The myth of practical consistency

European Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 366-402

  Kolodny, Niko ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61149165825     PISSN: 09668373     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00325.x     Document Type: Article

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