Ifs and oughts

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 107, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 115-143

  Kolodny, Niko ^a   Macfarlane, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957354357     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2010107310     Document Type: Review

References (36)

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4. W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1939), pp. 146-67;
5. A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: MacMillan, 1947), p. 128;
6. H. A. Prichard, "Duty and Ignorance of Fact," in Ross, ed., Moral Obligation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1949), pp. 18-39;
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10. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, and Blame (Cambridge: Harvard, 2008);
11. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford, 1984), p. 25,
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14. Ethics (Oxford: UP, 1912), pp. 100-01.
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21. "Conditionals," unpublished typescript;
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26. Seth Yalcin, "Epistemic Modals," Mind, CXVI (2007): 983-1026,
27. David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Harvard, 1973).
28. John Cantwell, "Changing the Modal Context," Theoria, LXXIV (2008): 331-51.
29. David Kaplan's "Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals," in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan (New York: Oxford, 1989), pp. 481-566.
30. R. M. Hare, "Meaning and Speech Acts," Philosophical Review, LXXIX (1970): 3-24, at p. 16;
31. Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism (New York: Oxford, 2006), p. 107.
32. Nolan, "Defending a Possible-Worlds Account of Indicative Conditionals," Philosophical Studies, CXVI (2003): 215-69, at p. 231;
33. Robert Stalnaker, in "Indicative Conditionals," Philosophia, V (1975): 269-86,
34. Bernard D. Katz, in "On a Supposed Counterexample to Modus Ponens," this JOURNAL, XCVI (1999): 404-15, at p. 414,
35. MacFarlane, "The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions," Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (New York: Oxford, 2005), pp. 197-233,
36. "Relativism and Disagreement," Philosophical Studies, CXXXII (2007): 17-31.