Writing the Book of the World

Writing the Book of the World

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-336

  Sider, Theodore ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

Carving at the joints; Fundamentality; Ground; Metametaphysics; Metaontology; Natural property; Objectivity; Realism; Structure; Substantivity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922280082     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697908.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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