From Normativity to Responsibility

From Normativity to Responsibility

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-296

  Raz, Joseph ^a  

^a Columbia University Law School ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Epistemic reasons; Intentional action; Intentions; Normativity; Practical reasons; Rationality; Reason; Reasoning; Reasons; Responsibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922211349     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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