Metaphysical Essays

Metaphysical Essays

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-312

  Hawthorne, John ^a  

^a Rutgers University English Department   (United States)

Author keywords

Causation; Identity; John Hawthorne; Metaphysics; Ontology; Vagueness

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922503636     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291236.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (143)

1. Infinity: An Essay in Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 255-9.
2. 'Tasks and Super-Tasks,' Analysis 15 (October 1954), 1-13.
3. 'Tasks, Super-Tasks and the Modern Eleatics,' The Journal of Philosophy, 59 (24), p. 708.
4. See, for example, his introduction to Philosophical Papers Volume II (Oxford University Press, 1986).
5. Cf. Shoemaker 'Causality and Properties', in Identity, Cause and Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 207.
6. 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity,' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998), p. 66.
7. 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity', pp. 69-70.
8. 'Causality and Properties', p. 215.
9. Cf. Lewis, 'Elusive Knowledge', Australian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996), 549-567.
10. 'On The Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge', Philosophical Perspectives 10:Metaphysics (1996), p. 23.
11. The Analysis of Matter (Kegan Paul, 1927), p. 264.
12. See his What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge University Press, 1983).
13. On The Plurality of Worlds (Blackwell, 1986), pp. 87-88.
14. The Analysis of Matter, p. 264.
15. From Metaphysics to Ethics (Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 24.
16. 'The Identity of Indiscernibles,' in Problems of Analysis, (Routledge Kegan Paul, 1984), 80-92.
17. See his 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow', in Philosophical Papers Volume II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 32-66.
18. 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow', p. 60.
19. 'Subjective probability: A judgement of representativeness', in Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (eds.), 32-47.
20. 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow', p. 61
21. Identity and Discrimination (Blackwell, 1990), pp. 128-9.
22. For further relevant and in places overlapping discussion, see John Hawthorne and Tamar Szabo Gendler, 'Origin Essentialism: The Arguments Reconsidered', Mind (April 2000).
23. For additional discussion, see: Graham Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality, (Oxford University Press, 1985)
24. 'The New Riddle of Existence', Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994), 415-430
25. T. McKay, 'Against Constitutional Sufficiency Principles', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, X1 (1986), 295-304
26. N. Salmon, Reference and Essence (Princeton University Press, 1981)
27. 'The Logic of What Might Have Been,' Philosophical Review 98 (1989), 3-34
28. T. Robertson 'Possibilities and the Argument for Origin Essentialism,' Mind 107 (1998), 729-749.
29. See his Vagueness (Routledge, 1994).
30. 'Demonstratives', in J. Almog et al. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan (Oxford University Press, 1989).
31. See, for example, 'Existence and Contingency', Aristotelian Society, sup. vol. 73 (1999), 181-203.
32. Kit Fine, 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic', Synthese 30 (1975).
33. 'Reply to Commentators' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57(4) (December 1997), 947-8.
34. Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Blackwell, 1982).
35. W. V. Quine, Word and Object, (MIT Press, 1960)
36. Hartry Field, Truth and the Absence of Fact, (Oxford University Press, 2001).
37. David Lewis, 'New Work for a Theory of Universals', and 'Putnam's Paradox', in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
38. Alfred North Whitehead, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1919).
39. For an example of this kind of approach, see Josh Parsons, 'Distributional Properties', in Jackson and Priest (eds.), Lewisian Themes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 173-180.
40. H. L. Royden, Real Analysis (New York: MacMillan, 1968), chapter 15.
41. W. V. O. Quine, 'Review of P. T. Geach, Reference and Generality', Philosophical Review 73 (1964), 100-4, p. 101.
42. P. T. Geach, 'Replies', in H. A. Leiws, Philosophical Encounters (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), p. 285.
43. Philosophy of Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 63.
44. Max Black, 'The Identity of Indiscernibles', in J. Kim and E. Sosa (eds.), Metaphysics:An Anthology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1999) (first pub. in Mind, 51 (1952), 153-64.
45. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT University Press, 1960), p. 230.
46. Williamson, 'Vagueness, Identity, and Leibniz's Law' in Giaretta, Bottani, and Carrera (eds.), Individuals, Essence, and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001).
47. For valuable discussions of Geach's views, see Michael Dummett 'Does Quantification Involve Identity?', in his The Seas of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993), 308-27
48. Harold Noonan 'Relative Identity' in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.), Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997) 634-52.
49. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).
50. Crispin Wright Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (New York: Humanities Press, 1983) was helpful to me here.
51. Peter van Inwagen, 'And yet they are not Three Gods but One God' in his God Knowledge, and Mystery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 222-59.
52. Michael Dummett, 'Does Quantification Involve Identity,' in his The Seas of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 308-27, p. 321.
53. Logic Matters (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1972), p. 240.
54. 'Identity and Time' in Michael Rea (ed.), Material Constitution (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 148-72, pp. 155-6.
55. Lewis, 'Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic', p. 46.
56. Eli Hirsch, The Concept of Identity (Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 32.
57. Cf. Ernest Sosa, 'Persons and Other Beings', Philosophical Perspectives 1 (1987), 155-187
58. Stephen Yablo, 'Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility', The Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987), 293-314.
59. John O'Leary-Hawthorne, 'A World of Universals', Philosophical Studies 91 (1998): 205-219
60. Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, (2001)), chapter 4, section 8, respectively.
61. Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1940), chapter VI.
62. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 59-69.
63. Russell, op. cit., p. 120, 127
64. Max Black, 'The Identity of Indiscernibles', Mind 61 (1952): 153-164 (who does not consider the bundle theory explicitly, only the identity of indiscernibles)
65. D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, volume 1:Nominalism and Realism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1978))
66. James Van Cleve, 'Three Versions of the Bundle Theory', Philosophical Studies47 (1985): 95-107.
67. John O'Leary-Hawthorne, "The Bundle Theory of Substance and the Identity of Indiscernibles," Analysis 55 (1995): 205-26.
68. Van Cleve, op. cit., p. 104. But his version of the response presupposes substantivalism about places (see his note 30).
69. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), section 4.4.
70. Michael Friedman, Foundations of Space-Time Theories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983)
71. Brent Mundy, 'Relational Theories of Euclidean Space and Minkowski Space-Time', Philosophy of Science 50 (1983): 205-226.
72. Theodore Sider, 'All the World's a Stage', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 433-453
73. Lewis, Plurality, pp. 202-204.
74. Clifford Truesdell, A First Course in Rational Continuum Mechanics (Academic Press, 1977)
75. 'Acts, Events, and Things', in Language and Ontology, Proceedings of the Sixth International Wittgenstein Symposium (1981), pp. 97-105.
76. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy (1644)
77. Quine, 'Things and Their Place in Theories', in Theories and Things (Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 16.
78. Relevant here is Craig Callender, 'Humean Supervenience and Rotating Homogeneous Matter', Mind 110 (2001), 25-42.
79. 'On The Persistence of Homogeneous Matter' (in preparation)
80. cf. Dean Zimmerman, 'Temporal Parts and Supervenient Causation: The Incompatibility of Two Humean Doctrines,' The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998), pp. 268-269.
81. Dean Zimmerman, 'Immanent Causation', Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1997), 433-471.
82. Philosophical Papers Volumes I and II (Oxford University Press, 1983 and 1986)
83. On The Plurality of Worlds (Blackwell, 1986).
84. David Lewis, 'Zimmerman and the Spinning Sphere', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999), 209-212
85. Cf. Dean Zimmerman, 'Temporal Parts and Supervenient Causation: The Incompatibility of Two Humean Doctrines'.
86. 'Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies', Philosophical Papers Volume I (Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 47-54.
87. Dean Zimmerman. 'One Reaslly Big Liquid Sphere: Reply to Lewis', Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1999) 77, 213-215.
88. Lewis, Counterfactuals (Blackwell, 1973).
89. 'New Work for a Theory of Universals', Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 32-33.
90. Eli Hirsh, 'Physical Identity', Philosophical Review 85 (1976), p. 361.
91. My Convention Lover is based upon Eli Hirsch's writings. See Dividing Reality (Oxford University Press, 1993)
92. 'Quantifier Variance and Realism' in Philosophical Issues 12 (2002), 51-73
93. 'Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense,' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Jan 2005, 67-97.
94. 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' in Meaning and Necessity, 2nd edition (University of Chicago Press, 1956)
95. 'The Question of Realism' in Words and Life (Harvard University Press, 1994))).
96. Timothy Williamson, 'Everything,' in Philosophical Perspectives 17 (Blackwell, 2003), pp. 415-466.
97. Brent Mundy, 'The Metaphysics of Quantity,' Philosophical Studies 51, 29-54
98. 'Quantity, Representation and Geometry', in P. Humphreys (ed.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher Vol 2 (Kluwer, 1994), 59-102.
99. Lewis, 'New Work For a Theory of Universals', Papers In Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 27.
100. Brent Mundy, 'The Metaphysics of Quantity', p. 32.
101. Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe (Vintage 2000).
102. Introduction to Philosophical Papers Volume II (Oxford University Press, 1986), ix.
103. On The Plurality of Worlds, p. 60
104. 'Putnam's Paradox,' Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, p. 66.
105. 'New Work For a Theory of Universals', p. 42.
106. 'Putnam's Paradox', in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, p. 66.
107. On the Plurality of Worlds, p. 61.
108. For Lewis's formulation of the argument from temporary intrinsics, see On the Plurality of Worlds, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 202-5.
109. Ted Sider develops the argument from vagueness in his 'Four-Dimensionalism', Philosophical Review 106 (1997): 197-231, pp. 197-231.
110. Lewis, 'Events', in Philosophical Papers, vol. II (Oxford University Press, 1986), 241-69
111. Cf. Peter van Inwagen, 'The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1987): 123-37, p. 123).
112. Trenton Merricks, 'There are no Criteria of Identity over Time', Nous 32 (1998): 106-24.
113. Lewis, 'Humean Supervenience Debugged,' in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 224-47, p. 227.
114. Michael Rea, 'Temporal Parts Unmotivated', Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 225-60, pp. 249-50
115. D. Robinson 'Matter, Motion and Humean Supervenience', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1989): 394-409.
116. Spinning disc thought experiments are also suggestive here. Particularly relevant is Dean Zimmerman 'Temporal Parts and Supervenient Causation: The Incompatibility of Two Humean Doctrines', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1998): 265-88.
117. Peter Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology (Clarendon Press, 1987).
118. Michael Burke, 'Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle', Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 129-139
119. 'Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1994): 591-624.
120. Timothy Williamson 'Existence and Contingency', Aristotelian Society, sup. vol. 73 (1999): 181-203
121. 'Bare possibilia', Erkenntnis 48, 2&3 (1998): 257-273.
122. David Lewis 'Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies', Philosophical Papers Volume I (Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 47-54.
123. C. Truesdell's A First Course in Rational Continuum Mechanics (Academic Press, 1977)
124. Six Lectures on Modern Natural Philosophy (Springer, 1966).
125. For more on the weakness of the so-called 'argument from temporary intrinsics', see Sider's Four Dimensionalism pp. 92-98.
126. 'Essence and Modality', Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994), pp. 1-16
127. 'On the Non-Identity of Material Thing and Its Matter', Mind, 40 (March 2003), pp. 195-234.
128. Cf Lewis, 'Extrinsic Properties', in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp. 111-115.
129. Peter Van Inwagen, Material Beings (Cornell University Press, 1990).
130. 'Many, But Almost One,' in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 172.
131. 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic,' Synthese, 30 (1975), 265-300.
132. 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' and Williamson's 'On The Structure of Higher-Order Vagueness', Mind 108 (January 1999), 127-143.
133. Vagueness, pp. 199-201.
134. Kamp, 'The Paradox of the Heap', in Monnich (ed.) Aspects of Philosophical Logic (Reidel, 1981), pp. 225-277
135. Soames, Understanding Truth (Oxford University Press, 1999)
136. Robert Boyle, 'About the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical Hypothesis (1674), reprinted in Thomas Birch (ed.), The Works of the Honorable Robert Boyle, Volume IV (1772).
137. von Weizsacker, The World View of Physics (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1952).
138. Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Harvard University Press, 1955).
139. introduction to Philosophical Papers Volume II, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)
140. 'Humean Supervenience Debugged', Mind 103 (1994), 473-90
141. On The Plurality of Worlds, (Blackwell, 1986), pp. 14-16 and pp. 87-92.
142. Relevant here is Tyler Burge's 'Individuation and Self-Knowledge', The Journal of Philosophy (November 1988), 649-663
143. Donald Davidson's 'First Person Authority', Dialectica 2-3 (1984), 441-458.