Framework: An Introduction to Economics (New York: Clarendon Press, 1942). The classical usage of social capital is the sense in which it used by Louis Putterman, "Social capital and development capacity: the example of rural Tanzania," Development Policy Review 13 (1995): 5-22.
176. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, first edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1890); John Hicks, The Social Framework: An Introduction to Economics (New York: Clarendon Press, 1942). The classical usage of social capital is the sense in which it used by Louis Putterman, "Social capital and development capacity: the example of rural Tanzania," Development Policy Review 13 (1995): 5-22.
177. Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977),
178. Hirschman, "Rival views of market society," Journal of Economic Literature 20 (1982): 1463-1484.
179. Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist."
180. David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press), 169.
181. Albert Hirschman. "Interest," in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, editors, The Invisible Hand (The New Palgrave) (London: Macmillan, 1987), 160 . The passages from McNally and Hirschman both come from Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist."
182. Albert Hirschman. "Interest," in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, editors, The Invisible Hand (The New Palgrave) (London: Macmillan, 1987), 160 . The passages from McNally and Hirschman both come from Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist."
183. See Jerry Evensky, "The role of community values in modern classical liberal economic thought," Scottish Journal of Political Economy 39/1 (1992): 21-38; Evensky, "Ethics and the invisible hand," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7/2 (1993): 197-205; and Jerry Muller, Adam Smith in his Time and Ours: Designing the Decent Society (New York: The Free Press). Evensky (pers. comm., 1997) claims that Smith planned but never wrote the "third leg" of what was supposed to be a three-volume treatise on economic growth and the evolution of society; the unwritten volume was to address the issue of jurisprudence.
184. See Jerry Evensky, "The role of community values in modern classical liberal economic thought," Scottish Journal of Political Economy 39/1 (1992): 21-38; Evensky, "Ethics and the invisible hand," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7/2 (1993): 197-205; and Jerry Muller, Adam Smith in his Time and Ours: Designing the Decent Society (New York: The Free Press). Evensky (pers. comm., 1997) claims that Smith planned but never wrote the "third leg" of what was supposed to be a three-volume treatise on economic growth and the evolution of society; the unwritten volume was to address the issue of jurisprudence.
185. See Jerry Evensky, "The role of community values in modern classical liberal economic thought," Scottish Journal of Political Economy 39/1 (1992): 21-38; Evensky, "Ethics and the invisible hand," Journal of Economic Perspectives 7/2 (1993): 197-205; and Jerry Muller, Adam Smith in his Time and Ours: Designing the Decent Society (New York: The Free Press). Evensky (pers. comm., 1997) claims that Smith planned but never wrote the "third leg" of what was supposed to be a three-volume treatise on economic growth and the evolution of society; the unwritten volume was to address the issue of jurisprudence.
186. Adam Muller's notion of spiritual capital embodied both cultural values and "the organic unity of society and state." While an ardent anti-capitalist, anti-industrialist and otherwise eccentric character, Muller was nevertheless "one of the first to raise - though rudimentarily - the social question." H. Reich, entry for "Adam Muller," in The New Palgrave (New York: The Stockton Press, 1987), 561.
187. Randall Collins, Four Sociological Traditions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
188. Richard Swedberg, "Economic sociology: past and present," Current Sociology 35/1 (1987): 1-215; Swedberg, "Major traditions of economic sociology."
189. Richard Swedberg, "Economic sociology: past and present," Current Sociology 35/1 (1987): 1-215; Swedberg, "Major traditions of economic sociology."
190. Portes and Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and immigration," 1321. Cf. the alternative definitions in endnote 2.
191. The classic intermediary position is, of course, the de Tocquevillian one, represented most compellingly in the work of Putnam, Making Democracy Work, in which a vibrant civil society acts to reconcile the "passions" of the micro level and the "interests" of the macro. As I argued above, however, Putnam's thesis as currently constituted does not resolve adequately the different uses of social capital at the micro and macro levels. Designating the comparative institutionalist work as "macro" is done mainly for heuristic purposes; this work, unlike the true macro-sociological work of Braudel, Wallerstein, or Mann, is perhaps more accurately identified as operating at the intersection of the macro and "meso" levels (i.e., the social ties crossing the public-private divide), but I find this latter term cumber-some. For our purposes, "the macro level" is simply short-hand for the formal business, political, and social organizations of society.
192. Mark Granovetter, "Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 493.
193. Polanyi argued, for example, that as a result of the structural transformation, "the noncontractual organizations of kinship, neighborhood, profession and creed were . . . liquidated since they claimed the allegiance of the individual and thus restrained his [economic] freedom." Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957 [1944]), 163 (emphasis added).
194. For a more detailed review of the idea of embeddedness, see Bernard Barber, "All economies are embedded: the career of a concept and beyond," Social Research 62/2 (1995): 387-413.
195. See Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975); and Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985).
196. See Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975); and Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985).
197. Ronald Coase, "The nature of the firm," Econometrica 4 (1937): 386-405.
198. The argument is not that the distinction between "formal" and "informal" does not matter - it clearly does in the case of contracts, for example - but rather that it should not be the basis for defining the boundary between a "market" and a firm (or "hierarchy"). Douglas North, whose recent work has been increasingly open to the input of non-economists, also stresses the idea that informal social mechanisms continue to be important even in highly advanced economies. "[F]ormal rules," he contends, "in even the most developed country, make up a small (although very important) part of the sum of constraints that shape choices; a moment's reflection should suggest to us the pervasiveness of informal constraints." Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 36.
199. Granovetter, "Economic action and social structure," 502.
200. Granovetter, "The strength of weak ties."
201. Ferdinand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. Vol. 2, The Wheels of Commerce (London: Fontana Press, 1985), 227. Cited in Richard Swedberg and Mark Granovetter, "Introduction," in Granovetter and Swedberg, editors, The Sociology of Economic Life (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 12.
202. Ferdinand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. Vol. 2, The Wheels of Commerce (London: Fontana Press, 1985), 227. Cited in Richard Swedberg and Mark Granovetter, "Introduction," in Granovetter and Swedberg, editors, The Sociology of Economic Life (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 12.
203. See Sharon Zukin and Paul DiMaggio, "Introduction," in Zukin and DiMaggio, editors, Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
204. "Dilemmas of collective action" is a term used predominantly by rational choice and game theorists - e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Penguin, 1984); Garrett Hardin, "The tragedy of the commons," Science 162: 1243-1248; Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Ostrom, Governing the Commons - to refer to what other social-science traditions call the "problem of order." The classical sociologists, along with Parsons and most recently Wrong, held this to be "the most fundamental and general question in social theory," Dennis Wrong, The Problem of Order (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 7. The problem of order has been addressed extensively by the normative/functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons, structuralists such as Marx and Dahrendorf, and the psychoanalytic theory of Freud - see Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987), and Wrong, The Problem of Order. Specifically, dilemmas of collective action are those situations in which, absent credible monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, individuals fail to cooperate for mutual benefit. As Putnam puts it, "the performance of all social institutions, from international credit markets to regional governments to bus queues, depends on how these problems are resolved." Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 164.
205. "Dilemmas of collective action" is a term used predominantly by rational choice and game theorists - e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Penguin, 1984); Garrett Hardin, "The tragedy of the commons," Science 162: 1243-1248; Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Ostrom, Governing the Commons - to refer to what other social-science traditions call the "problem of order." The classical sociologists, along with Parsons and most recently Wrong, held this to be "the most fundamental and general question in social theory," Dennis Wrong, The Problem of Order (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 7. The problem of order has been addressed extensively by the normative/functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons, structuralists such as Marx and Dahrendorf, and the psychoanalytic theory of Freud - see Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987), and Wrong, The Problem of Order. Specifically, dilemmas of collective action are those situations in which, absent credible monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, individuals fail to cooperate for mutual benefit. As Putnam puts it, "the performance of all social institutions, from international credit markets to regional governments to bus queues, depends on how these problems are resolved." Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 164.
206. "Dilemmas of collective action" is a term used predominantly by rational choice and game theorists - e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Penguin, 1984); Garrett Hardin, "The tragedy of the commons," Science 162: 1243-1248; Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Ostrom, Governing the Commons - to refer to what other social-science traditions call the "problem of order." The classical sociologists, along with Parsons and most recently Wrong, held this to be "the most fundamental and general question in social theory," Dennis Wrong, The Problem of Order (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 7. The problem of order has been addressed extensively by the normative/functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons, structuralists such as Marx and Dahrendorf, and the psychoanalytic theory of Freud - see Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987), and Wrong, The Problem of Order. Specifically, dilemmas of collective action are those situations in which, absent credible monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, individuals fail to cooperate for mutual benefit. As Putnam puts it, "the performance of all social institutions, from international credit markets to regional governments to bus queues, depends on how these problems are resolved." Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 164.
207. "Dilemmas of collective action" is a term used predominantly by rational choice and game theorists - e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Penguin, 1984); Garrett Hardin, "The tragedy of the commons," Science 162: 1243-1248; Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Ostrom, Governing the Commons - to refer to what other social-science traditions call the "problem of order." The classical sociologists, along with Parsons and most recently Wrong, held this to be "the most fundamental and general question in social theory," Dennis Wrong, The Problem of Order (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 7. The problem of order has been addressed extensively by the normative/functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons, structuralists such as Marx and Dahrendorf, and the psychoanalytic theory of Freud - see Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987), and Wrong, The Problem of Order. Specifically, dilemmas of collective action are those situations in which, absent credible monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, individuals fail to cooperate for mutual benefit. As Putnam puts it, "the performance of all social institutions, from international credit markets to regional governments to bus queues, depends on how these problems are resolved." Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 164.
208. "Dilemmas of collective action" is a term used predominantly by rational choice and game theorists - e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Penguin, 1984); Garrett Hardin, "The tragedy of the commons," Science 162: 1243-1248; Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Ostrom, Governing the Commons - to refer to what other social-science traditions call the "problem of order." The classical sociologists, along with Parsons and most recently Wrong, held this to be "the most fundamental and general question in social theory," Dennis Wrong, The Problem of Order (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 7. The problem of order has been addressed extensively by the normative/functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons, structuralists such as Marx and Dahrendorf, and the psychoanalytic theory of Freud - see Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987), and Wrong, The Problem of Order. Specifically, dilemmas of collective action are those situations in which, absent credible monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, individuals fail to cooperate for mutual benefit. As Putnam puts it, "the performance of all social institutions, from international credit markets to regional governments to bus queues, depends on how these problems are resolved." Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 164.
209. "Dilemmas of collective action" is a term used predominantly by rational choice and game theorists - e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Penguin, 1984); Garrett Hardin, "The tragedy of the commons," Science 162: 1243-1248; Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Ostrom, Governing the Commons - to refer to what other social-science traditions call the "problem of order." The classical sociologists, along with Parsons and most recently Wrong, held this to be "the most fundamental and general question in social theory," Dennis Wrong, The Problem of Order (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 7. The problem of order has been addressed extensively by the normative/functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons, structuralists such as Marx and Dahrendorf, and the psychoanalytic theory of Freud - see Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987), and Wrong, The Problem of Order. Specifically, dilemmas of collective action are those situations in which, absent credible monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, individuals fail to cooperate for mutual benefit. As Putnam puts it, "the performance of all social institutions, from international credit markets to regional governments to bus queues, depends on how these problems are resolved." Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 164.
210. "Dilemmas of collective action" is a term used predominantly by rational choice and game theorists - e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Penguin, 1984); Garrett Hardin, "The tragedy of the commons," Science 162: 1243-1248; Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Ostrom, Governing the Commons - to refer to what other social-science traditions call the "problem of order." The classical sociologists, along with Parsons and most recently Wrong, held this to be "the most fundamental and general question in social theory," Dennis Wrong, The Problem of Order (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 7. The problem of order has been addressed extensively by the normative/functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons, structuralists such as Marx and Dahrendorf, and the psychoanalytic theory of Freud - see Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987), and Wrong, The Problem of Order. Specifically, dilemmas of collective action are those situations in which, absent credible monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, individuals fail to cooperate for mutual benefit. As Putnam puts it, "the performance of all social institutions, from international credit markets to regional governments to bus queues, depends on how these problems are resolved." Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 164.
211. "Dilemmas of collective action" is a term used predominantly by rational choice and game theorists - e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Penguin, 1984); Garrett Hardin, "The tragedy of the commons," Science 162: 1243-1248; Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Ostrom, Governing the Commons - to refer to what other social-science traditions call the "problem of order." The classical sociologists, along with Parsons and most recently Wrong, held this to be "the most fundamental and general question in social theory," Dennis Wrong, The Problem of Order (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 7. The problem of order has been addressed extensively by the normative/functionalist theories of Durkheim and Parsons, structuralists such as Marx and Dahrendorf, and the psychoanalytic theory of Freud - see Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987), and Wrong, The Problem of Order. Specifically, dilemmas of collective action are those situations in which, absent credible monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, individuals fail to cooperate for mutual benefit. As Putnam puts it, "the performance of all social institutions, from international credit markets to regional governments to bus queues, depends on how these problems are resolved." Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 164.
212. On the emergence of the macro-level wing of the new sociology of economic development (i.e., "the new comparative political economy") during the 1980s, see Peter Evans and John Stephens, "Development and the world economy," in Neil Smelser, editor, Handbook of Sociology ( Beverly Hills: Sage, 1988).
213. See Mark Granovetter, "The economic sociology of firms and entrepreneurs," in Portes, editor. The Economic Sociology of Immigration ; and Portes, "Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: a conceptual overview." The comparative institutionalists were the late-comers to this conceptualization; it is only recently that the connection is finally made explicit: "Social capital inheres, not just in civil society, but in an enduring set of relationships that span the public-private divide . . . it is social capital built in the interstices between state and society that keeps [economic] growth on track." Peter Evans, "Government action, social capital and development: reviewing the evidence on synergy," World Development 24/6(1996): 1122.
214. See Mark Granovetter, "The economic sociology of firms and entrepreneurs," in Portes, editor. The Economic Sociology of Immigration ; and Portes, "Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: a conceptual overview." The comparative institutionalists were the late-comers to this conceptualization; it is only recently that the connection is finally made explicit: "Social capital inheres, not just in civil society, but in an enduring set of relationships that span the public-private divide . . . it is social capital built in the interstices between state and society that keeps [economic] growth on track." Peter Evans, "Government action, social capital and development: reviewing the evidence on synergy," World Development 24/6(1996): 1122.
215. Portes and Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and immigration."
216. Portes, "Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration."
217. Rueschemeyer and Evans, "The state and economic transformation."
218. Thorston Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966 [1915]); Polanyi, The Great Transformation; Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development; Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
219. Thorston Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966 [1915]); Polanyi, The Great Transformation; Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development; Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
220. Thorston Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966 [1915]); Polanyi, The Great Transformation; Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development; Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
221. Thorston Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966 [1915]); Polanyi, The Great Transformation; Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development; Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
222. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
223. Peter Evans, "Predatory, developmental and other apparatuses: a comparative political economy perspective on the third world state," Sociological Forum 4/4 (1989): 561-587; Evans, "The state as problem and solution: predation, embedded autonomy, and structural change," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, editors, The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
224. Peter Evans, "Predatory, developmental and other apparatuses: a comparative political economy perspective on the third world state," Sociological Forum 4/4 (1989): 561-587; Evans, "The state as problem and solution: predation, embedded autonomy, and structural change," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, editors, The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
225. Peter Evans, "Predatory, developmental and other apparatuses: a comparative political economy perspective on the third world state," Sociological Forum 4/4 (1989): 561-587; Evans, "The state as problem and solution: predation, embedded autonomy, and structural change," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, editors, The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
226. Peter Evans, "Predatory, developmental and other apparatuses: a comparative political economy perspective on the third world state," Sociological Forum 4/4 (1989): 561-587; Evans, "The state as problem and solution: predation, embedded autonomy, and structural change," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, editors, The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
227. Peter Evans, "Predatory, developmental and other apparatuses: a comparative political economy perspective on the third world state," Sociological Forum 4/4 (1989): 561-587; Evans, "The state as problem and solution: predation, embedded autonomy, and structural change," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, editors, The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
228. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
229. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
230. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
231. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
232. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
233. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
234. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
235. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
236. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
237. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
238. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
239. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
240. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
241. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
242. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
243. For related work, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981); Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, culture and authority: a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east," American Journal of Sociology 94/Supplement (1988): S52-S94; Dietrich Ruescherneyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1355-1369; Merile Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Grindle, "Divergent cultures? When public organizations perform well in developing countries," World Development 25/4 (1997): 481-495, Patrick Heller, "Social capital as a product of class mobilization and state intervention: industrial workers in Kerala, India," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1055-1071; Jonathan Fox, "How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural Mexico," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1089-1103; and Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). For a critique of this school, centered on Evans's Embedded Autonomy, see the review symposium in Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996). The comparative institutionalist approach is also known as historical institutionalism - see, for example, Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, editors, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) - though the latter holds more stringently to rational-choice assumptions. While still regarded with great skepticism in some quarters, the insights of the comparative institutionalists have slowly begun to make their presence felt in "official" interpretations of seminal events such as the so-called East Asian miracle; see, for example, World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Joseph Stiglitz, "Some lessons from the East Asia miracle," World Bank Research Observer 11/2 (1996): 151-177.
244. My distinction between "static" dilemmas of collective action and "dynamic" organizational dilemmas of development is thus a qualitative one, and should not be confused with equivalent terms used by game theorists in which the latter are simply repeated (or "iterated") instances of the former.
245. Linkage incorporates, but is not limited to, the widely-used socio-political concept of civic engagement.
246. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: The Free Press, 1984 [1893]) . Durkheim, of course, drew on and extended Tönnies' similar distinction between the familial and traditional social relations characterizing gemeinschaft (community) and weaker ties associated with an expanding division of labor and the transition to gesellschaft (society or association). Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft) (New York: Harper and Row, 1963 [1887]).
247. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: The Free Press, 1984 [1893]) . Durkheim, of course, drew on and extended Tönnies' similar distinction between the familial and traditional social relations characterizing gemeinschaft (community) and weaker ties associated with an expanding division of labor and the transition to gesellschaft (society or association). Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft) (New York: Harper and Row, 1963 [1887]).
248. William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Wilson, When Work Disappears.
249. William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Wilson, When Work Disappears.
250. Robert Klitgaard and Johannes Fedderke, "Social integration and disintegration: an exploratory analysis of the data," World Development 23/3 (1995): 357-369.
251. Wilson argues compellingly for the importance of both integration and linkage in understanding the plight of residents of contemporary inner-city ghettos: "On the basis of research conducted by the University of Chicago's Center for the Study of Urban Inequality . . . it appears that what many impoverished and dangerous neighborhoods have in common is a relatively high degree of social integration (high levels of local neighboring while being relatively isolated from contacts in the broader mainstream society) and low levels of informal social control (feelings that they have little control over their immediate environment, including the environment's negative influences on their children). In such areas, not only are children at risk because of the lack of informal social controls, they are also disadvantaged because the social interaction among neighbors tends to be confined to those whose skills, styles, orientations, and habits are not as conducive to promoting positive social outcomes (academic success, pro-social behavior, etc.) as are those in more stable neighborhoods. Although the close interaction among neighbors in such areas may be useful in devising strategies, disseminating information, and developing styles of behavior that are helpful in a ghetto (teaching children to avoid eye contact with strangers and to develop a tough demeanor in the public sphere: for protection), they may be less effective in promoting the welfare of children in the society at large." Wilson, When Work Disappears, 63-64 (emphasis added). Ulf Hannerz, Soulside: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 969) and J. MacLeod, Ain't No Making It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low-Income Neighborhood (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) tell similar stories to explain the divergent fortunes of black and white youths from poor communities in the United States. For a recent complementary argument on urban poverty in developing countries, see Caroline Moser, Confronting Crisis: A Comparative Study of Household Responses to Poverty and Vulnerability in Four Poor Urban Communities (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996). See also David M. Cutter and Edward L. Glaeser, "Are ghettos good or bad?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 62/3 (1997): 827-872.
252. Wilson argues compellingly for the importance of both integration and linkage in understanding the plight of residents of contemporary inner-city ghettos: "On the basis of research conducted by the University of Chicago's Center for the Study of Urban Inequality . . . it appears that what many impoverished and dangerous neighborhoods have in common is a relatively high degree of social integration (high levels of local neighboring while being relatively isolated from contacts in the broader mainstream society) and low levels of informal social control (feelings that they have little control over their immediate environment, including the environment's negative influences on their children). In such areas, not only are children at risk because of the lack of informal social controls, they are also disadvantaged because the social interaction among neighbors tends to be confined to those whose skills, styles, orientations, and habits are not as conducive to promoting positive social outcomes (academic success, pro-social behavior, etc.) as are those in more stable neighborhoods. Although the close interaction among neighbors in such areas may be useful in devising strategies, disseminating information, and developing styles of behavior that are helpful in a ghetto (teaching children to avoid eye contact with strangers and to develop a tough demeanor in the public sphere: for protection), they may be less effective in promoting the welfare of children in the society at large." Wilson, When Work Disappears, 63-64 (emphasis added). Ulf Hannerz, Soulside: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and
253. Wilson argues compellingly for the importance of both integration and linkage in understanding the plight of residents of contemporary inner-city ghettos: "On the basis of research conducted by the University of Chicago's Center for the Study of Urban Inequality . . . it appears that what many impoverished and dangerous neighborhoods have in common is a relatively high degree of social integration (high levels of local neighboring while being relatively isolated from contacts in the broader mainstream society) and low levels of informal social control (feelings that they have little control over their immediate environment, including the environment's negative influences on their children). In such areas, not only are children at risk because of the lack of informal social controls, they are also disadvantaged because the social interaction among neighbors tends to be confined to those whose skills, styles, orientations, and habits are not as conducive to promoting positive social outcomes (academic success, pro-social behavior, etc.) as are those in more stable neighborhoods. Although the close interaction among neighbors in such areas may be useful in devising strategies, disseminating information, and developing styles of behavior that are helpful in a ghetto (teaching children to avoid eye contact with strangers and to develop a tough demeanor in the public sphere: for protection), they may be less effective in promoting the welfare of children in the society at large." Wilson, When Work Disappears, 63-64 (emphasis added). Ulf Hannerz, Soulside: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 969) and J. MacLeod, Ain't No Making It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low-Income Neighborhood (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) tell similar stories to explain the divergent fortunes of black and white youths from poor communities in the United States. For a recent complementary argument on urban poverty in developing countries, see Caroline Moser, Confronting Crisis: A Comparative Study of Household Responses to Poverty and Vulnerability in Four Poor Urban Communities (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996). See also David M. Cutter and Edward L. Glaeser, "Are ghettos good or bad?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 62/3 (1997): 827-872.
254. Wilson argues compellingly for the importance of both integration and linkage in understanding the plight of residents of contemporary inner-city ghettos: "On the basis of research conducted by the University of Chicago's Center for the Study of Urban Inequality . . . it appears that what many impoverished and dangerous neighborhoods have in common is a relatively high degree of social integration (high levels of local neighboring while being relatively isolated from contacts in the broader mainstream society) and low levels of informal social control (feelings that they have little control over their immediate environment, including the environment's negative influences on their children). In such areas, not only are children at risk because of the lack of informal social controls, they are also disadvantaged because the social interaction among neighbors tends to be confined to those whose skills, styles, orientations, and habits are not as conducive to promoting positive social outcomes (academic success, pro-social behavior, etc.) as are those in more stable neighborhoods. Although the close interaction among neighbors in such areas may be useful in devising strategies, disseminating information, and developing styles of behavior that are helpful in a ghetto (teaching children to avoid eye contact with strangers and to develop a tough demeanor in the public sphere: for protection), they may be less effective in promoting the welfare of children in the society at large." Wilson, When Work Disappears, 63-64 (emphasis added). Ulf Hannerz, Soulside: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 969) and J. MacLeod, Ain't No Making It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low-Income Neighborhood (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) tell similar stories to explain the divergent fortunes of black and white youths from poor communities in the United States. For a recent complementary argument on urban poverty in developing countries, see Caroline Moser, Confronting Crisis: A Comparative Study of Household Responses to Poverty and Vulnerability in Four Poor Urban Communities (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996). See also David M. Cutter and Edward L. Glaeser, "Are ghettos good or bad?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 62/3 (1997): 827-872.
255. Wilson argues compellingly for the importance of both integration and linkage in understanding the plight of residents of contemporary inner-city ghettos: "On the basis of research conducted by the University of Chicago's Center for the Study of Urban Inequality . . . it appears that what many impoverished and dangerous neighborhoods have in common is a relatively high degree of social integration (high levels of local neighboring while being relatively isolated from contacts in the broader mainstream society) and low levels of informal social control (feelings that they have little control over their immediate environment, including the environment's negative influences on their children). In such areas, not only are children at risk because of the lack of informal social controls, they are also disadvantaged because the social interaction among neighbors tends to be confined to those whose skills, styles, orientations, and habits are not as conducive to promoting positive social outcomes (academic success, pro-social behavior, etc.) as are those in more stable neighborhoods. Although the close interaction among neighbors in such areas may be useful in devising strategies, disseminating information, and developing styles of behavior that are helpful in a ghetto (teaching children to avoid eye contact with strangers and to develop a tough demeanor in the public sphere: for protection), they may be less effective in promoting the welfare of children in the society at large." Wilson, When Work Disappears, 63-64 (emphasis added). Ulf Hannerz, Soulside: Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 969) and J. MacLeod, Ain't No Making It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low-Income Neighborhood (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) tell similar stories to explain the divergent fortunes of black and white youths from poor communities in the United States. For a recent complementary argument on urban poverty in developing countries, see Caroline Moser, Confronting Crisis: A Comparative Study of Household Responses to Poverty and Vulnerability in Four Poor Urban Communities (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996). See also David M. Cutter and Edward L. Glaeser, "Are ghettos good or bad?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 62/3 (1997): 827-872.
256. Georg Simmel, "Group expansion and the development of individuality," in Donald Levine, editor, Georg Simmel: On Individuality and Social Forms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1971 [1908]), 253, 255.
257. See Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Ross and Claus Wittich, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968 [1922]), and Weber, General Economic History, translated by Frank Knight (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1923 [1981]).
258. See Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Ross and Claus Wittich, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968 [1922]), and Weber, General Economic History, translated by Frank Knight (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1923 [1981]).
259. Weber, Economy and Society, 1394-1395.
260. Weber, ibid., 1393.
261. For a comprehensive overview of the development of Weber's theory of capitalism, see Randall Collins, "Weber's last theory of capitalism: a systemization" American Sociological Review 45/December (1980): 925-942 (1980).
262. Evans, Embedded Autonomy, 39.
263. Evans, "Government action, social capital and development," 1120.
264. Evans distinguishes between two types of synergy. The first is what he calls complementarity, i.e., "the conventional way of conceptualizing mutually supportive relations between public and private actors. It suggests a clear division of labor, based on the contrasting properties of public and private institutions . . . [and] fits nicely with existing paradigms in institutional economics and public administration . . [forcing] no rethinking of the public-private divide." Evans, "Government action, social capital and development," 1120. The second type of synergy is embeddedness, in the sense in which this term it has been discussed above at the macro level. It is the synergy-as-embeddedness aspect that I adopt in this article.
265. Randall Collins, commenting on Weber's understanding of the role of institutions in shaping the emergence of capitalism. Collins, "Weber's last theory of capitalism," 935.
266. Norman Uphoff, "Grassroots organizations and NGOs in rural development: opportunities with diminishing states and expanding markets," World Development 21 /4 (1993): 607-622.
267. Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions (New York: Bonanza, 1954), 54.
268. Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958). Amoral familism corresponds to Hirschman's notion of "group-focused" development. See Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (chapter 1).
269. Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958). Amoral familism corresponds to Hirschman's notion of "group-focused" development. See Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (chapter 1).
270. Platteau, "Behind the market stage where real societies exist," 799.
271. The historical transition, from a general ethos of favors to insiders and hostility to outsiders to a more universal and shared sense of fairness to all, is the central thesis of Nelson's account of the emergence of the modern financial system. See Benjamin Nelson, The Idea of Usury (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).
272. John Toye, Dilemmas of Development (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
273. Christopher Colclough, "Structuralism versus neo-liberalism: an introduction," in Christopher Colclough and James Manor, editors, States or Markets? Neo-Liberalism and the Development Policy Debate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
274. Holmes, "What Russia teaches us now," 37.
275. Sudhir Kakar, The Inner World (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978).
276. Putnam, Making Democracy Work; Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
277. Putnam, Making Democracy Work; Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
278. Paul Kennedy, African Capitalism: The Struggle for Ascendancy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
279. See Colin Turnbull, The Mountain People (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972).
280. For a more recent but equally telling example, consider the following passage from Klitgaard's (1990: 169) tale of the vicissitudes of economic development in Equatorial Guinea: "The women spend hours every day tending [malangas] and other food. . . . When the malangas are harvested after eleven months, they are placed in one hundred eighty-seven pound bags and taken to market. Each women feels compelled to take her own bag or bags to market. 'I don't trust my neighbor to sell the malanga for me,' one woman explained after several of my questions, apparently surprised that I was surprised. 'Why? I just do not. She would not give me the correct price or would take the money.' Even a woman in your village, your neighbor? 'Yes, I do not trust them.' Consequently each woman for each bag pays not only the bag's transportation but her own, and has to defray the cost of living for six days in the market - the time it takes to sell the one hundred eighty-seven pounds in small retail batches. . . . The marketing costs paid by the women come to about two-thirds of the sale price of twenty-five to thirty dollars a bag - or more than twice the cost of production."
281. 105. Mother Teresa's work in the slums of Calcutta, especially at Kalighat, the Home for the Dying, takes on a special significance in this context. Kalighat is for those with terminal illnesses living in adject poverty, who have no family or community to look after them. Already without physical, financial, and human capital, it can be argued that these individuals are truly the "poorest of the poor" precisely because they also lack social capital. Consider the following passage from Navin Chawla, in which a Sister is discussing aspects of the admissions procedure to Kalighat: "One of the small problems we face," said a Sister, "is to distinguish between 'street cases' and 'family cases'. 'Street cases' are the destitutes, the abandoned. They have no-one to look after them. No family, no relatives, no-one who loves them enough to wish to keep them. 'Family cases' are those where families are unable or unwilling to take care of their members . . . They often come here and say 'I have fallen ill. I have nowhere to lie down. The market is so crowded. It is only at night that I get a little corner to sleep in. I have nowhere to go.'" Navin Chawla, Mother Teresa: The Authorized Biography (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1992), 164.
282. Anomie in this instance corresponds to Hirschman's notion of "ego-focused" development. See Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic (chapter 1).
283. Hagan, Merkins, and Boehnke, "Delinquency and disdain."
284. Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope"; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism"; Richard Rose, "Russia as a hour-glass society: a constitution without citizens," East European Constitutional Review 4/3 (1995): 34-42; Ronald Inglehart, "The impact of culture on economic development: theory, hypotheses and some empirical tests," mimeo. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994); Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Woller, "Social capital and citizen support."
285. Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope"; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism"; Richard Rose, "Russia as a hour-glass society: a constitution without citizens," East European Constitutional Review 4/3 (1995): 34-42; Ronald Inglehart, "The impact of culture on economic development: theory, hypotheses and some empirical tests," mimeo. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994); Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Woller, "Social capital and citizen support."
286. Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope"; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism"; Richard Rose, "Russia as a hour-glass society: a constitution without citizens," East European Constitutional Review 4/3 (1995): 34-42; Ronald Inglehart, "The impact of culture on economic development: theory, hypotheses and some empirical tests," mimeo. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994); Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Woller, "Social capital and citizen support."
287. Mishler and Rose, "Trajectories of fear and hope"; Mishler and Rose, "Trust, distrust, and skepticism"; Richard Rose, "Russia as a hour-glass society: a constitution without citizens," East European Constitutional Review 4/3 (1995): 34-42; Ronald Inglehart, "The impact of culture on economic development: theory, hypotheses and some empirical tests," mimeo. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994); Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Woller, "Social capital and citizen support."
288. J. Galtung, "On the social cost of modernization. Social disintegration, atomie/ anomie and social development," Development and Change 27/2 (1996): 379-413.
289. Alejandro Portes, "Children of immigrants: segmented assimilation and its determinants," in Portes, editor, The Economic Sociology of Immigration, 264 (emphasis added).
290. See Brian Roberts, "Socially expected durations and the economic adjustment of immigrants," in Portes, editor, The Economic Sociology of Immigration.
291. Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles, 1965-1982 (Berkeley: University of California Press); I. Light, I. Kwoun, and D. Zhong, "Korean rotating credit associations in Los Angeles" Amerasia 16/1 (1990): 35-54.
292. Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles, 1965-1982 (Berkeley: University of California Press); I. Light, I. Kwoun, and D. Zhong, "Korean rotating credit associations in Los Angeles" Amerasia 16/1 (1990): 35-54.
293. Light and Karageorgis, "The ethnic economy."
294. Portes and Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and immigration."
295. Cited in Portes and Landolt, "The downside of social capital," 20. For related argument by students of ethnic entrepreneurship, see, among other citations, Roger Waldinger, "Immigrant enterprise," Theory and Society 15 (1986): 249-285; Waldinger, Still the Promised City? African-Americans and New Immigrants in Postindustrial New York (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Roger Waldinger, Howard Aldrich, and R. Ward, Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant and Ethnic Business in Western Industrial Societies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1990); Alejan
296. Cited in Portes and Landolt, "The downside of social capital," 20. For related argument by students of ethnic entrepreneurship, see, among other citations, Roger Waldinger, "Immigrant enterprise," Theory and Society 15 (1986): 249-285; Waldinger, Still the Promised City? African-Americans and New Immigrants in Postindustrial New York (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Roger Waldinger, Howard Aldrich, and R. Ward, Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant and Ethnic Business in Western Industrial Societies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1990); Alejan
297. Cited in Portes and Landolt, "The downside of social capital," 20. For related argument by students of ethnic entrepreneurship, see, among other citations, Roger Waldinger, "Immigrant enterprise," Theory and Society 15 (1986): 249-285; Waldinger, Still the Promised City? African-Americans and New Immigrants in Postindustrial New York (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Roger Waldinger, Howard Aldrich, and R. Ward, Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant and Ethnic Business in Western Industrial Societies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1990); Alejan
298. Cited in Portes and Landolt, "The downside of social capital," 20. For related argument by students of ethnic entrepreneurship, see, among other citations, Roger Waldinger, "Immigrant enterprise," Theory and Society 15 (1986): 249-285; Waldinger, Still the Promised City? African-Americans and New Immigrants in Postindustrial New York (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Roger Waldinger, Howard Aldrich, and R. Ward, Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant and Ethnic Business in Western Industrial Societies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1990); Alejan
299. For a recent review of the empirical evidence supporting the thesis that participation enhances the performance of development projects among the poor, see Jonathan Isham, Deepa Narayan, and Lant Pritchett, "Does participation improve performance? Establishing causality with subjective data," World Bank Economic Review 11/2 (1995): 175-200, which builds on the pioneering work of Milton Esman and Norman Uphoff, Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
300. For a recent review of the empirical evidence supporting the thesis that participation enhances the performance of development projects among the poor, see Jonathan Isham, Deepa Narayan, and Lant Pritchett, "Does participation improve performance? Establishing causality with subjective data," World Bank Economic Review 11/2 (1995): 175-200, which builds on the pioneering work of Milton Esman and Norman Uphoff, Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
301. Cf. Michael Cernea, "Modernization and development potential of traditional grass-roots peasant organizations," in M, Attir, B. Holzner, and Z. Suda, editors, Directions of Change: Modernization Theory, Research and Realities (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), and Albert Hirschman, Getting Ahead Collectively: Grass-roots Organizations in Latin America (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984).
302. Cf. Michael Cernea, "Modernization and development potential of traditional grass-roots peasant organizations," in M, Attir, B. Holzner, and Z. Suda, editors, Directions of Change: Modernization Theory, Research and Realities (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), and Albert Hirschman, Getting Ahead Collectively: Grass-roots Organizations in Latin America (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984).
303. Ian Zartman, editor, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).
304. This position is summed up in a telling comment from a distraught aid worker fleeing Liberia during its collapse in April 1996. "It's administrationless," she declared. Quoted in USAToday, April 12, 1996: A8.
305. Evans, "Predatory, developmental and other apparatuses"; Evans, "The state as problem and solution."
306. See, among others, Tina Rosenberg, Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America (New York: W. Morrow, 1991), and W. Soyinka, The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
307. See, among others, Tina Rosenberg, Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America (New York: W. Morrow, 1991), and W. Soyinka, The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
308. See Ian MacDonald, The New Shostakovich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), Tina Rosenberg, Haunted Land (New York: Random House, 1995), Holmes, "What Russia teaches us now,"
309. See Ian MacDonald, The New Shostakovich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), Tina Rosenberg, Haunted Land (New York: Random House, 1995), Holmes, "What Russia teaches us now,"
310. See Ian MacDonald, The New Shostakovich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), Tina Rosenberg, Haunted Land (New York: Random House, 1995), Holmes, "What Russia teaches us now,"
311. See, for example, Robert Wade. "The market for public office: why the Indian state is not better at development," World Development 13/4 (1985): 467-497, and Pranab Bardhan, "The state and dynamic comparative advantage," in K. Banerji and T. Vakil, editors, India: Joining the World Economy (New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill, 1995).
312. See, for example, Robert Wade. "The market for public office: why the Indian state is not better at development," World Development 13/4 (1985): 467-497, and Pranab Bardhan, "The state and dynamic comparative advantage," in K. Banerji and T. Vakil, editors, India: Joining the World Economy (New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill, 1995).
313. Cf. Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
314. Recent work by Pingle, drawing on the embedded autonomy framework, seeks to identify why certain industries within India have been more developmental than others. See Vibha Pingle, "State-Society Relations and Industrial Policy: A Comparative Historical Analysis of the Steel, Automobile and Computer Sectors in India," Ph.D. dissertation (Providence: Department of Sociology, Brown University, 1996).
315. Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
316. Chalmers Johnson, "Introduction - the Taiwan model," in J. Hsuing et al., editors, Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience (New York: Praeger, 1981); Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle; Johnson, Japan, Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental Slate (New York: Norton, 1995).
317. Chalmers Johnson, "Introduction - the Taiwan model," in J. Hsuing et al., editors, Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience (New York: Praeger, 1981); Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle; Johnson, Japan, Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental Slate (New York: Norton, 1995).
318. Chalmers Johnson, "Introduction - the Taiwan model," in J. Hsuing et al., editors, Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience (New York: Praeger, 1981); Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle; Johnson, Japan, Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental Slate (New York: Norton, 1995).
319. Evans, "The state as problem and solution," 164. See also Evans, Embedded Autonomy.
320. Evans, "The state as problem and solution," 164. See also Evans, Embedded Autonomy.
321. Corruption still occurs, of course, but it is less frequent than elsewhere and does not undermine the overall attainment of societal goals.
322. To be sure, the state does have unique powers and responsibilities - among them being the final arbiter and enforcer of laws - but for developmental purposes the importance of embeddedness and autonomy holds for all "top-down" institutions.
323. Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya, 273.
324. Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
325. Evans, Embedded Autonomy, 229.
326. Cf. Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market.
327. Robert Klitgaard, Tropical Gangsters (New York: Basic Book), 12.
328. Extreme poverty, when experienced as a routine feature of everyday life, is likely to undermine collective action by shortening time horizons, restricting social interaction, intensifying self-interest, and heightening distrust toward strangers. Perpetual uncertainty, stress, and risk thereby combine to establish and then perpetuate a vicious circle. For a related argument, see George Foster, "Peasant society and the image of the limited good," American Anthropologist 67 (1965): 293-315, and Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
329. Extreme poverty, when experienced as a routine feature of everyday life, is likely to undermine collective action by shortening time horizons, restricting social interaction, intensifying self-interest, and heightening distrust toward strangers. Perpetual uncertainty, stress, and risk thereby combine to establish and then perpetuate a vicious circle. For a related argument, see George Foster, "Peasant society and the image of the limited good," American Anthropologist 67 (1965): 293-315, and Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
330. For an overview of the Grameen Bank and its replication, see Alex Counts, Give Us Credit: How Muhammad Yunus's Micro-Lending Revolution is Empowering Women From Bangladesh to Chicago (New York: Times Books, 1996).
331. See endnote 118. The economists Tim Besley and Steven Coate, "Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral," Journal of Development Economics 46 (1995): 1-18, refer to relationships used in this manner as "social collateral."
332. One of the least studied but most important features of Grameen Bank's success is the means by which it has created and sustained its status as a corruption-free organization. Coordinating the diligent performance of twelve-thousand modestly-paid employees dispersed across the whole nation of Bangladesh is an extraordinary institutional achievement in a nation where one witnesses corruption even before passing through customs. For a preliminary discussion of this issue, see Partha Jain, "Managing credit for the rural poor: lessons from the Crameen Bank," World Development 241/1 (1996): 79-89.
333. Robert Merton, "Three fragments from a sociologist's notebook: establishing the phenomena, specified ignorance, and strategic research materials," Annual Review of Sociology 13 (1987): 1-28.
334. None of the authors cited in each case is necessarily the first or only person to recognize these dilemmas, but rather they are the ones who have articulated both a succinct statement of the problem and have made extensive theoretical and empirical attempts to try and resolve them, albeit only at one level.
335. Portes and Landolt, "The downside of social capital," 19.
336. The World Bank provides a list of various empirical indicators of social capital under four different headings - horizontal associations, civil/political society, social integration, legal/governance aspects. As it turns out, these categories correspond closely to the four dimensions of social capital outlined in this article. See World Bank, "Social capital: the missing link?" in Expanding the Measure of Wealth: Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable Development (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1997), 85.
337. Cf. Granovetter, who argues that questions such as "Why do firms exist?" are "syntactically disposed to teleological or functional answers - that firms exist in order to reduce transaction costs, for example. In the case of firms, it is urgent to add the 'bow' question: How is it in circumstances where profits could be made from the formation of a firm, actors are in fact able to construct one?" Mark Granovetler, "Business groups," in Smelser and Swedberg, editors, The Handbook of Economic Sociology, 453.
338. For a firm indication that the World Bank is beginning to construe development in these terms, see Ismail Serageldin, "Sustainability as opportunity and the problem of social capital," Brown Journal of World Affairs III/2 (1996): 187-203.
339. Greif, "Cultural beliefs and the organization of society," 944.
340. Peter Evans, "Introduction: development strategies across the public-private divide," World Development 24/6 (1996): 1033.
341. Scholars working within the modernization and world-systems perspectives continue to produce interesting work, but they no longer enjoy the political and academic influence they once did. For an overview of recent work from both camps, see Alvin Y. So, Social Change and Development (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990) and John Martinussen, Society, State and Market (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1997).
342. Scholars working within the modernization and world-systems perspectives continue to produce interesting work, but they no longer enjoy the political and academic influence they once did. For an overview of recent work from both camps, see Alvin Y. So, Social Change and Development (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990) and John Martinussen, Society, State and Market (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1997).