Contracts for afforestation and the role of monitoring for landowners' willingness to accept

Forest Policy and Economics

Volumn 51, Issue , 2015, Pages 29-37

  Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth ^a   Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl ^a   Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Agri environmental schemes; Choice experiment; Forest; Moral hazard; Payment for environmental services (PES); Social preferences

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; REFORESTATION; RISK MANAGEMENT;

AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL SCHEMES; CHOICE EXPERIMENTS; FOREST; MORAL HAZARD; PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES; SOCIAL PREFERENCE;

MONITORING;

EID: 84920749694     PISSN: 13899341     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2014.11.007     Document Type: Article

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