Can 'Intrinsic' be defined using only broadly logical notions?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Volumn 78, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 646-672

  Marshall, Dan ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 65649088316     PISSN: 00318205     EISSN: 19331592     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00259.x     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Kim, J. (1982). Psychophysical Supervenience. Philosophical Studies, 41, 51 70.
2. Langton, R. D. K. Lewis (1998). Redefining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2 333 345.
3. Lewis, D. K. (1983a). Extrinsic Properties. See Lewis (1999) 111 115.
4. Lewis, D. K. (1983b). New Work for a Theory of Universals. See Lewis (1999) 8 55.
5. Lewis, D. K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford : Blackwell.
6. Lewis, D. K. (1999). Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
7. Marshall, D. (ms). Intrinsic Properties. Unpublished manuscript.
8. Marshall, D. J. Parsons (2001). Langton and Lewis on 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2 347 351.
9. Parsons, J. (2001). Theories of Persistence. Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University.
10. Plantinga, A. (1974). The Nature of Necessity. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
11. Sider, T. (1996). Intrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 83, 1 27.
12. Yablo, S. (1999). Intrinsicness. Philosophical Topics 26, 479 505.