Against maxcon simples

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 81, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 265-275

  McDaniel, Kris ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847246461     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ajp/jag208     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Armstrong, D.M. 1980. Identity through Time, in Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, ed. Peter van Inwagen, Dordrecht: Reidel: 67-78
2. Baker, Lynne Rudder 1997. Why Constitution Is Not Identity, Journal of Philosophy 94: 599-621,
3. Bricker, Phillip 2001. Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality, in Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays in Honor of David Lewis, ed. G. Preyer and F. Siebelt, Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
4. Cartwright. Richard 1987. Scattered Objects, in Philosophical Essays, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
5. Forrest, Peter 1996. From Ontology to Topology in the Theory of Regions, Monist 79: 35-50.
6. Haslanger, Sally 1989. Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics, Analysis 49: 119-25.
7. Heller, Mark 1991. The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Hinchliff, Mark 1996. The Puzzle of Change, in Philosophical Perspectives 10, Metaphysics, ed. James Tomberlin, Cambridge MA: Blackwell.
9. Hoffman, Joshua and Gary Rosenkrantz 1997. Substance: Its Nature and Existence, London: Routledge.
10. Hudson, Hud 2001. A Materialist Metaphysics of Human Persons, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
11. Jubien, Michael 1993. Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12. Lewis, David 1986. On The Plurality Of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell.
13. Lewis, David 1991. Parts of Classes, Oxford: Blackwell.
14. Lewis, David 1983. Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, New York: Oxford University Press.
15. Markosian, Ned 1998a. Brutal Composition, Philosophical Studies 92: 211-49.
16. Markosian, Ned 1998b. Simples, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 213-26.
17. Mellor, Hugh 1998. Real Time II, London: Routledge.
18. Parsons, Josh 2000. Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts? Monist 83: 399-418.
19. Quine, W. V. O. 1976. Worlds Away, Journal of Philosophy 73: 859-63.
20. Smart, J. J. C. 1963. Philosophy and Scientific Realism, London: Routledge.
21. Sider, Ted 2001. Four Dimensionalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
22. Sider, Ted 1997. Four Dimensionalism, Philosophical Review 106: 197-231.
23. Sider, Ted 2000b. Simply Possible, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60: 585-90.
24. Sider, Ted 1995. Sparseness, Immanence, and Naturalness, Nous 29: 360-77.
25. Sider, Ted 2000a. The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics, Analysis 60: 84-8.
26. Sider, Ted 1993. Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk, Analysis 53: 285-9.
27. Thomson, Judith Jarvis 1983. Parthood and Identity Across Time, Journal of Philosophy 80: 201-20.
28. Van Cleeve, James 1986. Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Across Time, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: 141-56.
29. Van Inwagen, Peter 1981. The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67: 123-37.
30. Van Inwagen, Peter 1990a. Four-Dimensional Objects, Nous 24: 245-56.
31. Van Inwagen, Peter 1990b. Material Beings, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
32. Van Inwagen, Peter, ed. 1980. Time and Came: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, Dordrecht: Reidel.
33. Zimmerman, Dean 2000. Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts? An Argument for Atomless Gunk, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 1-29.