Epistemic akrasia

Monist

Volumn 85, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 381-397

  Owens, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846796930     PISSN: 00269662     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/monist200285316     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Davidson, D. (1980) "How Is Weakness of Will Possible?," in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
2. Dretske, F. (1971) "Reasons, Knowledge and Probability," Philosophy of Science 38: 216-20
3. Greenspan, P. (1988) Emotions and Reasons (New York: Routledge)
4. Harman, G. (1980) "Reasoning and Evidence One Does Not Possess," in French, P., Uehling, T., Wettstein, H. (eds.) (1980) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume V (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press)
5. Holton, R. (1999) "Intention and Weakness of Will," Journal of Philosophy 96: 241-62
6. Hurley, S. (1993) Natural Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
7. Moran, R. (1997) "Self-Knowledge; Discovery, Resolution and Undoing," European Journal of Philosophy, 5: 141-61
8. - (2001) Authority and Estrangement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)
9. Owens, D. (2000) Reason Without Freedom (London: Routledge)
10. Pettit, P. and Smith, M. (1996) "Freedom in Belief and Desire," Journal of Philosophy 93: 433-36
11. Scanlon, T. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)
12. Velleman, D. (2000) "On the Aim of Belief" in The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
13. Williams, B. (1973) "Ethical Consistency," in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)