Combating moral hazard in agri-environmental schemes: A multiple-agent approach

European Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 75-91

  Hart, Rob ^a,b   Latacz Lohmann, Uwe ^b  

^a SWEDISH UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES   (Sweden)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KIEL   (Germany)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Agri environmental policy; Moral hazard; Principal agent model

Indexed keywords

EID: 24144471260     PISSN: 01651587     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/erae/jbi002     Document Type: Article

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